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INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BILL OF RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The International Migrants Bill of Rights (hereinafter IMBR) is the result
of a two-year collaboration between students at the American University in
Cairo, Georgetown University Law Center, and Hebrew University in Jerusa-
lem. The IMBR is a dynamic blueprint for the protection of the rights of
migrants, drawing from all areas of international law, including treaty law,
customary international law, areas of State practice and best practices. The
IMBR posits a group of rights that are “universal, interdependent and
interrelated,”1 and that populate the continuum from hard to hortatory. Yet
even as the result projects a framework for migrants’ rights that is as yet on
the horizon, it is also a vision that does and will intersect with the sovereign
prerogatives and needs of States.
The IMBR responds to gaps in existing law. There is no single legal
framework that unequivocally—and effectively—protects the rights of all
migrants.2 Nor is there a single mechanism to coordinate global migration
policy.3 And while protection of the rights of migrants is among the oldest
areas of international law,4 increasingly the discourse of rights triggers
1. The IMBR thus adopts the formulation of the Vienna Declaration. See World Conference on
Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
2. See Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an Interconnected World:
New Directions for Action 58, ¶ 24 (2005) (“There is an urgent need to fill the gap that currently exists
between the principles found in the legal and normative framework affecting international migrants
and the way in which legislation, policies and practices are interpreted and implemented at the
national level”). For a discussion of the low ratification of the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, see Antoine Pecoud
& Paul Guchteneire, Migration, Human Rights and the United Nations: An Investigation into the Low
Ratification Record of the UN Migrant Workers Convention, GLOBAL MIGRATION PERSP. (Global
Commission on Int’l Migration), Oct. 2004, at 9 et seq.
3. See, e.g., Anne-Grethe Nielsen, Cooperation Mechanisms, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW:
DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES 405 (Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007).
4. See generally Richard B. Lillich, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1984) (discussing the historical origins of the doctrines of State responsibility and
diplomatic protection).
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concerns about the subversion of sovereignty.5 In the vacuum perpetrated by
this status quo, migrants remain exposed to widespread human rights abuses
and with nothing to invoke in their defense.6 The IMBR takes up this
challenge and presents, in a single document, the rights of all categories of
migrants. The accompanying commentaries trace the development, content
and consequences of each right.
As a dynamic blueprint, the IMBR and commentaries will serve as a tool
for migrants and civil society as well as a resource for legislators, policymak-
ers and courts as they seek to respect, protect and promote the rights of
migrants. In blending aspiration and binding law, the IMBR is envisioned as
a set of soft-law norms. However, the IMBR has been carefully drafted to
include both exhortations and obligations such that it can be incorporated
into law.7 Following publication, the drafters envision a program of advocacy
directed at States, intergovernmental bodies and civil society. This effort will
be facilitated by the Georgetown University Law Center, Hebrew University
and the Migration Studies Unit at the London School of Economics. In
contributing to both a conversation and a movement, the drafters hope that
the IMBR will help secure a global legal architecture for all migrants, on the
basis of their humanity and dignity.
5. Some commentators suggest that this is a false dichotomy, noting that in large part the
historical development of the rights of migrants is a result of State practice, and has thus developed
“from the ground up.” T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms and Migration: A Report,
in MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 1 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds.,
2003).
6. See, e.g., Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, The Rights of Non-Citizens 5,
HR/PUB/06/11 (2006).
7. In this regard, the IMBR draws from other areas of migration and international law. Similar to
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Cartagena Declaration, the IMBR is drafted
to facilitate its incorporation, in whole or in part, into regional and national legal frameworks. UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/
Add.2 (July 22, 1998); Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, Annual Report of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/IL.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at
190–93 (1984–85). The drafters are also inspired by the success of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines. See Jody Williams, The International Campaign to Ban Landmines—A Model for
Disarmament Initiatives?, available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/
article.html.
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BILL OF RIGHTS
DRAFT IN PROGRESS
PREAMBLE
RECALLING the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other widely accepted interna-
tional and regional human rights instruments that recognize and protect the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals;
EMPHASIZING the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the
United Nations Charter and the human rights instruments to which they are
party, to respect, protect, and promote the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of migrants under these various international and regional human
rights instruments on an equal basis and without discrimination;
UNDERSCORING that all persons, including migrants, are entitled to due
process, equal treatment, freedom from discrimination, and the protection of
their human rights and fundamental freedoms, while acknowledging that
differential treatment may at times be justified based on an individual’s
citizenship or immigration status;
AFFIRMING that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear
and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone,
including migrants, may enjoy economic, social, cultural, civil, and political
rights;
RECOGNIZING the legitimate interest of States in controlling their
borders and further recognizing that the exercise of sovereignty entails
responsibilities;
ACKNOWLEDGING the legitimate concerns of receiving and sending
States regarding migrants, as well as the need to adopt appropriate and
comprehensive migration policies;
RECOGNIZING that a balance should be struck between the interest of
States in preserving the cultural heritage of their people and the interest of
migrants in preserving their cultural identity, and acknowledging the impor-
tance of cultural pluralism and diversity;
RECOGNIZING that migrants have special needs that may require special
accommodations in certain regards;
CONSIDERING that the ability to participate in and influence one’s
community is a significant part of human dignity and that States should
accordingly provide avenues for civic participation for all people living
within their borders; and
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TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the importance of eliminating all forms of
slavery, servitude, and forced labor:
ARTICLE 1
DEFINITION OF MIGRANT
(1) The term “migrant” in this Declaration means a person who has left a
State of which he or she is a citizen, national, or habitual resident.
(2) Nothing in this Declaration should be interpreted as limiting or
derogating from any rights recognized by or guaranteed under other appli-
cable international instruments, or national legislation, nor shall it be invoked
to invalidate claims to citizenship. Where rights are also recognized or
guaranteed by other instruments, the migrant shall be guaranteed the relevant
rights at the most favorable standard.
ARTICLE 2
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
(1) All persons, including migrants, are equal before the law. Migrants are
entitled to the equal protection of the law on the same basis as nationals of the
State in which they reside. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any dis-
crimination and guarantee to migrants equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other
status.
(2) Distinctions in the treatment of migrants are permissible, including in
the regulation of admission and exclusion, only where the distinction is made
pursuant to a legitimate aim, the distinction has an objective justification, and
reasonable proportionality exists between the means employed and the aims
sought to be realized.
ARTICLE 3
NON-REFOULEMENT
(1) No migrant shall be returned to a country where there are substantial
grounds for believing he or she would be in danger of being subjected to a
serious deprivation of human rights that would threaten the migrant’s life or
freedom.
ARTICLE 4
DUE PROCESS
(1) Every migrant has the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law and the right to due process of law before the courts, tribunals,
and all other organs and authorities administering justice, as well as those
specifically charged with making status determinations regarding migrants.
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(2) In criminal and administrative proceedings, and in civil proceedings
where the migrant is a defendant, a migrant shall be entitled to interpretation
into a language the migrant can understand. The migrant shall be informed of
the availability of an interpreter upon receiving the civil complaint, adminis-
trative summons, or upon arrest.
(3) A migrant shall be provided legal aid and representation in criminal
proceedings and, as far as feasible, in administrative and civil proceedings.
The migrant shall be informed of the availability of such aid and representa-
tion upon receiving the civil complaint, administrative summons, or upon
arrest.
(4) Migrants shall be accorded an effective remedy for acts violating the
rights guaranteed to the migrant by the relevant domestic law as well as
international law, including those rights or freedoms herein recognized.
ARTICLE 5
REMOVAL
(1) A migrant may be removed from the territory of a State, or refused
entry at the borders of a State, only when justified by the specific facts
relevant to the individual concerned and only pursuant to a decision reached
in accordance with law. The individual concerned shall be allowed adequate
opportunity to submit reasons why he or she should not be removed or
refused entry, except where compelling reasons of national security other-
wise require.
(2) Collective removal of migrants is prohibited.
(3) When seeking to remove a migrant whether or not lawfully within its
territory, a State shall:
a. state the grounds upon which removal is sought;
b. show the migrant all evidence that the State will present in
support of removal and grant the migrant a reasonable time to
rebut such evidence, except where compelling reasons of na-
tional security otherwise require;
c. inform the migrant of the right to obtain legal representation;
d. permit the migrant to communicate with official representatives,
including consular and diplomatic officials, of the migrant’s
home State;
e. provide and inform the migrant of a process for appealing a
removal order;
f. establish a process for seeking a suspension of removal.
(4) Neither deportation nor voluntary departure shall deprive or cancel
any legal claims possessed by a migrant before such removal or departure.
(5) No migrant shall be deported or refused entry at the border of a State
for activities, beliefs, or conduct protected under this Declaration.
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(6) States shall establish opportunities for relief from removal for mi-
grants who have a substantial connection to the host country or for whom
removal would impose serious harm, either due to family relationships or
conditions in the State to which he or she would be removed.
(7) States shall ensure safe repatriation of vulnerable migrants, including
victims of trafficking in persons, migrants with disabilities, and children.
ARTICLE 6
DETENTION
(1) States shall not detain a migrant, irrespective of the migrant’s legal
status, unless he or she is the subject of removal proceedings, there is a
reasonable prospect of removal, and detention is reasonably necessary to
prevent absconding, or otherwise, on the basis of equality of treatment with
nationals. Detention in connection with removal proceedings shall be for as
short a period as possible.
(2) Detention of migrants shall occur only in accordance with law and with the
right of the migrant to appeal conditions, legality, and length of detention.
(3) States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that detention of
migrants in connection with removal proceedings takes place in specialized
detention facilities, and in segregation from ordinary prisoners. Particular
attention should be paid to the situation of vulnerable persons, including
through provision of emergency medical care.
(4) States will undertake to ensure that detained family members remain
together during detention in connection with removal. States shall facilitate
communication and in-person meetings among detained and other family
members if separation is necessary.
ARTICLE 7
ASYLUM SEEKERS
(1) Migrants have a right to seek and enjoy asylum. States shall estab-
lish effective procedures for determining any migrant’s request for asylum
within their territory, at their borders, or in their effective control. Migrants
shall have a right to claim asylum at any time, including in removal
proceedings.
(2) A trained official of the State shall determine whether the migrant
(i) qualifies as a refugee under the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (as appropriate), (ii) is entitled to protection
under the Convention against Torture, or (iii) is eligible for any other form of
relief from return established by international and domestic law. In such
proceedings, migrants shall be entitled to interpretation and may be repre-
sented.
(3) A migrant denied asylum has the right to appeal the determination to
an independent review body.
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ARTICLE 8
VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING
(1) States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent trafficking in
persons; to criminalize trafficking; to investigate and ensure effective penal-
ties for violations of anti-trafficking laws; and to inform victims of trafficking
in persons of the means of seeking assistance and legal support.
(2) States should create avenues for temporary and permanent relief from
removal for victims of trafficking in persons.
(3) States should provide assistance to ensure the physical, psychological,
and social recovery of victims of trafficking in persons.
ARTICLE 9
CHILDREN
(1) States shall ensure that rights of children are enjoyed by migrant
children on the basis of equality with citizens.
(2) The best interests of a child migrant shall be a primary consideration
in all actions affecting the child migrant. The views of child migrants must be
given due weight in accordance with their maturity and age.
(3) Detention of child migrants shall be a measure of last resort, and child
migrants shall be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and particular
vulnerabilities.
(4) States shall establish equitable and effective procedures for identify-
ing and protecting unaccompanied minor migrants. States should create a
process for ensuring that all unaccompanied minors have a caregiver or
guardian. States should create avenues for temporary and permanent relief
from removal for unaccompanied minor migrants.
ARTICLE 10
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(1) States shall respect, protect, and promote all civil and political rights
of migrants, including, but not limited to, the following:
a. The rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of
migrants. These rights shall include freedom to have or to adopt
a religion or belief of his or her choice and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice, and teaching;
b. The right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of national boundaries, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of their
choice;
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c. The rights of peaceful assembly and of association;
d. The right to the security of person and protection by the State
against violence, bodily harm, or expression inciting violence,
whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual,
group, or institution;
e. The right to liberty of movement within the territory of the
host State and free choice of residence, unless the host State
initiates a formal removal proceeding in accordance with
Article 5;
f. Migrants have a right to identity documents. It shall be unlawful
for anyone, other than a duly authorized public official, to
confiscate, destroy, or damage identity documents, work per-
mits, or documents authorizing entry, stay, residence, or establish-
ment in the national territory.
(2) Migrants have the right to protection against national, racial, re-
ligious, or xenophobic hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimina-
tion, hostility, or violence against migrants. States shall take all appro-
priate measures to discourage the advocacy of such hatred and to modify
social and cultural patterns of individual conduct in order to eliminate such
hatred.
(3) States should facilitate migrants’ participation in the civil and political
life of their communities and in the conduct of public affairs.
ARTICLE 11
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
(1) Migrants shall be entitled to emergency medical care and to disaster
relief.
(2) Mothers shall, on the basis of equality of treatment with nationals, be
accorded special protection during a reasonable period before and after
childbirth.
(3) Migrants shall be provided access to medical care, social security, and
an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing, and housing.
(4) Migrants shall not, based solely on their status as migrants, be denied
the benefits of any social welfare or insurance program to which they have
contributed.
ARTICLE 12
CULTURAL RIGHTS
(1) Migrants have the right to enjoy their own cultures and to use their
own languages, either individually or in community with others, and in
public or private.
(2) Migrants’ rights to manifest their religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice, and teaching shall not be indirectly restricted through
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regulation that places disproportionate administrative or disproportionate
financial burdens on such activities.
(3) To ensure the religious, cultural, linguistic, and moral education of
their children in conformity with their own convictions, the liberty of migrant
parents to choose for their children schools other than those established by
the public authorities shall be respected. Such schools shall conform to such
non-arbitrary minimum educational standards as may be established by the State.
(4) States shall not impede, but should encourage and support, migrants’
efforts to preserve their cultures by means of educational and cultural
activities, including the preservation of minority languages and knowledge
related to a migrant’s culture. Nothing in this provision shall mean that States
may not adopt measures to promote acquisition and knowledge of the
majority, national or official language or languages of the State.
(5) States should take appropriate steps to promote public awareness and
acceptance of the cultures of migrants by means of educational and cultural
activities, including minority languages and knowledge related to the mi-
grant’s own culture.
ARTICLE 13
LABOR RIGHTS
(1) A migrant shall never be subject to servitude, slavery, or forced labor.
A migrant’s right to work and to free choice of employment shall only be
restricted pursuant to a legitimate aim, when the restriction has an objective
justification, and when reasonable proportionality exists between the means
employed and the aims sought to be realized.
(2) A migrant has the right to be remunerated at a just and favorable level
for his or her work. Migrants must be informed of working conditions, labor
laws, and means of seeking assistance and legal support in the receiving State
in a language they understand.
(3) States may not arbitrarily change or terminate a work permit.
(4) A migrant shall be protected by laws respecting, inter alia, minimum
wages, minimum working age, maximum hours, safety and health standards,
protection against dismissal, and the rights to join trade unions, to organize,
or to take part in collective bargaining.
(5) States must take all appropriate measures to protect migrants from
being compelled or induced to accept conditions of work below standards
mandated by national law. States must prohibit employers or employees from
privately contracting for worse conditions of work than those mandated by
national law.
(6) States shall seek to identify, eliminate, and provide remedies for
abusive labor conditions, with special attention to labor agreements that bind
migrants to particular employers. States should establish effective penalties
for violations of these rights and take appropriate measures to ensure that
these rights are ensured.
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(7) Migrants have the right to claim these rights and receive remedies
regardless of their legal status.
ARTICLE 14
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Migrants have the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others. No migrant shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her property.
Any lawful taking shall be accompanied by just compensation at a level
equal to nationals and that is prompt, adequate, and effective.
ARTICLE 15
INTEGRATION
(1) Because prolonged irregular status often leads to abuse of mi-
grants, States should take appropriate measures to ensure that such situations
do not persist. When providing opportunities for regularization, States may
require that the migrant must show a substantial connection to the host
country.
(2) States shall take appropriate steps to support migrants in learning the
majority, national, or official language(s) of the State.
ARTICLE 16
CITIZENSHIP
(1) States shall provide for, and encourage, the naturalization of migrants,
subject to limitations and conditions that are non-arbitrary and accord with
due process of law. Factors that strengthen a claim to naturalization include:
duration of residence; economic, social, and family ties; community and
linguistic integration; legal status; the best interest of the child; and humani-
tarian grounds.
(2) Migrants who have not yet gained citizenship in their host country
shall maintain the citizenship of their country of origin and should as far as possible
enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizens of their country of origin.
(3) States shall recognize the right of expatriation and renunciation of
citizenship, subject only to conditions and limits based on compelling con-
siderations of public order or national security.
(4) States shall allow children having multiple nationalities acquired
automatically at birth to retain those nationalities.
(5) States shall allow nationals to possess another nationality acquired
automatically by marriage, and shall not remove the nationality of a citizen
who marries a non-citizen unless the citizen takes affirmative steps to
renounce his or her citizenship.
(6) States should not consider a migrant’s acquisition of foreign national-
ity to be an automatic or implied basis of renunciation of the nationality of
the State of origin.
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ARTICLE 17
EDUCATION
On the basis of equality of treatment with nationals, children of migrants
have the right to education. States should make primary education free and
compulsory for children of migrants. States should encourage the develop-
ment of secondary education and make it accessible to migrants and their
children without discrimination.
ARTICLE 18
FAMILY RIGHTS
(1) Migrant families are entitled to protection by society and the State,
irrespective of the citizenship status of any member of the family.
(2) For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “members of the family”
refers to persons married to migrants or having with them a relationship that,
according to applicable law, produces effects equivalent to marriage, as well
as their dependent children and other dependent persons who are recognized
as or are the substantial equivalent to members of the family according to
applicable legislation or applicable agreements between the States con-
cerned.
(3) States shall take all appropriate measures to facilitate the reunification
of migrant family members with nationals or citizens. Children with no
effective nationality have the right to return to their parents’ country of origin
and to stay indefinitely with their parents regardless of the children’s
citizenship.
(4) Dependent family members of migrants have a right to derivative
immigration status and timely admission to the country in which a migrant is
lawfully settled.
(5) States should consider extending derivative immigration status to
non-dependent family members of lawfully settled migrants.
ARTICLE 19
ADDITIONAL CLAUSES
(1) Nothing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as implying for any
State, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any
act that limits, intrudes on, or interferes with the internationally recognized
rights of others.
(2) Governmental, administrative, and other bodies charged with enforce-
ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms should invoke this Declara-
tion as appropriate in the recognition and development of principles, stan-
dards, and remedies.
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACHPR  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
ACHR  American Convention on Human Rights
CAT  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
CEDAW  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women
CERD  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
CRC  Convention on the Rights of the Child
EU  European Union
ECHR  European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECOSOC  United Nations Economic and Social Council
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights
ICMW  International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families
ILO  International Labor Organization
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IMBR  International Migrants Bill of Rights
OAS  Organization of American States
OAU  Organization of African Unity
OHCHR  Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights
Palermo Protocol  Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the UN Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR  Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BILL OF RIGHTS:
A COMMENTARY*
DRAFT IN PROGRESS
PREAMBLE
RECALLING the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other widely accepted interna-
tional and regional human rights instruments that recognize and protect the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals;
EMPHASIZING the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the
United Nations Charter and the human rights instruments to which they are
party, to respect, protect, and promote the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of migrants under these various international and regional human
rights instruments on an equal basis and without discrimination;
UNDERSCORING that all persons, including migrants, are entitled to due
process, equal treatment, freedom from discrimination, and the protection of their
human rights and fundamental freedoms, while acknowledging that differential
treatment may at times be justified based on an individual’s citizenship or
immigration status;
AFFIRMING that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone, including migrants,
may enjoy economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights;
RECOGNIZING the legitimate interest of States in controlling their borders and
further recognizing that the exercise of sovereignty entails responsibilities;
ACKNOWLEDGING the legitimate concerns of receiving and sending
States regarding migrants, as well as the need to adopt appropriate and
comprehensive migration policies;
RECOGNIZING that a balance should be struck between the interest of
States in preserving the cultural heritage of their people and the interest of
migrants in preserving their cultural identity, and acknowledging the impor-
tance of cultural pluralism and diversity;
RECOGNIZING that migrants have special needs that may require special
accommodations in certain regards;
CONSIDERING that the ability to participate in and influence one’s
community is a significant part of human dignity and that States should
accordingly provide avenues for civic participation for all people living
* An addendum is located at page 493 of this issue.
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within their borders; and
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the importance of eliminating all forms of
slavery, servitude, and forced labor:
Commentary:
(1) History and Purpose—Recalling: This first paragraph is intended to
solidify the linkage and connection of this Bill of Rights with former
agreements and instruments that safeguard human rights and fundamental
freedoms and to put the Bill in the appropriate legal context. These docu-
ments serve as the foundations of the human rights regime and are all derived
from the notion that human dignity is shared equally by all.
(2) History and Purpose—Emphasizing: The main purpose of the second
paragraph is to emphasize the need to respect, protect, and promote the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings, including those
of migrants. It also affirms the connection between the human rights regime
and United Nations Charter, as well as the fundamental requirement of
nondiscrimination, the cornerstone of the human rights regime.
(3) History and Purpose—Underscoring: Paragraph three is derived from
the ICCPR,1 entrusting States with the duty to respect and ensure the equality
of the rights of all individuals, including migrants. This paragraph also
recognizes that the content of certain rights may vary as a function of the
sovereignty of States.
(4) History and Purpose—Affirming: Paragraph four reaffirms the under-
standing that human rights protections are only achieved as a community and
that one cannot be free while others are denied fundamental freedoms. It also
affirms that ideal freedom consists not only of physical freedom, but also the
freedom to express and achieve social, cultural, economic, civil and political
freedoms.
(5) History and Purpose—Recognizing: There is an inherent tension
between the State’s prerogative to control its borders and the international
regime governing migrants’ rights. This paragraph gestures towards a bal-
ance between the two that respects, protects and promotes sovereignty and
migrants’ rights.
(6) History and Purpose—Acknowledging: This paragraph acknowledges
the importance and extent of global migration. Almost three percent of the
global population are migrants.2 This paragraph also stresses the importance
of balancing the interests of receiving and sending states through comprehen-
sive migration policies grounded in respect for human rights.
(7) History and Purpose—Recognizing: Paragraph seven acknowledges
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
2. GLOBALIZING MIGRATION REGIMES: NEW CHALLENGES TO TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION 4.
(Kristof Tamas & Joakim Palme eds., Ashgate Publishing 2006).
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the balance between preserving the culture and heritage of host States and the
cultural rights of migrants.
(8) History and Purpose—Recognizing: Paragraph eight underscores that
migrants, generally, have different characteristics that require the State to
make special accommodations.
(9) History and Purpose—Considering: This paragraph refers to the civic
rights of migrants. This is a general provision, which acknowledges that
comprehensive protection of migrants’ human rights depends in part on the
connection between the individual and the State. The paragraph also high-
lights that participation in one’s community is an element of the realization of
human dignity.
(10) History and Purpose—Taking Into Account: This paragraph is
based on the Convention against Slavery3 and is intended to highlight that
migrants are often subject to slavery or forced labor due to their inherent
vulnerability.4
ARTICLE 1
DEFINITION OF MIGRANT
(1) The term “migrant” in this Declaration means a person who has left a
State of which he or she is a citizen, national, or habitual resident.
(2) Nothing in this Declaration should be interpreted as limiting or
derogating from any rights recognized by or guaranteed under other appli-
cable international instruments, or national legislation, nor shall it be invoked
to invalidate claims to citizenship. Where rights are also recognized or
guaranteed by other instruments, the migrant shall be guaranteed the relevant
rights at the most favorable standard.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 1: This Article provides a purposefully broad and
inclusive definition of “migrant.” Paragraph 1 establishes that “migrant”
refers to individuals who have left the territory of the State of which they are
a citizen, national, or habitual resident. Moreover, this definition captures
stateless persons who have left a country to which they are indigenous or
habitual residents. Thus individuals are migrants regardless of whether their
presence is temporary, lawful, for protection, or for economic reasons, etc.
(2) This definition does not include individuals who are present in the
territory of a State where they hold secondary citizenship or nationality. It
also does not apply to individuals who migrate—forcibly or voluntarily—
within the borders of a State in which they are citizens, nationals or habitual
3. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S.
253.
4. See HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved Worker’s Hotline v. Gov’t of Israel [2006] 1 Isr. L. Rep. 260.
2010] IMBR: A COMMENTARY 413
residents.5 This broad definition applies to all Articles within the IMBR,
except when particular enumerated rights are qualified to apply to one or
more specific categories of migrants.
(3) Paragraph 2 clarifies the continued applicability of existing interna-
tional, regional and national instruments to persons who fall within the
purview of the IMBR. Paragraph 2 seeks to ensure that complementary rights
found in other instruments are not undermined by potential interpretations of
IMBR Articles. In addition, Paragraph 2 explicitly seeks to ensure that the
IMBR cannot be invoked to invalidate claims to citizenship on any grounds,
such as claims by stateless persons or members of indigenous groups to
longstanding habitual residence—and thus effective nationality—in a terri-
tory in which they are not nationals or citizens. Hence, when other or
multiple international or municipal legal instruments recognize or guarantee
the same rights found in the IMBR, the “most favorable standard” arising
from these instruments shall be accorded to migrants.
(4) Problems Addressed: Under current international law, there is no
definitive, legal definition of who is considered a migrant for the purposes of
human rights protection. Current international legal instruments related to the
rights of migrants remain largely unconnected, while specific protections are
limited to subcategories of migrants, such as refugees and asylum seekers or
migrant workers.6 The term “migrant” advances the notion that all types of
migrants are entitled to a unified set of basic protections regardless of their
individual circumstances. The current categorizations do not articulate the
protections that should apply to persons who have left their countries of
origin or habitual residence. The IMBR bridges this gap in international
human rights law.
(5) Origins of Paragraph 1: The broad definition of migrant in Article 1
seeks to encompass definitions from a number of complementary interna-
tional and regional instruments. These include the International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families (ICMW);7 the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons (1954 Statelessness Convention);8 the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention);9 the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter);10 the Organization of
5. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (defines and enumerates protections for
internally displaced persons).
6. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families arts. 2, 3, 6, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter ICMW]; Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1A, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
7. ICMW, supra note 6, arts. 2, 3, 6.
8. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S 117.
9. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 6.
10. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 18, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1.
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American States’ (OAS) Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (OAS Declara-
tion);11 the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 1969 Convention Govern-
ing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 OAU Conven-
tion);12 and additional international instruments relating to non-citizens.13
(6) History and Purpose—Persons with Special Protection under Interna-
tional Law: In line with the wide definition of “migrants,” persons who are
entitled to special protection under international law will receive the “most
favorable standard” as mentioned in Article 1(2) of the IMBR. Nevertheless,
if for any reason, de jure or de facto, the special protection ceases, these
persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of the IMBR if they remain
present within the territory of a State of which they are not citizens or
nationals.
(7) History and Purpose—Persons with Special Status under Interna-
tional Law: Forced Migrants: The term “migrant” in Paragraph 1 includes
forced migrants for whom international or municipal law accords special
status, including refugees, asylum seekers and the temporarily displaced, as
ascribed both in international and regional treaties, agreements and conven-
tions.14 Migrants, therefore, include refugees and asylum seekers15 who
qualify for refugee status under the criteria set forth in the 1951 Refugee
Convention,16 regional instruments and agreements, and municipal legisla-
tion, as well as under any extended mandate17 of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Additionally, migrants include refu-
11. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees
in Central America, Mexico and Panama para. 5, Nov. 22, 1984, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at 190–93 (1984–85),
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cartagena1984.html.
12. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa art. 1, Sept. 10,
1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
13. See, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [OHCHR], THE
RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS, U.N. Doc. HR/Pub/06/11, U.N. Sales No. E.07.XIV.2 (2006); Declaration
on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live, G.A.
Res. 40/144, annex, Supp. (No. 53) at 252, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Dec. 13, 1985).
14. See sources cited supra notes 6–13.
15. See infra Commentary to Art. 7.
16. Pursuant to Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, refugees include
persons who are “at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance,” as well as refugees
“ipso facto . . . entitled to the benefits” of the 1951 Refugee Convention because the “protection or
assistance” they receive “from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees has ceased for any reason,” without their position “being definitely
settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.” See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, REVISED UNHCR NOTE ON
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES TO PALESTINIAN
REFUGEES (2009) (clarifying a long-standing inconsistency on the part of UNHCR with regard to the
second clause of Article 1D).
17. UNHCR’s current extended mandate applies to individuals “outside their country of origin
or habitual residence and unable or unwilling to return there owing to serious and indiscriminate
threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously
disturbing public order,” including for example “foreign domination, intervention, occupation or
colonialism.” UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINA-
TION: IDENTIFYING WHO IS A REFUGEE 34 (2005).
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gees or asylum seekers granted refuge under temporary international, re-
gional or municipal protection schemes, or whose claims remain under
review.
(8) The designation of “migrant” also applies to forced migrants who do
not qualify for special status under international law, but nevertheless are
forcibly18 displaced to, or are compelled to, find refuge in the territory of
another country.19 The term “migrant” equally refers to stateless persons who
have left a State in which they are habitual residents or indigenous.20 Due
attention should be given to the special relevance of the IMBR for the
protection of migrants who do not enjoy the privilege of having the support
of their country of origin, regardless of whether it ceased to exist or refuses to
offer support.
(9) History and Purpose—Lawfully Settled Migrants: The term migrant
also encompasses persons who qualify for a durable legal status that entitles
them to long-term residence, in compliance with host State immigration
laws, as well as individuals who are de facto permitted to settle in spite of a
specific residency status to the contrary.21 Paragraph 1 also applies to spouses
who migrate for marriage. Migration for marriage primarily, but not exclu-
sively, affects women. This phenomenon is noted in particular, because such
migration arrangements have the potential to make persons “vulnerable,
since their legal status is linked to that of” another person.22
(10) History and Purpose—Lawful Temporary Migrants: Paragraph 1
does not distinguish between migrants based on length of stay. Therefore, the
definition of migrant includes persons intending to lawfully remain in the
territory of another state temporarily, because such persons are equally
18. The term ‘forced’ “is not to be limited to physical force but includes the threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment.” Prosecutor v Stakic´, Case No IT-00-39-T, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, 729 (Sept. 27,
2006).
19. Such migrants include forcibly displaced individuals who have sought refuge because of
violations of human, “economic, social and/or cultural rights, where victims perceive that survival in
minimally acceptable conditions is at risk or impossible,” or whose claims have not yet been filed,
have been rejected or are considered inadequate, yet are still present in a country in which they are
neither citizens, nationals nor habitual residents. P.A. Taran, Human Rights of Migrants: Challenges
of the New Decade, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS 29 (International Organization of Migration
2001).
20. Article 1 incorporates the 1954 Statelessness Convention definition, which holds that a
“‘stateless person’ means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law.” Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 8, art. 1. It
should be noted that stateless individuals who do not fall under the IMBR are nonetheless entitled to
the full spectrum of human rights enshrined in the UDHR and outlined in international and national
instruments, including the 1954 Statelessness Convention and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness.
21. Such persons include, for example, lawful permanent residents, recognized and intending
immigrants, lawful long-term non-immigrant residents, and other individuals with recognized
permanent status.
22. Nicola Piper & Margaret Satterthwaite, Migrant Women 240, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES, 49–51 (Ryszard Cholewinski, et al. eds.,
T.M.C. Asser Press 2008).
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entitled to the rights enumerated in the IMBR, including equal protection,
due process and protection against discrimination. Such persons include, for
example, tourists; people conducting business for a temporary period of time,
including investors;23 students and trainees;24 and artists present within the
territory of a State of which they are not a citizen or national. Nevertheless,
length and original purpose of stay may serve as a relevant criterion for
distinction in various contexts, as mentioned, for instance, in Article 2(2), or
Article 16 infra. The IMBR also applies to irregular migrants that were, for a
certain period, under regular status that excludes protection by other interna-
tional instruments (such as students or tourists).
(11) History and Purpose—Migrant Workers: Paragraph 1 applies fully to
“migrant workers” and incorporates the definition of migrant worker in the
ICMW.25 The IMBR adopts a broad definition of migrant to ensure a uniform
standard of treatment.
(12) History and Purpose—Irregular Migrants: Paragraph 1 encompasses
migrants who are not lawfully present in a State of which they are nationals
or citizens. Such persons include undocumented migrants; individuals with
expired status; individuals “who enter without following required immigra-
tion procedures;”26 individuals “who enter as non-immigrants and then
remain beyond the limits of their permission to remain,”27 or persons who
otherwise lack the requisite documentation to remain. The term migrant also
refers to irregular migrants who may be smuggled,28 trafficked,29 or other-
23. But cf. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 3(c) (excluding “persons taking up residence in a State
different from their State of origin as investors” from the benefits of the Convention).
24. But cf. id. The IMBR recognizes “students and trainees” as migrants, unlike ICMW art. 3(e),
which excludes these two categories of migrants.
25. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 2. (“The term ‘migrant worker’ refers to a person who is to be
engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not
a national.”) Under the Convention, the migrant worker category explicitly includes frontier workers;
seasonal workers; seafarers; workers on offshore installations “under the jurisdiction of a State of
which [they] are not . . . national[s];” itinerant workers; project-tied workers; specified-employment
workers; and self-employed workers.
26. David Weissbrodt, Protection of Non-Citizens in International Human Rights Law, in
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND KEY CHALLENGES 221, 229 (Ryszard
Cholewinski et al. eds., T.M.C. Asser Press 2007).
27. Id.
28. The UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air seeks to
distinguish between victims of trafficking and smuggling. Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, GA Res. 55/25, annex III, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, UN Doc.
A/45/49 (Vol. I) (Nov. 15, 2000). Article 3 of the Protocol “states that smuggled migrants have
consented to being transported—usually for a fee—and the relationship with the smugglers ends upon
arrival. Trafficked persons, although they may consent to transportation, do so under coercive and
deceptive conditions, making the consent meaningless. Most importantly, victims of trafficking are
not free upon their arrival. Instead, they continue to be exploited for profit.” DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 207 (2008). See also Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic
in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, July 25, 1951, 96 U.N.T.S 271.
29. Trafficking “involves the transportation of human beings for illicit purposes, such as sexual
exploitation, child labor, forced labor, sweatshop labor, and other illegal activities.” Weissbrodt,
supra note 28, at 207. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
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wise irregularly entered into a State where they are not nationals or citizens.
It is important to note that a migrant’s unlawful entry into and presence
within a State do not automatically abrogate or otherwise limit rights
provided to all migrants in the IMBR, unless specifically noted otherwise.
(13) Issues Raised: Defining who qualifies as a migrant brings to the fore
important issues regarding the origins, destinations, patterns, volume and
intensity of global migration. Cognizant of the complexity of international
migration, the IMBR has purposefully provided a broad and encompassing
definition. In this context, the IMBR and the commentary suggest a dynamic
blueprint for identifying various types of migration in a changing, global
world. The underlying premise of Paragraph 1 is that migrants are entitled to
human rights protections, regardless of their nationality, the cause of their
migration, legality or irregularity of their presence, or the temporary versus
longstanding nature of their stay.
(14) Scope of Protection: Article 1 highlights important questions as to
when an individual ceases to be a migrant. The designation of “migrant”
ceases to apply when a migrant either returns to settle in their country of
nationality, citizenship or habitual residence, or when he/she is naturalized in
the State in which he/she is resident and thus no longer meets the definition of
migrant.30 Notably, then, temporary return to a country of nationality or
citizenship does not extinguish all rights in the host country of imminent
return. A migrant’s acquired rights are not forfeited upon return to the country
of nationality or citizenship. This provision is particularly relevant in the
context of cyclical migration.
(15) Origin of Paragraph 2: The phrasing of this paragraph has its roots in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).31 It has since been
restated in various formulations to ensure that new human rights treaties do
not explicitly or implicitly restrict or derogate any rights recognized by or
guaranteed under existing international and national human rights laws.
Similar safeguards are found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”),32 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),33 the 1981 Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
art. 3, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, 55 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol 1)
(2001) [hereinafter Palermo Protocol].
30. The acquisition of foreign citizenship does not automatically or implicitly forfeit an
individual’s right to citizenship in his or her home country. See infra Commentary to Art. 16.6.
31. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 30, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (“Nothing in this
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
herein.”).
32. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 5.
33. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 5, Dec. 16, 1966, 1966
U.S.T. 521, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 6 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCR].
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Religion or Belief,34 and the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”),35 among others.
(16) History and Purpose—Paragraph 2: This paragraph aims to ensure
the complementarity of human rights standards and protections found in
other international or national instruments. This paragraph re-emphasizes a
central tenet of human rights law: human rights instruments, in whole or in
part, cannot be applied selectively or in isolation from other human rights
instruments. They function as a mutually enforcing collection of rights and
protections that are “universal, indivisible and interdependent and interre-
lated.”36 If provisions in two or more instruments provide for a discrepancy
in recognition or protection, the “most favorable standard” should automati-
cally apply to migrants. This paragraph thus firmly places the IMBR within
established international human rights law.
ARTICLE 2
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
(1) All persons, including migrants, are equal before the law. Migrants are
entitled to the equal protection of the law on the same basis as nationals of the
State in which they reside. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to migrants equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth,
or other status.
(2) Distinctions in the treatment of migrants are permissible, including in
the regulation of admission and exclusion, only where the distinction is made
pursuant to a legitimate aim, the distinction has an objective justification, and
reasonable proportionality exists between the means employed and the aims
sought to be realized.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 2: Article 2 emphasizes two core and interrelated
principles underlying the protection of the rights of migrants in the Interna-
tional Migrants Bill of Rights: non-discrimination and equality before the
34. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief art. 8, Nov. 25, 1981, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (“Nothing in the
present Declaration shall be construed as restricting or derogating from any right defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights.”).
35. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 53,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (“Nothing in this Convention shall be construed
as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
Party”).
36. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
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law. The phrasing of Clause 1 of Paragraph 1 emphasizes that individual
migrants are rights-bearers. The phrasing of the second clause of Paragraph 1
places both a negative and a positive obligation on States with regard to
migrants. The standard for distinctions permitted among and between mi-
grants in Paragraph 2 creates a presumption favoring the equal protection of
migrants without unduly burdening States.
(2) Problems Addressed: Despite wide application of hard and soft norms
mandating equal treatment and non-discrimination,37 migrants frequently do
not enjoy equal protection of the laws of host States and face widespread
discrimination.38 The denial of equal protection to migrants is widely
acknowledged as a human rights issue and has been a subject of increasing
concern.39 In spite of this attention, human rights bodies have not presented a
consistent standard for distinctions among and between migrants, deferring
to the judgment of States.40
(3) Origins of Paragraph 1, Clause 1: That all persons are entitled to
equality before and protection of the law is a fundamental tenet of human
rights law. Both the UDHR and the ICCPR recognize the principles of
equality and equal protection.41 The principle has been widely affirmed in
37. Indeed, the Inter-American Court has proclaimed them preemptory norms. See Juridical
Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003): “Accordingly, this Court considers that the principle of equality
before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because
the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental
principle that permeates all laws.” See also C. v. Belgium, 35/1995/541/627, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 38
(1996).
38. See Ryszard Cholewinski, The Human and Labor Rights of Migrants: Visions of Equality,
22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 177, 194, 196 (2008); Weissbrodt, supra note 26, at 228 (“Xenophobia and
racism—at times reflected in a country’s legislation—prevail, and serve to deny non-citizens the
rights they are guaranteed by international law, leaving them subject to harassment and abuse by
political parties, officials, the media, and by society at large.”).
39. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SLOW MOVEMENT: PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS’ RIGHTS IN
2009 1–3 (2009).
40. See, e.g., Office of U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, reported in 1 Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 189 ¶¶ 1–2,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008). Compare with The Position of Aliens under the
ICESCR, General Comment 30 to CERD, Covenant, reported in 1 Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 189–90 ¶¶ 6–9, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008). Compare with U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009); U.N. High
Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommen-
dation 28 to CEDAW.XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, Reported in 2 Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 303
¶ 4, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008). The ICCPR committee, for example, uses merely a
‘legitimate and reasonable’ standard to evaluate state distinctions, leading to more deference to state
conduct, while other experts interpret human rights law as imposing a proportionality requirement.
See David A. Martin, The Authority and Responsibility of States, in MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL NORMS 35, (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., T.M.C. Asser Press 2003) (citing
Buergenthal study).
41. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 7. (“All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law.”); ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 26.
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other human rights instruments and by human rights treaty bodies.42 The
IMBR, however, adopts a slightly different phrasing for the right in order to
emphasize that equal protection must at a minimum afford protection on the
same basis as nationals and to focus on grounds which are considered jus
cogens in international law.
(4) Origins of Paragraph 2, Clause 2: The restriction on discriminatory
treatment is a fundamental—and complementary—principle of the interna-
tional human rights regime. Both the UDHR and the ICCPR prohibit
discrimination, and the IMBR adopts the enumerated grounds of the ICCPR.43
In doing so, the IMBR impliedly includes grounds considered ‘other status’
under the ICCPR, such as gender identity and sexual orientation.44 Thus the
document allows for further development in the field of non-discrimina-
tion.45 The document does not, however, include nationality as a per se
ground of prohibited discrimination.
(5) History and Purpose—Equality: The right to equality, and specifically
42. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 18 (“Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the
right to equality with nationals of the State concerned before the courts and tribunals.”). U.N. Econ.
& Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Progress
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-citizens, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2002/25 (June 5, 2002) (“In general, international human rights law requires the equal treatment of
citizens and noncitizens.”); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Dom. Rep., ¶ 34, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.16 (Dec. 12, 1997) (“State[s] party . . . take all necessary measures to ensure that
Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic enjoy their economic social and cultural rights fully
and without discrimination.”); American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San Jose, Costa
Rica” art. 24, Nov. 21, 1969, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144; African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights art. 3, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter ACHPR].
43. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 7 (“All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination
in violation of this Declaration.”); ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status . . . .”); ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 26 (“In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.”); U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment
No. 15, supra note 40, at 189 ¶¶ 1–2; The position of Aliens under the Covenant, ¶¶ 1–2, 27th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/41/40 (Nov. 4, 1986) (“In general, the rights set forth in the [ICCPR] apply to everyone,
irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness. Thus the general
rule is that aliens receive the benefit of the general requirement of non-discrimination in respect of the
rights guaranteed in the Covenant.”).
44. See generally The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, March 2007, available at
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm; Joslin v. N.Z., Human Rights Comm.,
Commc’n No. 902/1999, reported in 2 Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 223, U.N. Doc.
A/57/40 (2002); Jarvinen v. Fin., Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 295/1988, reported in
2 Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 104 ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Oct. 4, 1990); U.N. High
Comm’r for Human Rights Comm’n, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15, supra note
40, at 189 ¶ 3.
45. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 12/27, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/27 (Oct. 22,
2009) (“The protection of human rights in the context of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)”) (noting serious impact of discrimination and
HIV-related stigma on the lives of those infected by HIV).
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equality before the law, is a right to be treated equally and in a non-arbitrary
manner, even when the specific legal consequence of a law or action does not
implicate an independent human right.46 It also follows that, as a general rule,
equal factual situations involving migrants must be treated consistently with
those involving citizens, as well as other migrants.47 This applies broadly, for
example in requiring equal access to criminal and civil complaint mecha-
nisms; equal access to courts of law and administrative processes, including
such things as birth registration; equal access to remedies and equality in the
performance of civil and criminal judgments—all direct consequences of
equality before the law.48
(6) History and Purpose—Equal Protection: The right to ‘equal protec-
tion’ is a right to enjoy actual and effective protection of law. This is a right
directed at those promulgating laws and regulations, mandating that States
refrain from enacting discriminatory laws, as well as affirmatively promul-
gate measures that afford effective protection against discrimination for
migrants (i.e. afford migrants substantive equality).49 Thus there should be
equal application of national legislation to migrants as well as citizens, and
legislation itself should not be discriminatory.50
(7) History and Purpose—On the Same Basis as Citizens: Qualifying the
guarantee ‘on the same basis as citizens’ reaffirms the importance of ensuring
46. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY
465 (2d rev. ed., N.P. Engel 1993).
47. Id. at 467; U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment No. 15, supra note 40,
para. 1–3, 7, 9; Gueye v. France, Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 196/1985, reported in Report
of the Human Rights Committee, at 194 ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (Sept. 29, 1989); CERD—
Recommendation 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 189–90 ¶ 1, 3, 4, 6;
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Prot. of
Human Rights, Prevention of Discrimination: The Rights of Non-Citizens, ¶¶ 21–23, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23 (May 26, 2003); CERD General Recommendation XIV (Forty-second ses-
sion, 1993): On Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, 4, 7, 9, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9
(May 27, 2008); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15 para. 4 (2004).
48. The contours of equal protection, while aided by the development of international human
rights norms as providing various minimum standards of treatment, continues the long international
legal tradition of recognizing the juridical capacity of aliens. See, e.g., ANDREAS HANS ROTH, THE
MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS, at 131, n.1 (La Haye 1949) (citing
The Institute of International Law declaration of 1874 affirming that the juridical capacity of aliens
“existe inde´pendamment, de toute stipulation des traites et de toute condition de reciprocite” (exists
independent of any treaty stipulation and of any obligation of reciprocity [comity]; i.e. juridical
capacity is absolute); U.N. Comm’r on Human Rights, Comment—The rights of Non-citizens; CERD
—GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 30 ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-CITIZENS; U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Prot. of
Human Rights, Prevention of Discrimination: The Rights of Non-citizens, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2003/23 (May 26, 2003); U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at ¶ 469, U.N.
Doc. A/59/18-24 (2004); Human Rights Comm., General Comment 15 para. 7
49. Nowak, supra note 46, at 468–69.
50. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18:
Non-discrimination, reported in 1 Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 195, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008);
RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 46
(Manchester Univ. Press 1984).
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legal protection without regard to alienage. This does not mean that migrants
bear all the same rights as nationals, but instead stresses that migrants enjoy
the same protection as nationals for all coextensive rights. Notably, the
IMBR does not limit these obligations to rights provided by the IMBR.51
(8) History and Purpose—Enumerated Grounds: Clause 2 of Paragraph 1
mandates that states refrain from discriminating against or between migrants
on a number of enumerated bases.52 This should not be seen as an exhaustive
list, however, and explicitly allows for breadth to encompass developments
in customary international and human rights law. This wording echoes the
affirmative obligation on States, noted above, to both enact non-discrimina-
tory laws and to work to eliminate the discriminatory effect of all laws and
policies.53 As should be clear from the non-exhaustive nature of the enumer-
ated grounds, this affirmative obligation is not limited to distinctions between
migrants and nationals and citizens. It includes affirmative obligations with
regard to all grounds recognized as constituting discrimination per se, for
example, with regard to gender-based discrimination.54
(9) Origins of Paragraph 2: The IMBR adds a specific legal test for
making distinctions among and between migrants, selecting a standard that
mandates legitimate action, objective justification, and reasonable proportion-
ality. The standard thus distinguishes between prohibited discrimination and
lawful distinctions. In selecting this standard, the IMBR creates a presump-
tion in favor of migrants drawn from commentators and ECHR jurispru-
dence,55 and explicitly rejects the more deferential standard articulated by the
51. This follows general human rights principles. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 31, at pmbl. ¶ 1
(“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”); see also Int’l
Labor Org. [ILO], ILO Declaration of Philadelphia: Declaration concerning the aims and purposes
of the International Labour Organisation, ¶ II(a) (May 10, 1944) (“The general rule is that each one
of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and
aliens.”).
52. See Nowak, supra note 46, at 459 (“The prohibition on discrimination for reasons of certain
personal characteristics has come to be the most essential element in a substantive structuring of the
principle of equality . . . .”).
53. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 238–39 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2005); see also Nowak, supra note 46, at 476–79 (discussing ICCPR Committee
commentaries discussing positive measures (affirmative action) to mitigated horizontally discrimina-
tory effect, such as in the workplace).
54. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in marriage and family relations,
reported in 2 Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, at 337, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008).
55. GUY S. GOODWIN GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN
STATES 78 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (citing Judge Tanaka’s dissent in The South West African Cases
and the ECHR decision in the Belgian Linguistics cases. See also Joan Fitzpatrick, The Human Rights
of Migrants, in MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 172, 176 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Vincent Chetail eds., T.M.C. Asser Press 2003); SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN,
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIAL AND COMMENTARY
700-28 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
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UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment 18.56 The standard flows
directly from the principles of equality and non-discrimination, as was
suggested by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment 15.
(10) History and Purpose—Regulation of Admission and Exclusion: The
IMBR does not limit the sovereign power of States to control admission of
aliens at their borders or formulate immigration policy,57 as long as it is
reasonable.58 Thus, the standard both acknowledges and allows that States
will make such distinctions, rejecting any notion that States require an
explicit ‘margin of appreciation.’59 Indeed, the IMBR allows States to make
reasonable distinctions among and between migrants in light of foreign
policy goals or on the basis of national security.60 The IMBR standard for
distinctions between and among migrants strikes a balance between the needs
and rights of States and the need to protect migrants.
(11) History and Purpose—Legitimate Aim: The IMBR allows only those
distinctions based on a legitimate aim. This should be read in reference to
international and regional norms as well as national norms and protections
(i.e. not just rights within the IMBR or the core international human rights
treaties).61 The standard does not require that distinctions only be made
pursuant to law, but the broader requirements of equal protection generally
do. Thus, the IMBR constrains both discretionary and non-discretionary
State action.
(12) History and Purpose—Objectivity and Reasonable Proportionality:
The IMBR further requires States to act in a way that is objectively related to
56. General Comment 18 does not mention proportionality. U.N. High Comm’r for Human
Rights, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, reported in 1 Compi-
lation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, at 198 ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008). See also Martin, supra note 40,
at 35.
57. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 40, at 31 n.1 (discussing James A.R. Nafziger, The General
Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 803 (1983) (suggesting that states
can maintain immigration regimes that give preference on the basis of, for example, economic
status)).
58. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the
Prot. of Human Rights, Prevention of Discrimination: The Rights of Non-citizens, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23 (May 26, 2003); Mauritian Women v. Mauritius, Human Rights Comm.,
Commc’n No. 35/1978, at ¶¶ 9.2(b)2(ii)2–9.2(b)2(ii)3 (Apr. 9, 1981); Abdulaziz v. U.K.,
App. No. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, at ¶ 72 (1985).
59. Gaygusuz v. Austria, App. No. 17371/90, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 364, 381–82 (1996) (adopting
same test as IMBR; noting the margin of appreciation doctrine but also indicating that states must
provide ‘very weighty reasons’ to benefit from it; holding that distinctions in emergency housing
assistance between Austrian and non-European community national discriminatory in spite of States
claim of special responsibility for citizens). See also U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General
Comment No. 15, supra note 40, at 189 ¶ 5; Poirrez v. France, App. No. 40892/98, at ¶¶ 12, 46, 49
(2003) (claim to disability benefits by a Cote d’Ivoire national resident in France, citing Gaygusuz);
Abdulaziz v. U.K., App. No. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, ¶ 72 (1985); Proposed Amendments to the
Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, par. 62,
January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984).
60. See Martin, supra note 40, at 33 (discussing the traditional and historically fundamental
sovereign function of regulating admission of aliens).
61. Including, for example, obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.
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and reflects a reasonable proportionality between the means employed and
the legitimate goal pursued. This test is intentionally context-specific.62
Fundamentally, the IMBR should be interpreted as creating a continuum or
sliding scale of reasonable and proportional distinctions.63 Most importantly,
as a migrant’s contact and connection with the host State increase, any
distinctions made should tend towards more favorable treatment. Conse-
quently, migrants with less contact or connection with the host State may
receive less favorable treatment, as long as the treatment they receive
complies with the provisions of this Bill and other human rights protections.
Thus, a State may, for example, take into account the longstanding connec-
tion of particular classes of migrants (or of individual migrants) to the State
when conferring benefits.64 The standard does not prohibit more favorable
treatment per se, such as measures taken by a State to protect a particular
national group in a time of natural disaster in the State of origin.65
(13) Application of Article 2: The IMBR makes clear that the prohibition
on non-discrimination (both under the per se grounds of nondiscrimination
and the test established in paragraph 2) includes (and protects) migrants. The
IMBR follows the general convention of human right instruments in positing
a general standard of non-discrimination as broadly applicable, while explic-
itly allowing for variation in other articles.66 Thus, Article 2 shall be read as
the rule of general application unless specifically displaced in the circum-
stances prescribed by a subsequent article.
(14) Issues Raised—Paragraph 1: Paragraph 1 reproduces current interna-
tional law with respect to equal protection and non-discrimination. Its
fundamental innovation is to reformulate this protection in order to make its
application to migrants beyond question. In reproducing the enumerated
grounds of the ICCPR, the IMBR forces ‘other status’ to carry all current and
future innovation in the field of nondiscrimination. In doing so, however, the
IMBR both promotes continued broadening of the norm, and seeks to
reaffirm the notion that any such development must be equally applied to
migrants.
(15) Issues Raised—Paragraph 2: Paragraph 2 codifies a standard for
distinctions among and between migrants. In doing so, the IMBR explicitly
selects a standard at the most protective end of current State practice and
62. Joseph et al., supra note 55, at 700.
63. See Martin, supra note 40, at 35.
64. See, e.g., Article 15 Integration, which explicitly provides that substantial connection be
taken into account when States take measures to address the issue of prolonged irregular status, or
Article 5 Removal, which envisions that States will take substantial connection into account when
creating opportunities for relief from removal.
65. For example, the practice of according temporary protection to migrants independent of
non-refoulement obligations. Such a measure would fall within the bounds of the legal test and
therefore not be discriminatory.
66. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment No. 15, supra note 40,
at 189 ¶ 2. This is clear in articles, such as Article 18 Family Rights, which posit a more specific
standard. In such cases, the most specific standard displaces the general.
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opinio juris. The test represents the optimal compromise between protecting
sovereign functions and safeguarding the welfare of migrants. In selecting a
test that hinges both on legitimacy and proportionality, the IMBR affirms that
the rights of migrants derive both from their fundamental human dignity and
status as persons before the law, as well as their ties to the community of the
host State.
ARTICLE 3
NON-REFOULEMENT
(1) No migrant shall be returned to a country where there are substantial
grounds for believing he or she would be in danger of being subjected to a
serious deprivation of human rights that would threaten the migrant’s life or
freedom.
Commentary:
(1) Origin of Article 3: Non-refoulement is a cornerstone principle of
international law protecting individuals, a jus cogens norm.67 It was first
defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, article 33(1), which states that “No
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion.”68 Although Article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention lists two exceptions (one for public order and the other
for national security),69 these exceptions apply in extremely limited situa-
tions.70 Non-refoulement is non-derogable and applies in all circumstances,
including in the context of combating terrorism and during times of armed
conflict.71
(2) The principle of non-refoulement is also recognized in a number of
other international treaties. The UN Convention against Torture (CAT) states
67. See Jean Allain, The jus cogens Nature of non-refoulement, 13(4) Int’l J. Refugee L. 533, 538
(2001); GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Oxford Univ. Press 1983);
United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Opinion: The Scope and Content of the Principle of
Non-refoulement, ¶ 216 (June 20, 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?
pagesearch&docid3b33574d1&querynon-refoulement.; Erika Feller, Asylum, Migration and
Refugee Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise of Things to Come, 18(3–4) Int’l J. Refugee L.
509, 523 (2006) (describing non-refoulement as “the most fundamental of all international refugee
law obligations”).
68. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 6, art. 33(1).
69. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 6, art. 33(2).
70. UN High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement,
November 1997, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid
438c6d972.
71. UN High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol, January 2007, para. 20, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/
45f17a1a4.pdf.
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that “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.”72 Although the ICCPR and the
European Convention on Human Rights do not contain any explicit provi-
sions on this topic, the UN Human Rights Committee and the European
Court of Human Rights have interpreted the ban on refoulement as being
inherent in Article 7 of the ICCPR73 and Article 5 of the European Conven-
tion, respectively.74
(3) History and Purpose—Article 3: Article 3 protects migrants from
being returned to countries where their well-being may be seriously compro-
mised. The Article sets forth a “substantial grounds” test for determining
whether the condition of the State to which the migrant will be returned is
adequate to trigger the protection. Under this test, evidence of harm or
persecution in the State of return need not be certain and conclusive. It
suffices that the evidence be reasonably credible and serious so as to establish
a risk of harm to the migrants’ human rights and fundamental right to life and
freedom. Article 3 establishes a protection that extends to all migrants, not
only those within a State’s territory but also subject to its jurisdiction or
control.75 This “extraterritorial” understanding of non-refoulement is based
on the overriding humanitarian purpose of the principle, and the intent of
States party to the 1951 Refugees Convention not to place migrant persons at
risk of serious harm or persecution.76 It also derives from the nature of the
IMBR as a set of norms derived from the fundamental dignity of all migrants,
rather than their ties to any particular sovereign. The country of return in
Article 3 is understood to designate not only the country to which removal is
to be effected directly, but also any other country to which the migrant may
be removed afterwards.77
72. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT].
73. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20: art. 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 10 March 1992, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/
Rev.7, para. 9 (“States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition,
expulsion or refoulement”); General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation
on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para. 12.
74. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439
(1989), and subsequent cases, including Cruz Varas v. Sweden, Application No. 15576/89, [1991]
Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (1991); Vilvarajah et al. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 13163/87, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 215 (1991); Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413
(1996); Ahmed v. Austria, Application No. 25964/94, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 62 (1996); TI v. United
Kingdom, Application No. 43844/98 (Admissibility), [2000] I.N.L.R. 211 (2000).
75. UN High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol, January 2007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45f17a1a4.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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ARTICLE 4
DUE PROCESS
(1) Every migrant has the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law and the right to due process of law before the courts, tribunals,
and all other organs and authorities administering justice, as well as those
specifically charged with making status determinations regarding migrants.
(2) In criminal and administrative proceedings, and in civil proceedings
where the migrant is a defendant, a migrant shall be entitled to interpretation
into a language the migrant can understand. The migrant shall be informed of
the availability of an interpreter upon receiving the civil complaint, adminis-
trative summons, or upon arrest.
(3) A migrant shall be provided legal aid and representation in criminal
proceedings and, as far as feasible, in administrative and civil proceedings.
The migrant shall be informed of the availability of such aid and representa-
tion upon receiving the civil complaint, administrative summons, or upon
arrest.
(4) Migrants shall be accorded an effective remedy for acts violating the
rights guaranteed to the migrant by the relevant domestic law as well as
international law, including those rights or freedoms herein recognized.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 4: The right to due process of law is a fundamental
check on arbitrary treatment and the violation of other rights. Article 4 thus
affirms a strong principle of customary international law grounded in comity
and historical notions of equality and is echoed in human rights law and
jurisprudence. In affirming a general right to due process for migrants, the
IMBR goes further than other international instruments to give specific
content to the implications of personhood for migrants before the law.
(2) Problems Addressed: The international community has long realized
the importance of due process of law as a check on rights abuses. Although
implicitly applicable to migrants by virtue of their personhood, the right to
due process is subject to particularly pronounced abuses by governments.78
Of particular concern are administrative detention of migrants, the increasing
use of criminal sanctions as a policy response to increases in migration, and
State responses to terrorism.
(3) Origins of Paragraph 1: The importance of recognition before the law
is a long-recognized principle in international law.79 The first clause of
78. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F.Supp.2d 825 (C.D.Cal. 2007); Karen
Tumlin, Immigration Detention Centers under the Microscope: Recent Reports Reveal Widespread
Violations of the National Detention Standards, 21:6 IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS UPDATE (July 20, 2007)
(reviewing U.S. government violations of its own standards regarding migrant detention).
79. Commentators trace its development to well before the Copernican revolution of interna-
tional human rights law. Indeed, the necessity of recognition as a person before the law was the
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paragraph 1 echoes the affirmation of legal personhood within human rights
law.80 The second part goes further and formally ties to this personhood a
general right to due process before all adjudicatory institutions.
(4) History and Purpose of Paragraph 1: Human rights law establishes
due process as an essential consequence of personhood in a fair legal regime.
While personhood and due process are recognized in more than one interna-
tional legal instrument as fundamental human rights, and migrants’ due
process and personhood rights fall under general human rights protections,
the particularly heightened abuses affecting migrants require specific provi-
sions aimed at enshrining migrants’ rights to the same treatment as nationals
of a State. Both classes are entitled to the respect of their personhood and due
process under international human rights law. Article 4(1) achieves this by
reiterating the human right to personhood and due process and applying it
explicitly to migrants, thereby eliminating any misconception that migrants
can be treated in an inferior way to nationals with regards to basic human
rights.
(5) Issues Concerning Paragraph 1—Due Process: The right to due
process is intended to include all of the procedural guarantees of Article 13 of
the ICCPR (essentially an opportunity to be represented and heard before a
competent decision maker). The IMBR, like the ICCPR, prohibits collective
expulsion.81 Importantly, the IMBR does not limit the right to due process to
those with lawful status, but provides this right to all migrants.82
(6) Origins of Paragraph 2: The right of a defendant to an interpreter
under Article 4(2) draws from international human rights norms. In the
criminal context, the ICCPR explicitly guarantees defendants the right to be
informed of their charges in detail in a language they understand.83 The
ICCPR also provides for defendants to enjoy the free assistance of an
interpreter.84 In the civil context, there is no explicit international right to
predicate to the exhaustion aspect of the notion that injury to non-nationals was an injury to a State.
Thus, non-nationals had to be persons before the law to seek redress in local courts in order to prove
the grievance. See generally Lillich, supra note 50, at 8–21. With the increasing rise in vindication of
substantive rights came a requirement of procedural protections, including free access to courts. See
ANDREAS HANS ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS 178–182
(A.W. Sijthoff 1949).
80. UDHR, supra note 31, arts. 6, 10, 11; ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 14, 16; International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(a), Dec. 21, 1965,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]; ICMW, supra note 6, arts. 17(1), 18(1); Declaration of
Individuals Who Are Not Nationals art. 5(1-c), A/RES/40/144 (1985); Convention on the Rights of
the Child arts. 12(2), 40(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; ECHR, supra note 35,
art. 6(1).
81. Joseph, supra note 55, at 378 (citing General Comment 15).
82. See id. at 379 (citing General Comment 15).
83. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14(a) (“In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality . . . (a) to be
informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the
charge against him”).
84. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14(e) (“In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled . . . to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
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interpretation but it can be inferred from the provisions of the ICCPR, the
CAT and the UDHR.85 These documents all contain language on due process
and fairness that underscores the importance of a defendant’s awareness of
charges and proceedings.86 Although the grounds for this requirement are
much stronger in criminal cases, the civil and administrative contexts
(particularly immigration proceedings) should also be considered important,
due to the interests at stake and the importance of integrity and fairness in the
legal process.
(7) History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: A defendant needs to be fully
aware of the charges or details of the proceedings brought against him or her,
whether in the criminal, civil, or administrative contexts, in order to properly
defend himself or herself. This is especially relevant where the defendant is a
migrant who may not sufficiently understand the language or legal culture of
the host country. As noted in paragraph 6 of this Commentary above, while
the defendant’s right to an interpreter is explicit in the ICCPR for criminal
matters, it is only an inferred right in the civil context. Article 4(2) of the
IMBR explicitly provides for interpretation to be offered to migrant defen-
dants so that they may understand in detail the charges and proceedings
brought against them. It also extends the right to an interpreter, making it
applicable in civil, criminal and administrative proceedings. In order to
prevent abuses and to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights secured under it,
the IMBR also provides that migrant defendants be put on notice of their
entitlement to an interpreter.
(8) Issues Concerning Paragraph 2: Although the IMBR did not adopt the
language of the ICCPR, which promised the “free assistance of an inter-
preter,” it is understood that the host government will defray the costs of the
interpretation service in order to ensure that financial considerations do not
interfere with migrant defendants’ exercise of their rights.
(9) Origins of Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3 recognizes the right of migrants
to be provided free legal assistance and representation where they cannot
afford it. The State must provide free legal assistance and representation to
low-income migrants in criminal cases where they are defendants. For
non-criminal cases, this Paragraph establishes a sliding scale, governed by
Article 2(2) of the IMBR. As far as possible, duly taking into account the
circumstances of the individual case, the financial needs of the migrant, and
the fundamental rights at stake, the State shall provide free legal assistance
and representation to migrants in civil and administrative cases. Due to the
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him”).
85. Compare KATHY LASTER & VERONICA TAYLOR, INTERPRETERS & THE LEGAL SYSTEM 73
(Federation Press 1994) with ECHR, supra note 35, art. 6 (interpreted as not applying to immigration
proceedings).
86. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 10; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 9(2)–(5); CAT, supra note 72, art.
13, 14.
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special and critical nature of administrative proceedings related to the legal
status of migrants and their families, especially removal proceedings, the
State has a duty to provide low-income migrants free legal assistance and
representation in those cases wherever possible. Paragraph 3 also includes a
provision on notification, making it mandatory that a migrant be duly
informed of his or her right to free counsel promptly after receiving notice of
the criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings to which he or she is a party.
(10) History and Purpose of Paragraph 3: Access to counsel is an
essential element of due process, and the provision of legal aid and represen-
tation to the poor is grounded in notions of state responsibility in the context
of international human rights obligations.87 ICCPR Article 14 expressly
recognizes a right to free counsel in criminal but not civil cases.88 However,
the Human Rights Committee has emphasized that Article 14 applies to both
criminal and civil cases.89 The United Nations Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
provides that a detained person is entitled to have legal counsel assigned to
him or her by a judicial or other authority in all cases where the interests of
justice so require and without payment by him or her if he or she does not
have sufficient funds to pay.90 The United Nations Basic Principles on the
Role of Lawyers state that governments shall ensure the provision of
sufficient funding and other resources for legal services to the poor and, as
necessary, to other disadvantaged persons, and that professional associations
of lawyers should cooperate in the organization and provision of services,
facilities, and other resources.91 The principle of providing legal representa-
tion at public expense to litigants who are unable to afford it is widely
accepted and observed: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Madagascar
and South Africa have statutes or a constitutional provision providing for free
civil counsel for those in need.92 The European Court of Human Rights ruled
in 1979 in Airey v. Ireland that free civil counsel to facilitate access to the
courts was a basic right.93 Thereafter, the Council of Europe required its
members to provide free counsel. Each country has met this requirement, but
with limits in the form of merit-based and need-based eligibility standards.94
87. EILEEN SKINNIDER, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES TO PROVIDE LEGAL AID (The International
Center for Crimial Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy 1999), http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/
Publications/Reports/beijing.pdf.
88. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14(3)(d).
89. United Nations, Int’l Human Rights Instruments, Human Rights Comm. Gen. Comment 13,
art. 14 ¶ 2 (21st Sess., 1984), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1, at 14 (1994).
90. The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. Res 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988).
91. UNITED NATIONS, BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE ROLE OF LAWYERS, (1990), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddb9f034.html.
92. Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon: A Human Right Elsewhere in the World, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE
REVIEW 288 (2006).
93. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979).
94. Lidman, supra note 92, at 292.
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This principle is also grounded in treaty law: The OAS Charter explicitly
recognizes a right to counsel,95 and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have recog-
nized that the right applies in both civil and criminal cases.96 As a recognized
human right, the right to state-funded legal assistance is essential in criminal
proceedings due to the fundamental rights at stake.97 This right, however, is
not limited to criminal proceedings and should be expanded to include,
wherever possible, civil and administrative proceedings to ensure that the
right to due process under Article 4 of the IMBR is meaningfully secured.
This right has special relevance in the context of immigration proceedings
due to the fundamental rights at stake, and States should make every effort to
provide migrants with free legal aid and representation in proceedings related
to their status or the status of their family members.
(11) Origins of Paragraph 4: The remedy clause of Article 4 of the IMBR
finds its roots in Article 8 of the UDHR and Article 2(3) of the ICCPR.98
Article 8 of the UDHR is one of a series of articles that are seen as the first
articulation of a right to a fair trial in a modern, multilateral document.99
Article 8 specifically ensures that a migrant is given some form of judicial or
administrative recourse in the event of a violation of national or international
law, and IMBR Article 4(4) mirrors that. As the focus of the IMBR is on
migrants, the IMBR’s remedy clause specifically addresses these protections
to them. ICCPR Article 2(3) provides a remedy to persons whose rights and
freedoms found in the ICCPR itself have been violated. In that vein, IMBR
Article 4(4) explicitly provides migrants with a remedy for any violations of
the rights and freedoms mentioned in the IMBR. This seeks to give the
IMBR’s provisions added force and place it on an equal footing with national
and international laws in order to ensure that migrants are sufficiently
protected against abuses of their rights.
(12) History and Purpose of Paragraph 4: The remedy clause of the
IMBR confirms that the rights and protections granted by the national laws of
the receiving State and international law, as well as the IMBR itself, are
enforceable by migrants. Coupled with the equality provisions found in
Article 2 of the IMBR, this remedy clause provides migrants with the same
ability to avail themselves of national and international law as any national of
the receiving State, empowering them to seek recourse against violations of
95. OAS Charter, art. 45, Dec. 13, 1951, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
96. Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Access to Justice as a Guarantee of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: A Review of the Standards Adopted by the Inter-Am. System of Human Rights 47
(2007) ¶ 182, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.129 doc. 4.
97. For a discussion of the historical development of free legal aid and the priority of criminal
cases, see Skinnider, supra note 87.
98. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 8; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2(3).
99. These articles are UDHR, supra note 31, arts. 8–11. See Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in
International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the International Bill of Rights, 16(2) IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 437–81 (2009).
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their rights by the government or private parties, in accordance with govern-
ing national and international laws.
ARTICLE 5
REMOVAL
(1) A migrant may be removed from the territory of a State, or refused
entry at the borders of a State, only when justified by the specific facts
relevant to the individual concerned and only pursuant to a decision reached
in accordance with law. The individual concerned shall be allowed adequate
opportunity to submit reasons why he or she should not be removed or
refused entry, except where compelling reasons of national security other-
wise require.
(2) Collective removal of migrants is prohibited.
(3) When seeking to remove a migrant whether or not lawfully within its
territory, a State shall:
a. state the grounds upon which removal is sought;
b. show the migrant all evidence that the State will present in
support of removal and grant the migrant a reasonable time to
rebut such evidence, except where compelling reasons of na-
tional security otherwise require;
c. inform the migrant of the right to obtain legal representation;
d. permit the migrant to communicate with official representatives,
including consular and diplomatic officials, of the migrant’s
home State;
e. provide and inform the migrant of a process for appealing a
removal order;
f. establish a process for seeking a suspension of removal.
(4) Neither deportation nor voluntary departure shall deprive or cancel
any legal claims possessed by a migrant before such removal or departure.
(5) No migrant shall be deported or refused entry at the border of a State
for activities, beliefs, or conduct protected under this Declaration.
(6) States shall establish opportunities for relief from removal for mi-
grants who have a substantial connection to the host country or for whom
removal would impose serious harm, either due to family relationships or
conditions in the State to which he or she would be removed.
(7) States shall ensure safe repatriation of vulnerable migrants, including
victims of trafficking in persons, migrants with disabilities, and children.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 5: Article 5 imposes a limitation on the ability of
States to remove a migrant without process. While the IMBR respects the
right of States to remove aliens from their territories, it codifies restrictions
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on this right under international law. The protections afforded to migrants in
this Article take into consideration the particular vulnerability of migrants
regarding removal.
(2) Problem Addressed: Arbitrary and illegal removal of migrants is a
human rights issue with serious and complicated consequences for migrants
and their families, as well as States of origin and receiving States.100 States
all too frequently deport migrants without regard for their rights under
international law, including on the basis of prohibited discriminatory grounds,
en masse, and without consideration for their safety in transit or upon
return.101
(3) Origin of Paragraph 1: Paragraph 1 is adapted from Article 13 of the
ICCPR. It fundamentally expands the protections provided under the ICCPR,
by asserting that all migrants, regardless of legal status, are rights-bearers.102
(4) History and Purpose—Paragraph 1: This paragraph reaffirms the
general right of States to remove migrants. In doing so, however, Paragraph 1
prohibits arbitrary removal. It has long been considered within the sover-
eign’s discretion to remove and exclude migrants.103 However, this discre-
tion is not unconstrained. Historically, the development of the limitations on
States’ discretion arose as a consequence of the relationships among and
between coequal sovereigns.104 The IMBR extends these prohibitions be-
cause of the dignity and individual humanity of migrants, rather than as a
result of an effective relationship with any State.
(5) In restricting removal to decisions made on the basis of specific facts
and in accordance with law, Paragraph 1 echoes the prohibitions, pursuant to
Articles 2 and 4, on discrimination and against arbitrariness.105 Paragraph 1
also stresses that fundamental procedural protections are required in all
circumstances, including at a border or point of entry. If a State seeks to
remove, exclude or otherwise deny entry to a migrant, such a decision must
be justified by an application of the facts of the particular migrant’s
100. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Introduction, in NO REFUGE: MIGRANTS IN GREECE (2009),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/02/no-refugees; Human Rights Watch, Summary,
in PUSHED BACK, PUSHED AROUND: ITALY’S FORCED RETURN OF BOAT MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM
SEEKERS, LIBYA’S MISTREATMENT OF MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS (2009), available at http://
www.hrw.org/en/node/85582/section/3.
101. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL AND DEPORTATION: HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES AFFECTING MIGRANTS LIVING WITH HIV (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2009/06/18/discrimination-denial-and-deportation-0; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PERILOUS PLIGHT:
BURMA’S ROHINGYA TAKE TO THE SEAS (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/05/
26/perilous-plight-0; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAN: HALT MASS DEPORTATIONS OF AFGHANS (2007)
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/06/17/iran-halt-mass-deportation-afghans.
102. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 13. See Nowak, supra note 46, at 224; U.N. High Comm’r for
Human Rights, General Comment No. 15, supra note 40; Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
at 18 (1994); infra IV.A.1.
103. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 520–21 (2008).
104. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 55, at 307.
105. Infra art. 2, art. 4. See MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 19 (T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., 2003).
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circumstance and the applicable law. This restriction should be interpreted in
conjunction with the test proposed in Article 2. Although national security
concerns do not automatically justify the removal of a migrant, the article
preserves the traditional margin of appreciation afforded states in regulating
exclusion and removal in times of crisis.106
(6) Origins of Paragraph 2: Prohibitions on collective expulsion are also
found in the ICCPR107 and in several regional instruments governing human
rights, such as the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights,108 the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”),109 and the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (“ACHPR”).110
(7) History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: Mass expulsion is impermis-
sible because it denies migrants the right to an individual status determina-
tion. This clause is necessary to address the increasing number of mass
expulsions in the last half-century.111 This paragraph thus affirms the indi-
vidual nature of the procedural requirements granted in Paragraphs 1 and 3.
(8) Origins of Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3 draws from the basic procedural
guarantees afforded to all persons in relation to criminal proceedings under
the ICCPR, while highlighting and adding those guarantees particularly
important in the context of removal.112
(9) History and Purpose of Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3 affirms the basic
procedural limitations on the ability of States to remove migrants already
within their territory. These provisions, unlike Paragraph 1, do not regulate
exclusion or other decisions made at the border or outside the territory of
States. In codifying these basic procedural protections, the IMBR extends the
historical limitations on State discretion pertaining to exclusion or removal,
because it implicates fundamental human rights, including liberty, freedom
of movement, the prohibition on arbitrary detention, etc.113
(10) The purpose of Paragraph 3 is to ensure fair, non-arbitrary removal
proceedings in which a migrant has access to the grounds upon which
removal is sought, legal advice and assistance from counsel, as well as the
106. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 55, at 307–08.
107. ICCPR, supra note 1. See also U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment
No. 15, supra note 40, at 189, ¶ 9.
108. Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, supra note 35 (as amended by Protocol No. 11, Strasbourg,
Sept. 16, 1963; Europ. T.S. No. 46), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/
046.doc.
109. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 22(9), Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
110. ACHPR, supra note 42, art. 12.
111. Examples of such expulsions include those in Egypt 1956, Iraq 1969, Uganda 1972, Benin
1978, Vietnam 1979, Rwanda 1982, Nigeria 1983, and Sudan 2006. See RICHARD PLENDER,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 460 (2d ed. 1988).
112. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14.
113. See, e.g., Juan Mendez et al., International Standards of Due Process for Migrant Workers,
Asylum Seekers and Refugees in HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND
MIGRANT WORKERS 460 (Anne Bayefesky ed., 2006).
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protection of officials representing the migrant’s State of origin.114 The use of
evidence that is not disclosed to the public or the migrant is a denial of the
migrant’s fundamental right to a fair hearing. The implication of these
procedural limitations on removal is that a State must reach an initial
decision prior to the removal of the migrant. Thus, Paragraph 3 provides
migrants with a right to appeal a removal order. Initial review, such as
administrative appeal proceedings, should therefore have mandatory suspen-
sive effect. States have the discretion to create procedures to accommodate
the migrant’s right to seek a suspension of removal during higher levels of
appellate review, ever mindful of the obligations of non-refoulement en-
shrined in Article 3 of the IMBR. Notably, however, the requirement that
States create a process for migrants to seek suspensive effect does not
constitute a remedy or form of durable relief from removal.
(11) Origin of Paragraph 4: Paragraph 4 is a consequence of the legal
personhood of migrants, of freedom of movement and of the right of
migrants to own property.115
(12) History and Purpose of Paragraph 4: The freedom to depart is
available to all migrants. Paragraph 4 thus guarantees that any pre-existing
legal claims will not be cancelled if a migrant leaves. Migrants who return to
their home country should be able to preserve pending claims to a legal status
as well as pending civil claims, such as labor or contract disputes. This is
particularly important in the context of circular migration.116
(13) Origin of Paragraph 5: Paragraph 5 affirms the specific content of
the prohibition on nondiscrimination as well as migrants’ civil, political,
cultural and social rights in the context of exclusion and removal.
(14) History and Purpose of Paragraph 5: Paragraph 5 of the IMBR
affirms that discriminatory motive cannot be a factor in a removal proceed-
ing. This paragraph seeks to target arbitrary and politically motivated
decisions in the context of removal. Thus, the exercise of any fundamental
rights protected under the IMBR cannot be a ground for removal or
exclusion.
ARTICLE 6
DETENTION
(1) States shall not detain a migrant, irrespective of the migrant’s legal
status, unless he or she is the subject of removal proceedings, there is a
reasonable prospect of removal, and detention is reasonably necessary to
114. See INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ALL MIGRANT
WORKERS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES, G.A. Res. 45/158, Adopted by the General Assembly at
its 45th session on 18 December 1990 (U.N. Doc.A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
115. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12; UDHR, supra note 31, art. 13. See infra art. 14 Commentary
on Property.
116. See supra art. 1 (discussion of cessation of migrant status).
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prevent absconding, or otherwise, on the basis of equality of treatment with
nationals. Detention in connection with removal proceedings shall be for as
short a period as possible.
(2) Detention of migrants shall occur only in accordance with law and
with the right of the migrant to appeal conditions, legality, and length of
detention.
(3) States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that detention of
migrants in connection with removal proceedings takes place in specialized
detention facilities, and in segregation from ordinary prisoners. Particular
attention should be paid to the situation of vulnerable persons, including
through provision of emergency medical care.
(4) States will undertake to ensure that detained family members remain
together during detention in connection with removal. States shall facilitate
communication and in-person meetings among detained and other family
members if separation is necessary.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 6: Article 6 affirms a number of fundamental
elements of the right to liberty and security of the person as it relates to
detention of migrants. Paragraph 1 asserts a basic presumption of non-
detention, explicitly conditioning the State’s ability to detain migrants,
regardless of their status. Paragraph 2 reproduces core procedural protections
against arbitrary detention. Paragraph 3 promotes minimum obligations
regarding conditions of detention. Paragraph 4 incorporates elements of the
rights to family and privacy as they relate to detention in connection with
removal.
(2) Problem Addressed: The right of migrants to liberty and security of the
person is violated so frequently as to be increasingly honored only in the
breach. States increasingly use detention at the border, criminal enforcement,
and other forms of detention to punish irregular migrants.117 In some cases,
including many involving those with no effective nationality, or where there
are no diplomatic relations between the host State and the country of origin, a
State’s inability to remove migrants may render detention indefinite.118
Additionally, the use of criminal penalties in lieu of, or to reinforce,
administrative enforcement violations of immigration law is of increasing
concern.119 Article 6 thus attempts to codify those fundamental protections
necessary to ensure adequate protection of the rights of migrants in detention.
117. See, e.g., Protection of Migrants, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., 70th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/63/184 (Mar. 17, 2009).
118. See, e.g., Katherine Perks & Jarlath Clifford, The Legal Limbo of Detention, 32 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 42 (2009).
119. See, e.g., Navanethem Pillay, Opening Remarks at the Panel Discussion on Human Rights of
Migrants in Detention Centres (Sept. 18, 2009) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/
huricane.nsf/0/BBD29A58B74B878CC1257635005778E6?opendocument.
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(3) Origins of Paragraph 1: Paragraph 1 is rooted in the rights of liberty
and security of the person,120 as well as the prohibition on arbitrary detention,
and applies regardless of legal status.121 The wording of the IMBR is adapted
from the European Union Returns Directive Article 15, selecting those
elements that affirm a general presumption of non-detention.122 While it
focuses on detention in connection with removal, Paragraph 1 explicitly
affirms the ability of States to detain migrants on the basis of equality with
nationals in other circumstances, such as in connection with criminal prosecu-
tion. Notably, however, all forms of detention must be in conformity with
human rights norms, including the prohibitions on cruel, inhumane and
degrading treatment and torture.123
(4) History and Purpose—Presumption of Non-detention: Detention of
migrants in connection with removal is a widespread practice, and is
increasingly used as a mechanism for controlling illegal migration.124 How-
ever, illegal presence alone is an insufficient basis for detaining migrants;
wrongful detention is incompatible with the principles of both the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration.125 In order to safeguard
the rights and autonomy of migrants, then, the IMBR affirms a presumption
of non-detention, with limits carefully constrained to protect the interests of
sovereign States.
(5) Origin of Paragraph 2: Paragraph 2 is a synthesis of Paragraphs 1 and
4 of ICCPR Article 9.126 It thus includes both a requirement of non-
arbitrariness and procedural fairness and a right to challenge detention.127
Thus, it both places an obligation on States and provides a specific right to
migrants. It also impliedly incorporates other commentary that has stressed
the links between legal personhood (as a fundamental expression of liberty)
and prohibitions on arbitrary detention and the common-law-derived right of
habeas corpus.128 This restriction applies to all forms of detention, including
detention at the border, and not just detention in connection with removal.
(6) History and Purpose—In Accordance with Law: The prohibition
120. Shyla Vohra, Detention of Irregular Migrants and Asylum Seekers, in INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION LAW 49–51 (Ryszard Cholewinski, et al. eds., T.M.C. Asser Press 2008).
121. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 9; UDHR, supra note 31, art. 9.
122. European Union Return Directive 2008/115/EC, art. 15, 2008 O.J. (L348) 51.
123. CAT, supra note 72, art. 10.
124. Vohra, supra note 120, at 49.
125. Id. at 53 (citing United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Rep. (1980)).
126. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 9(1), 9(4).
127. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 55 (“The rule of international law requires that there be available
some procedure whereby the underlying legality of executive action can be questioned, such as the
writ of habeas corpus in common law jurisdictions”; citing the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases for
proposition that the ICCPR ‘embodies and crystallizes’ pre-existing rules of customary international
law).
128. “To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be, by process from the courts of judicature,
or by warrant from some legal officer, having authority to commit to prison; which warrant must be in
writing, under the hand and seal of the magistrate, and express the causes of the commitment, in order
to be examined into (if necessary) upon a habeas corpus.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554
(2004) (J. Scalia, dissenting) (quoting Blackstone) (emphasis added).
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against arbitrary detention is a process right mandating that States define
precisely the cases in which deprivation of liberty is permissible.129 It places
a legal obligation on both legislators and law enforcement officials.130 The
general standard for determining arbitrariness is that action must be reason-
able and necessary in all the circumstances, and must not contravene national
or international law, including the IMBR.131
(7) History and Purpose—Right to Challenge Detention: This section is
meant to apply to all forms of detention, and with particular force to the
administrative detention of migrants.132 The right to challenge detention
should include judicial review, and is subject to the other requirements of the
IMBR, including Articles 2 and 4.133 The right to challenge detention obliges
a State to respond to its invocation without delay and, consistent with
prevailing interpretations of other human rights instruments, release the
migrant following a successful challenge.134
(8) Origin of Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3 draws from Article 16 of the
European Union Returns Directive as well as the ICCPR Article 10 restric-
tion on detaining accused migrants together with convicted prisoners.135
(9) History and Purpose—Specialized Detention Facilities: Paragraph 3
affirms the right of migrants to be detained separately from ordinary
prisoners. The requirement of specialized detention facilities also impliedly
incorporates a general requirement of minimum and humane conditions for
detained migrants.136 Broadly, the identification of migrants as a special
category of prisoners also highlights their uniquely vulnerable status as well
as the pervasive abuse of migrants when combined with ordinary prison-
ers.137
(10) History and Purpose—Care for Vulnerable Individuals: The explicit
guarantee of emergency medical care for vulnerable migrants affirms the
continued right of detained migrants to enjoy other fundamental human
rights, such as the right to life. States cannot use migrants’ status or situation
129. Nowak, supra note 46, at 160 (noting that although a process right, liberty of the person is
tied to the freedom of movement, and thus only implicated when that freedom has been abridged).
130. Id. at 172.
131. Id. at 173 (citing Van Alphen v. the Netherlands (finding that although a particular detention
was lawful it was not reasonable or necessary in all the circumstances, and was therefore arbitrary;
weighing flight risk, interference with evidence, risk of further criminal conduct, etc.); notably,
detention cannot be justified by a domestic law that violates binding international minimum
standards). See Joseph et al., supra note 55, at 342 (citing A v. Australia (ICCPR Committee 560/93)).
132. For a discussion of the definition of detention, see Shyla Vohra, supra note 120, at 50–52.
133. This Includes the elements of the IMBR governing due process, removal, and the protection
of Asylum-seekers and victims of trafficking. See discussion supra arts. 2, 4.
134. Nowak, supra note 46, at 179–180 (commenting that under ICCPR art. 9(4), if a court finds
an individual’s liberty is deprived unlawfully, then the individual must be released); ICCPR, supra
note 1, art. 9(4).
135. Council and Parliament Directive 2008/115, art. 16, 2008 J.O. (L 348) 98, 99 (EC); ICCPR,
supra note 1, art. 10(2).
136. See, e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663C,
U.N. Doc. E/3048 (July 31, 1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (May 13, 1977).
137. Vohra, supra note 120, at 60.
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in detention to justify denial of the right to emergency medical care.138
(11) Origin of Paragraph 4: This paragraph draws on language in the
ICMW, as well as elements of the right against unlawful interference with
family in the ICCPR.139
(12) History and Purpose—Family Unity: The right to family unity is
often brought in conflict with the limited right of States to detain migrants.
This Paragraph affirms the basic right of family unity during detention in
connection with removal. Like all elements of the rights of migrants in
connection with such detention, it should be interpreted in the context of the
presumption of non-detention contained in Paragraph 1 and reinforced with
special force regarding the detention of children in Article 9. Thus, when
detention is necessary, Paragraph 4 requires that, whenever possible, families
be allowed to remain together. When detention is not necessary for all family
members, or when family unity cannot be maintained in detention, Paragraph
4 places an obligation on States to ensure that detained and non-detained
family members can meet and communicate with one another.
ARTICLE 7
ASYLUM SEEKERS
(1) Migrants have a right to seek and enjoy asylum. States shall establish
effective procedures for determining any migrant’s request for asylum within
their territory, at their borders, or in their effective control. Migrants shall
have a right to claim asylum at any time, including in removal proceedings.
(2) A trained official of the State shall determine whether the migrant
(i) qualifies as a refugee under the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (as appropriate), (ii) is entitled to protection
under the Convention against Torture, or (iii) is eligible for any other form of
relief from return established by international and domestic law. In such
proceedings, migrants shall be entitled to interpretation and may be repre-
sented.
(3) A migrant denied asylum has the right to appeal the determination to
an independent review body.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 7: The right to seek and enjoy asylum—as a way of
allowing migrants to escape persecution in another State—has been infor-
138. See infra art. 11, discussion of the right to emergency health care.
139. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 17(5) (“During detention or imprisonment, migrant workers and
members of their families shall enjoy the same rights as nationals to visits by members of their
families.”); ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 17.
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mally accepted and exercised throughout history.140 Article 7 bestows a
positive right on migrants to seek and enjoy asylum in an environment
cognizant of due process. The right to asylum is supported both from the
perspective of necessity and that of internationally recognized human rights.141
Thus, the protection of a migrant’s right to seek and enjoy asylum via a just
and effective asylum process enables the protection of the human rights of
those fleeing rights abuses that occurred elsewhere.142 A migrant’s right to
seek asylum in this article thus goes beyond the broad language of the
UDHR and is made more robust by procedural safeguards outlined in
Paragraphs 1–3. The article also explicitly recognizes the right to seek
various forms of asylum, including national-level protection. Significantly,
the article enumerates only minimum standards for the treatment of asylum
seekers, without prejudice to the granting by States of more favorable
treatment.
(2) Problem Addressed: The UDHR, in establishing the right to seek
asylum, stopped short of establishing the right to receive asylum, instead
defining it as a right of States143 and thereby creating the idea of an asylum
applicant without establishing further protections once an application is
placed. The human rights of migrants are—almost by definition—at particu-
lar risk, because they require surrogate protection and generally do not enjoy
the protection of their State of citizenship.144 This article aims to recognize
and begin to fill that gap by promoting the protection of specific due process
rights for asylum seekers during the application process.
(3) Origins of Article 7: The foundation for asylum was concisely
presented in UDHR’s Article 14, while the right itself was elaborated by
further UN instruments,145 regional agreements such as the EU Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention on Refugees,
GCR),146 and national commitments.147 Finally, Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture, in upholding the principle of non-refoulement, strongly
implies that there should be an appropriate process for determining the
140. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXAMINING ASYLUM SEEKERS: A HEALTH PROFES-
SIONAL’S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF TORTURE vii (2001) (noting that
assuring the right of asylum is “a crucial component of the ongoing campaign to abolish torture”).
141. See generally Niraj Nathwani, The Purpose of Asylum, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 354 (2000)
(arguing that the doctrine of necessity explains the purpose of asylum).
142. Id. at 364.
143. See, e.g., Jane McAdam, Asylum and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
27 REFUGEE SURV. Q., 3, 5 (2008).
144. Joan Fitzpatrick, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM-
SEEKERS, AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 6–15 (Joan Fitzpatrick ed. 2002).
145. See Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A/RES/2312(XXII), Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR,
22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (Dec. 14, 1967).
146. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons: Implementation within the European Union Member States and Recommendations
for Harmonisation, (October 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/415c3cfb4.html.
147. See, e.g., GRUNDGEZETS [GG] [Constitution] art. 16a (F.R.G.); Law no. 122/2006 on Asylum
in Romania (2006) (Romania); Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999, c.33 (Gr. Brit.).
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grounds for this (and other) form(s) of asylum.148
(4) Origins of Paragraph 1: The right to seek and enjoy asylum is derived
from the UDHR.149 An appropriate interviewing process is suggested in a
number of instruments, such as the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the 2005 Procedural
Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate,150 as
well as a number of UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions released to
date.151
(5) Purpose and History—Paragraph 1: Paragraph 1 requires States to
create effective procedures for determining applications for asylum. The
description of procedures as “effective” also implies that States should strive
to prevent and minimize the population of asylum seekers in temporary
detention, to shorten the duration of such detention to the extent reasonably
possible, to improve the conditions of such detention when appropriate, and
to monitor and document the conditions at detention facilities and detention-
related procedures faced by asylum seekers.152
(6) Paragraph 1 does not intend to imply that an asylum application
cannot be granted without individual interviews or cannot be otherwise
expedited. A State may elect to apply procedures that are more permissive
than the minimal protections suggested in this article—such as the consider-
ation of grouped asylum applications from persons fleeing a known conflict
or disaster zone or categories of migrants for whom the additional time spent
148. “For the purpose of determining whether there are . . . [substantial grounds for believing a
person would be subjected to torture upon return], the competent authorities shall take into account
all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” CAT, supra note 72, art. 3(2).
149. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 14.
150. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1992), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html;
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINA-
TION UNDER UNHCR’S MANDATE (2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4316f0c02.html.
151. See Executive Committee Conclusions No. 8 (XXVIII)—1977 on Determination of Refugee
Status, No. 15 (XXX)—1979 on Refugees Without an Asylum Country, No. 30 (XXXIV)—1983 on
the Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum, and
No. 58 (XL)—1989 on Refugees and Asylum-Seekers Who Move in an Irregular Manner from a
Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, in U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
CONCLUSIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
REFUGEES: 1975–2004 (2005) http://www.unhcr.org/41b041534.pdf. The importance of access to fair
and efficient procedures has also been reaffirmed by the Executive Committee in its Conclusions
No. 29 (XXXIV)—1983; No.55 (XL)—1989; No. 65 (XLII)—1991; No. 68 (XLIII)—1992; No. 71
(XLIV)—1993; No. 74 (XLV)—1994; No. 81 (XLVIII)—1997; No. 82 (XLVIII)—1997; No. 85
(XLIX)—1998; No. 92 (LIII)—2002.
152. For problems associated with lengthy or burdensome detention policies, see generally,
WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION, DETENTION AND ASYLUM AT A GLANCE (2009), http://www.womens
refugeecommission.org/docs/wrc_detention_asylum.pdf (noting the high number of refugee status
applicants in detention in US alone, with particularly disproportionate effects on abused women and
unaccompanied children); ELEANOR ACER AND JESSICA CHICCO, “HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, US ASYLUM
SEEKERS AND DETENTION: SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON” Human Rights First (2009) (noting
escalation of detention and its negative impact on asylum seekers).
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as an asylum seeker would present a harmful burden (e.g. children, persons
with mental health disabilities).153
(7) The process of seeking asylum should afford applicants protection
from the initiation of removal proceedings, a temporary work permit, and
rights to other migrant services described in later Articles of this Bill.
Removal proceedings should also be suspended in such cases of “defensive”
asylum applications.154
(8) Origins of Paragraph 2: Paragraph 2 defines asylum as a general term
that encompasses at least three independent forms of protection: (i) refugee
status under the 1951 Convention or equivalent, (ii) protection of migrants
from return to torture,155 and (iii) other (i.e. trafficking, or protection of
migrants fleeing conflict zones, etc).
(9) History and Purpose—Paragraph 2: Paragraph 2 defines the various
types of protections that forced migrants may seek from host States. The
paragraph further elaborates on the “effective procedure” requirement set in
Paragraph 1 by noting that the asylum application shall be reviewed by a
“trained official,” with the exact extent and nature of such training being
subject to a more detailed definition by individual States. The provision of
representation and interpretation resources represents the effort to protect an
applicant’s right to due process, outlined in additional detail in Article 4.
Adequate representation and interpretation should also be available to
asylum seekers with special needs (e.g., unaccompanied children, victims of
torture, asylum seekers suffering from mental illness) who generally require
additional legal, as well as other, assistance. The separation of Paragraphs 1
and 2 in the present Article do not imply a two-step process or suggest that
States are able to reject asylum seekers at the border without granting them
the process provided in Article 2.
(10) Purpose and History—Paragraph 3: A right to appeal the first
rejection of an asylum application to an “independent review body” ensures
that asylum seekers have a chance to present their case at a second impartial
hearing. This key procedural safeguard (that the appeal be considered by an
authority different from and independent of that making the initial decision)
153. See, e.g., Signe S. Nielsen et al., Mental health among Children Seeking Asylum in Denmark
—The Effect of Length of Stay and Number of Relocations: a Cross-sectional Study, 8 BMC PUB.
HEALTH 293 (2008) (finding that children who had been asylum-seeking for more than one year in
Denmark had an increased risk of having mental difficulties; concluding that protracted stays at
asylum centres and multiple relocations within the asylum system appear to have an adverse effect on
asylum-seeking children’s mental health; proposing a limit to the duration of the children’s stay in the
asylum system).
154. An asylum application is considered defensive when it is initiated in response to a
deportation proceeding.
155. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1 (1984); CAT, supra note 72.
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derives from general administrative law.156 The right to a timely (and
therefore somewhat limited) appeal balances the asylum seeker’s right of due
process with the administrative costs of a longer procedure.157
ARTICLE 8
VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING
(1) States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent trafficking in
persons; to criminalize trafficking; to investigate and ensure effective penal-
ties for violations of anti-trafficking laws; and to inform victims of trafficking
in persons of the means of seeking assistance and legal support.
(2) States should create avenues for temporary and permanent relief from
removal for victims of trafficking in persons.
(3) States should provide assistance to ensure the physical, psychological,
and social recovery of victims of trafficking in persons.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 8: This Article seeks to ensure protection and
support for victims of human trafficking, as well as criminalization and State
action against those involved in trafficking activities. Because the IMBR is
focused on the protection of individual migrants, the emphasis of this Article
is on the human rights of trafficked individuals. Inspiration is drawn from the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially
Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) attached to the UN Convention
Against Organized Crime, as well as the Council of Europe Convention on
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.158 This Article does not,
however, deal with the issue of smuggling, as smuggling is largely a crime
against the State with the involvement of migrants typically being voluntary
in nature. However, this distinction is not intended to deny the commonalities
between the two practices or the fact that many migrants are also victimized
by the practice of smuggling.159
(2) Problems Addressed: Slavery has long been prohibited by interna-
tional law and is today one of the few uncontroverted jus cogens norms.160
However, certain forms of servitude, including involuntary prostitution,
156. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, FAIR AND EFFICIENT ASYLUM PROCEDURES: A
NON-EXHAUSTIVE OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (2005), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/432ae9204.html.
157. But see VVD, CDA Oppose Appeal Right for Asylum Seekers, NIS NEWS BULLETIN (Dutch
News), Sept. 13, 1996, http://www.nisnews.nl/dossiers/immigration/130996_127.htm.
158. Palermo Protocol, supra note 29, at 60; Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 197.
159. SILVIA SCARPA, TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: MODERN SLAVERY 68-69 (2008); UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TOOLKIT TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 4–5 (2008),
available at http://www.uodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/HT_ToolKit08_English.pdf.
160. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: “Jus Cogens” and “Obligatio Erga
Omnes,” 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
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forced industrial and domestic labor, and child labor persist to this day. These
exploitative activities are often facilitated and reinforced by the practice of
human trafficking. According to the U.S. Department of State, between
600,000 and 800,000 human beings are trafficked internationally each
year.161 Eighty percent of the victims of trafficking are women and girls,
while up to fifty percent are children.162 Trafficking represents a major threat
to both the human rights of victims and to the security of States.163 Victims of
trafficking are denied many fundamental rights, including the right to
freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom from servitude, the
right to bodily integrity, and in the case of children, the right to a childhood.
The practices employed by traffickers often amount to arbitrary detention,
slavery, rape, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.164
(3) Victims of trafficking are recruited in their native countries via
deceptive, fraudulent or coercive practices. Such coercion may be physical,
emotional, social or economic in nature and often relies on the exploitation of
vulnerable victims seeking better prospects either at home or abroad. Traffick-
ing is often carried out by sophisticated trans-national networks, many of
which have links to organized crime.165 Having arrived in destination States,
victims of trafficking may languish in a state of servitude. Even once their
predicament is discovered, trafficking victims are all too often left to their
own devices, granted limited legal and social protection and may even be
subject to criminal sanctions for their “participation” in trafficking activi-
ties.166
(4) Origins of Paragraph 1: The elements of this paragraph are drawn
from the Palermo Protocol. Article 9 of the Protocol calls upon signatories to
“establish comprehensive policies, programs and other measures” to prevent
trafficking. Article 5 of the Protocol requires States to criminalize the
practice of trafficking, and Article 6 mandates the provision of legal and
administrative information to victims. Accordingly, the content of this
Paragraph should be interpreted in conformance with the Protocol, its
commentaries and legislative guide. Articles 5, 12, and 18–22 of the Council
of Europe Convention similarly mandate, respectively, prevention, assistance
161. Edward Newman & Sally Cameron, Introduction: Understanding Human Trafficking, in
TRAFFICKING IN HUMANS: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 1, 5 (Edward Newman &
Sally Cameron eds., 2008).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 4.
164. The Global Problem of Trafficking in Persons: Breaking the Vicious Cycle on “Trafficking of
Women and Children in the International Sex Trade”: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int’l
Relations, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (testimony statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of
State).
165. See Saltanat Sulaimanova, Trafficking in Women from the Former Soviet Union for the
Purposes of Sexual Exploitation, in TRAFFICKING AND THE GLOBAL SEX INDUSTRY 61 (Karen Beeks &
Delila Amir eds., 2006); Phil Williams, Trafficking in Women: The Role of Transnational Organized
Crime, in TRAFFICKING IN HUMANS, supra note 161, at 126.
166. Ratna Kapur, Migrant Women and the Legal Politics of Anti-Trafficking Interventions, in
TRAFFICKING IN HUMANS, supra note 161, at 118–19.
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and criminalization. This instrument may also be used as an interpretive
guide.
(5) For definitional purposes the IMBR also relies on the Palermo Proto-
col. The Protocol defines trafficking in human beings as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of per-
sons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion,
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.167
(6) Purpose of Paragraph 1: This paragraph recognizes the need for
States to take active measures to prevent, criminalize and actively investigate
trafficking activities. It also recognizes the need for victims to have vital
access to assistance and legal support while dealing with the consequences of
being trafficked. The Paragraph thus recognizes the dual impact of trafficking
on both the receiving State and the individual migrant.
(7) Issues Raised by Paragraph 1: While it is important for States to take
measures to prevent and criminalize trafficking activities, they must take care
not to criminalize or stigmatize victims. To this effect, law enforcement
agents and prosecutors must thoroughly investigate the structure of traffick-
ing operations, carefully examining the relationships between all involved, in
order to distinguish between victims and perpetrators. States must also
ensure that victims’ identities remain secret and that their privacy is re-
spected.
(8) Simple criminalization and interdiction efforts, however, are not
sufficient to stem the tide of trafficking operations. Instead, root causes, both
structural (including economic, social, ideological and geopolitical factors)
and proximate (including legal and policy aspects, rule of law issues, and
civil society-state relations), must be effectively addressed in order to solve
the problem of trafficking.168
(9) Origin of Paragraph 2: This paragraph is based on Article 7 of the
Palermo Protocol. The Protocol requires signatories to consider the adoption
of legislative or other measures to allow victims of trafficking to remain,
either temporarily or permanently, in the receiving state. The adoption of
such measures is to be based on the consideration of humanitarian and
167. Palermo Protocol, supra note 29, art. 3.
168. Newman & Cameron, Understanding Human Trafficking, supra note 161, at 3.
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compassionate factors.169
(10) Purpose of Paragraph 2: The purpose of this paragraph is to
recognize that victims of trafficking have often suffered greatly due to their
ordeal and that, as a result, they should be considered for lawful resident
status on compassionate or humanitarian grounds. Victims may face repris-
als, stigmatization, social marginalization or, in rare cases, even criminal
prosecution upon return to their countries of origin.
(11) Issues Raised by Paragraph 2: States should pay particular attention
to the unique needs and perilous situation of trafficking victims in order to
consider granting them asylum, refugee status or some other temporary or
permanent protective status.170
(12) Origin of Paragraph 3: The language of Paragraph 3 is based on
Article 6.3 of the Palermo Protocol, which calls upon States to consider
providing for the physical, psychological and social recovery of trafficking
victims.
(13) Purpose of Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3 is designed to ensure that
trafficking victims are amply supported and protected during the period of
vulnerability which follows their arrival in the receiving State. Victims may
potentially suffer from social dislocation, emotional or physical trauma, and
heightened stress levels.
(14) Issues Raised by Paragraph 3: As part of the assistance indicated in
Paragraph 3, receiving States should consider the provision of: appropriate
housing; counseling and information, particularly with regard to legal rights,
in a language understood by the victim; medical, psychological and material
assistance; and employment, education and training opportunities. Regard
should be had for the age, gender and special needs of trafficking victims. In
the case of children, particular attention should be paid to the provision of
housing, education and other care. Because the provision of such services is
costly, States should also consider providing victims with the ability to
pursue legal action and recover damages from those responsible for their
trafficking, particularly any business entities that have knowingly profited
from the labor of trafficked persons. In this regard, Article 8 should be read
in conjunction with the rights contained in Article 4, Due Process, and
Article 11, Economic and Social Rights.
169. Article 13 of the Council of Europe Convention goes a step further: it mandates that States
observe a thirty day “recovery and reflection” period during which trafficking victims may escape the
influence of the traffickers and make a measured decision regarding their cooperation with the
authorities.
170. See, e.g., Isabel Crowhurst, The Provision of Protective and Settlement Services for Migrant
Women Trafficked for Sexual Purposes: The Case of Italy, in TRAFFICKING AND THE GLOBAL SEX
INDUSTRY 217, supra note 165, at 217.
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ARTICLE 9
CHILDREN
(1) States shall ensure that rights of children are enjoyed by migrant
children on the basis of equality with citizens.
(2) The best interests of a child migrant shall be a primary consideration
in all actions affecting the child migrant. The views of child migrants must be
given due weight in accordance with their maturity and age.
(3) Detention of child migrants shall be a measure of last resort, and child
migrants shall be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and particular
vulnerabilities.
(4) States shall establish equitable and effective procedures for identify-
ing and protecting unaccompanied minor migrants. States should create a
process for ensuring that all unaccompanied minors have a caregiver or
guardian. States should create avenues for temporary and permanent relief
from removal for unaccompanied minor migrants.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 7: This article serves a dual purpose. First, the
article affirms the fundamental principle that children are people before the
law, and all fundamental human rights must be respected in the treatment of
children.171 Second, this article recognizes that in furtherance of this prin-
ciple, special measures must be taken in many instances to ensure the full
realization of the rights of the child. This article articulates some special
protections for children to ensure that, despite their inherent vulnerabilities,
children enjoy all of their rights. The article is not, however, exhaustive in
this respect. Rather, the rights asserted elsewhere in the IMBR on behalf of
all migrants should be understood to be incorporated for and directly
applicable to children.
(2) This article thus complements the broad assertion of the rights of the
child by specifically addressing some situations where the inherent vulnerabil-
ity of the migrant child is exacerbated by a separation from the family unit or
by legal and administrative proceedings, which may confuse and intimidate a
migrant who lacks maturity. In addition to the need for special protections for
children against social and administrative abuses, this article suggests affir-
mative measures to be taken by States in recognition of the duty under
international law to provide specially for the well-being of children.172
(3) Problems Addressed: Children face particular impediments to their
enjoyment of fundamental rights. Children often lack financial indepen-
171. This is a natural and necessary extension of art. 1 of the UDHR: “All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights.” UDHR, supra note 31, art. 1.
172. That childhood is entitled to special care and assistance receives support from, inter alia, the
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 25.2; the ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 24.1; the Geneva Declaration of the
Rights of the Child of 1924, Sept. 26, 1924; the ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 10.
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dence, they frequently lack the education and experience necessary to fully
articulate their ideas and beliefs, and they often do not exercise control over
their own movement between States. Migrant children may face additional
hardships by virtue of separation from the family unit and legal proceedings
brought against the child to challenge the child’s legal status. This article
addresses affirmative measures which should be taken to protect the migrant
child’s access to a supportive home and to ensure that legal and other
administrative proceedings against the child do not interfere with the child’s
fundamental rights.
(4) In addressing these challenges, the Drafting Committee respects that
migrant children disproportionately represent children displaced by poverty
and war; furthermore, migrant children are frequently separated from their
families. These deprivations, in addition to the inherent vulnerabilities of the
child, make migrant children particularly prone to abuses of the labor,
citizenship, education, and family rights declared in this Document.173
(5) History and Purpose—Paragraph 1: This paragraph recognizes that
children often, necessarily, are subject to special provisions and protections
under domestic laws on account of the particular vulnerabilities of persons of
minor age. The principle of equal protection—a principle specifically codi-
fied in Article 2 of this Document—must apply with equal force to children.
Moreover, while status distinctions made under domestic laws may some-
times be valid, such is not the case for abrogations of the fundamental rights
of the child—such protections must be afforded regardless of the child’s legal
status.174 The realization of this principle further requires the existence of an
effective remedy for violations of the principle.175 Accessing such a remedy
and subsequently enjoying the equal protection demanded by this article may
require that special assistance be available to children.176
(6) This paragraph requires that States shall ensure that migrant children
enjoy their rights on a basis of equality with citizens. The article does not,
however, describe specific measures which must be taken to achieve this
equality. Rather, it is left to the sovereign discretion of States to properly
address any domestic problems of unequal access to children’s rights.
Necessary steps to ensuring equality might include the availability of
qualified translators and the existence of a social services administration with
special expertise in the problems confronting migrant children in that State.
The creation of an Ombudsman or similar official speaker for children,
making professional child welfare advocates publicly available, and establish-
173. See infra arts. 11, 14, 15, 16.
174. CRC, supra note 80, art. 2. See also LAWRENCE LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD: UNITED NATIONS LAWMAKING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 98 (1995).
175. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 31, art. 8.
176. In this respect, the article fully embraces the proclamation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 10.3, that “special measures of protection and assistance
should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of
parentage or other conditions.” ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 10.3.
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ing thorough data collection services whose function it is to track the
presence and condition of minor children within the State are all measures
which may advance the guarantees States pledge under this paragraph.
(7) This paragraph defers to the sound discretion of States to develop
standards of best practices, as the Drafting Committee recognizes a paucity
of data concerning the exact numbers and living conditions of migrant
children to be a primary, present obstacle to the full protection of the rights of
the migrant child.177 States shall undertake in good faith to identify the
problems confronting minor children in their territories, and subsequent
action shall be taken in light of those findings to ensure equal protection for
migrant children.
(8) History and Purpose—Paragraph 2: The first sentence of this para-
graph affirms the internationally established position that the “best interests”
of the child must play a central role in all actions concerning the child.178 In
considering the child’s best interests, it is the opinion of the Drafting
Committee that certain principles should be honored. First, with respect to
legal and administrative proceedings, any undue delay in proceedings involv-
ing a child shall constitute a harm to the welfare of the child.179 Second,
children are entitled to express themselves freely,180 and (as explicitly
observed in the following sentence in this paragraph) children capable of
expressing themselves must be permitted to do so in official proceedings
against or otherwise involving them.181 These statements should influence
the determination of what constitutes the best interests of the child. Honoring
the child’s best interests may also involve procedural accommodations on
account of the child’s maturity and vulnerability. Many States employ
“child-friendly” procedural rules and tribunals to mitigate any oppressive
element in the bureaucracy and to encourage the child to fully express
personal opinions and priorities.182 It is the opinion of the Drafting Commit-
tee that such purposefully age-appropriate proceedings represent best prac-
177. See Sarah Maloney, Transatlantic Workshop on ‘Unaccompanied/Separated Children:
Comparative Policies and Practices in North America and Europe’, held at Georgetown University,
18–19 June, 2001, 15 J. REFUGEE STUD. 102, 118 (2002).
178. See CRC, supra note 80, art. 3.
179. This position echoes the duty of States to act speedily in proceedings involving the welfare
of a child which has been previously articulated in, inter alia, art. 7 of the European Convention on
the Exercise of Children’s Rights and in § 1(2) of the Children Act under English law. European
Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights art. 7, Jan. 25, 1996, Europ. T.S. 160, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de78d964.htm; Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 1(2), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/ukpga_19890041_en_1.
180. CRC supra note 80, art. 13.
181. Id., art. 12.
182. See, Maloney, supra 177, at 107, 113 (summarizing the procedural and evidentiary rules for
proceedings involving children in the United States and Canada, which aim to be non-adversarial
and to take account of the child’s emotional experience of persecution; explaining the similarly
non-adversarial procedures adopted for children in the United Kingdom).
450 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:411
tices.183 Finally, any infringement of the rights guaranteed to the migrant
child in this Document or in other relevant international conventions shall be
contrary to the best interests of the child.
(9) The second sentence of this paragraph unambiguously affirms the
right of the migrant child to be heard in any proceedings involving the
child.184 This sentence also recognizes that, in respecting the child’s expres-
sion, due consideration must be given to the context of the child’s statements,
which are provided by the child’s age and manifest level of maturity. The
Drafting Committee embraces the idea that a child’s capacity for self-
expression and mature judgment are “evolving capacities,” and adults should
speak for the child only to the extent that the child lacks the experience and
judgment to effect such expression personally.185 Fulfilling the obligations of
this paragraph may require that States appoint a representative to speak on
behalf of the child; as with Paragraph 1, however, the Drafting Committee
has not articulated specific means by which States must provide such
representatives.186
(10) History and Purpose—Paragraph 3: This paragraph offers a natural
extension of the consideration of the child’s best interests already articulated
in Paragraph 2. Detention of child migrants is explicitly disfavored for
several reasons. Detention almost necessarily entails a separation from the
family unit and other nurturing features of an ordinary childhood, and in this
respect detention may violate the priority due to the family unit in society.
Detention further interferes with the child’s access to education and free
expression and association, thereby frustrating the exercise of numerous
rights due to the child under this and other international human rights
instruments. Furthermore, as has been observed of proceedings involving
children generally, any delay in the final disposition of the child’s legal case
may constitute a harm to the child’s ultimate development as a person;
detention of the child may be understood to be a per se delay in this respect.
(11) In those situations where detention may be appropriate, however,
care must be exercised in ensuring that the circumstances of the detention
appropriately accommodate the particular vulnerabilities of the child. Deten-
183. See SAVE THE CHILDREN, SEPARATED CHILDREN IN EUROPE PROGRAMME: STATEMENT OF
GOOD PRACTICE 2 (3rd ed., 2004).
184. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 6 guarantees the right of everyone to
recognition as a person before the law. Moreover, the Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12.2
guarantees that children shall be granted an opportunity to be heard in proceedings affecting them.
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 6; CRC, supra note 80, art. 12.2. The second sentence of paragraph 2,
art. 7 of this document fully embraces these positions.
185. See GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, CHILD RIGHTS IN EUROPE 30–37 (Council of Europe Publishing
2007) (expressing in greater detail the proper role of the adult speaking as a representative for the
child’s own views in proceedings concerning the child’s welfare and legal status).
186. The Drafting Committee recognizes that translators and attorneys must often be made
available for this purpose. For greater guarantees of children’s access to necessary representatives,
some may favor permanent, institutional establishments with specially qualified representatives. See
Malfrid Grude Flekkøy, The Ombudsman for Children: Conception and Developments, in THE NEW
HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 404, 404–419 (Bob Franklin ed., 2002).
2010] IMBR: A COMMENTARY 451
tion may be intimidating, humiliating, and socially disorienting—all of
which may be particularly harmful to the physically and emotionally vulner-
able condition of the child. On this subject, the Drafting Committee is aware
that many child migrants in detention were originally displaced by wars and
extreme economic hardships; many of these children arrive in detention
already presenting symptoms of traumatic stress disorders and other acute
psychological disruptions. Detention must not advance these unhealthy
conditions, and States must recognize their obligation to specially protect
children—particularly those children whose freedoms have been curtailed by
commitment to State detention facilities.
(12) Origins of Paragraph 4: This paragraph encourages the personal
development and social integration of the child migrant by proceeding in
three parts. First, a State shall effectively and equitably identify the presence
of unaccompanied minor-age migrants in its territory; these children shall
then receive necessary protection from the State. Second, States should
provide formal, reliable means by which unaccompanied minors may be
assigned an appropriate caregiver or guardian. Finally, States should provide
official avenues by which temporary and permanent relief from removal may
be sought by the migrant child.187
(13) As to the first, mandatory measure, this paragraph recognizes that the
duty of States to specially protect the condition of the child requires that
States make themselves aware of the existence of particularly vulnerable
children within their territories. The reference to equitable procedure refers
to medical tests often employed in order to determine the age of young
migrants, who are often close to the age of majority, and to the margin of
error employed in the determination process. In doing so, States must employ
methods that are safe and respect the dignity of migrant children.188 In this
respect, equitable procedures should not force migrants to undergo medical
examinations, should not rely on only one indicator in determining age, and
will err on the side of considering a migrant a child when medical tests are
within the margins of statistical error.189
(14) Enormous personal costs to the child may result from a want of any
adult custodian, and similarly great social costs to the State may attach to the
presence of unsupported and unguided children within the State’s territory.
Upon the recognition of an unaccompanied minor child’s presence, the State
must also take steps to protect the child’s rights and future development.
187. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 80.
188. See Statement of Erika Feller, Address at the EU Seminar on Children Affected by
Armed Conflict and Displacement (Norrkoping 1 March 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
42b970b22.html.
189. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)—VIENNA, RESOURCE BOOK FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ON GOOD PRACTICES IN COMBATING CHILD TRAFFICKING 35–72 (2006);
Lucy Kralj & David Goldberg, UK Government Policy and Unaccompanied Adolescents Seeking
Asylum, 10(4) CHILD & ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH 202, 203–204 (2005). But cf. Unaccompanied
Alien Child Protection Act of 2005, S. 119, 109th Cong. § 105(b) (2005).
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Particular steps to be taken have not been itemized, but the Drafting
Committee considers the fullest social integration and custodial support of
the child to be paramount priorities; formal structures which offer broad
access to health, education, familial support, and—upon attaining an appro-
priate age—employment may be considered best practices.190
(15) The second point made in this paragraph stems from the fundamental
importance of the family in the full development of the child as a person.
Where migrant children have been irreparably or necessarily separated from
their parents, this paragraph adopts the position that it is in the best interests
of all parties for the child to be given access to an appropriate caregiver.
Specific institutions or criteria to be applied in assigning such a caregiver to
an unaccompanied child are not mandated here; instead, States are to
determine in good faith and with appropriate respect for the best interests of
the child how a caregiver should be provided. A formal process should exist,
however, and use of this process must respect all applicable norms of equal
protection, due process, and self-expression which children are due.
(16) Finally, this paragraph suggests that States should provide formal
avenues through which unaccompanied migrant children may seek tempo-
rary or permanent relief from removal. This point must necessarily be read in
concert with the removal rights expressed elsewhere in this Document. A
proper respect for the views of the child embodied in the rights to self-
expression and self-determination would also require, at a minimum, that the
child be heard in respect to a protest against removal. Thus, this paragraph
should be read in conjunction with Paragraph 2, which enshrines the
paramount notion of the best interests of the child. While this point does not
place an affirmative obligation upon States to provide avenues for relief, this
last clause must also not be interpreted as negating the broad asylum
provisions and strict non-refoulement principle contained in the IMBR.
ARTICLE 10
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(1) States shall respect, protect, and promote all civil and political rights
of migrants, including, but not limited to, the following:
a. The rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of
migrants. These rights shall include freedom to have or to adopt
a religion or belief of his or her choice and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice, and teaching;
190. See, Life Projects for Unaccompanied Migrant Minors, Recommendation Rec(2007)9
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 12 July 2007 and explanatory
memorandum, Council of Europe Publishing (2008).
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b. The right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of national boundaries, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of their
choice;
c. The rights of peaceful assembly and of association;
d. The right to the security of person and protection by the State
against violence, bodily harm, or expression inciting violence,
whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual,
group, or institution;
e. The right to liberty of movement within the territory of the host
State and free choice of residence, unless the host State initiates
a formal removal proceeding in accordance with Article 5;
f. Migrants have a right to identity documents. It shall be unlawful
for anyone, other than a duly authorized public official, to
confiscate, destroy, or damage identity documents, work per-
mits, or documents authorizing entry, stay, residence, or establish-
ment in the national territory.
(2) Migrants have the right to protection against national, racial, religious,
or xenophobic hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility,
or violence against migrants. States shall take all appropriate measures to
discourage the advocacy of such hatred and to modify social and cultural
patterns of individual conduct in order to eliminate such hatred.
(3) States should facilitate migrants’ participation in the civil and political
life of their communities and in the conduct of public affairs.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 10: This Article incorporates and emphasizes vital
civil and political rights guaranteed to all people under various human rights
treaties such as the ICCPR, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.191 Article
10 thus highlights the issues that are particularly pertinent to migrants on
account of their minority status, non-majority culture, and often disadvan-
taged position in host countries. By restating the key provisions of existing
documents in a migrant-specific context, this document serves as a basis for
addressing, or reexamining, the serious rights violations that are still being
visited upon migrants and for reminding States that their human rights
191. U.N. Human Rights Comm., ICCPR General Comment 15: Position of Aliens Under the
Covenant, para. 2, Nov. 4, 1986 (expressly stating a general rule extending protections of the ICCPR
to aliens and emphasizing the universal applicability of these rights to all people without regard to
citizenship).
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responsibilities are not limited to their own citizens.192
(2) Problems Addressed: Even though all States are bound by interna-
tional law to provide extensive civil and political rights to all people within
their territories, migrants in many countries face severe difficulties in
claiming and accessing these rights.193 As one commentator has observed,
“[S]tates have improperly deployed the concept of citizenship to carve out
significant exceptions to the universality of human rights protection.”194
(3) Origins of Paragraph 1: The language of subparagraph (a) is taken
directly from Article 18 of the ICCPR and is also found in many subsequent
human rights documents.195 The idea of freedom of religion is expressed
slightly differently in the Universal Declaration196 and with entirely different
language in the Banjul Charter,197 but the concept is the same throughout
human rights law. Human Rights Committee General Comment 15 to the
ICCPR explicitly extends these freedoms to aliens.198
(4) In the ICCPR, the language relating to religious freedom is followed
by three complementary paragraphs that are not reproduced here. The
omission of ICCPR Article 18 Paragraph 2 prohibiting government coercion
is not meant to imply that migrants, unlike citizens, may be subject to
coercion. It is not included because it is not a problem specific to migrants;
rather, States that tend to coerce people within their borders usually do so
regardless of immigration status. Similarly, the omission of ICCPR Article 18
Paragraph 3 does not give migrants freedom to manifest religion in situations
when a state legitimately denies this freedom to citizens. However, only
legitimate, narrow objectives can limit migrants’ rights, which do not exceed
192. See Sandra Bart, Office of the General Counsel of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),
Address at the Special Meeting on Implementation of the Inter-American Program for the Promotion
and Protection of the Human Rights of Migrants, Including Migrant Workers and Their Families
(Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_07/CP18400E13.doc
(emphasizing the need for increased education and public awareness).
193. See U.N. Comm. on Migrant Workers and Jorge A. Bustamante, Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrants, Statement at the U.N. Migrant Workers Convention (Dec. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.december18.net/article/statement-un-committee-migrant-workers-and-special-
rapporteur-bustamante (“Despite the increased efforts of the international community . . . migrants
continue being exposed to commoditization and human rights violations.”); Jorge A. Bustamante,
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Statement to the 11th Session of the Human
Rights Council (June 2, 2009) (outlining 12 allegations of violations of the basic human rights of
migrants in 19 Member States), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go011.
194. James A. Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimination, Citizenship,
and the Rights of Noncitizens, 20(3) ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS. 321, 323 (2006).
195. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 18. See also ECHR, supra note 35, art. 9; CRC, supra note 174,
art. 14; ICMW, supra note 5, art. 12.
196. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 18 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.”).
197. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 8, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217,
245; 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [(hereinafter Banjul Charter)] (“Freedom of conscience, the profession and
free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to
measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms.”).
198. ICCPR General Comment 15, supra note 191, para. 7.
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those lawfully granted to citizens. Language similar to the ICCPR’s para-
graph 4 is found in Article 10 of this document.199
(5) Subparagraph (b) is based on Article 19 of the ICCPR.200 As with
Article 18, only the parts of Article 19 of the ICCPR with specific relevance
to migrants are included in this document. While migrants are more likely to
express themselves in different ways from the majority culture, there is
nothing about the right to hold opinions that justifies greater scrutiny or
persecution of migrants. The rights to freedom of expression granted by this
document are not more or less expansive than those granted by the ICCPR.
(6) Subparagraph (c) is taken from the ECHR, which contains a more
concise version of Articles 21 and 22 of the ICCPR.201 The ability to form
unions, often addressed in the context of freedom of association, is dealt with
in more depth in Article 13 of Paragraph 4 of this document and is omitted
here to avoid repetition. Yet, it should be emphasized in this context that in
order to secure this right effectively, no migrants shall be removed or
detained solely due to their attempt to secure labor, political or social rights
for themselves or others. States retain the ability to abridge these rights for
migrants as well as citizens in certain extreme circumstances provided for by
international law.202
(7) Subparagraph (d) derives from the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.203 Furthermore, the basic
right to liberty and security of one’s person is protected by Paragraph 1 of
Article 16 of the Migrant Workers Convention.204 The exclusion of the
following 9 paragraphs is in the interest of brevity and to avoid repetition of
Articles 4 and 6 of this document; the rights guaranteed to migrant workers
and their families under Article 16 of the ICMW are all intended to apply
under the more general statements found herein.
(8) The language of subparagraph (e) is based on Article 12 of the
ICCPR.205 These rights, and similar rights guaranteed in the ICMW, are
199. See art. 10, para. 2 infra.
200. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19, para. 2; see also ICMW, supra note 6, art. 13, para. 2; ECHR,
supra note 35, art. 10. Compare Banjul Charter, supra note 197, art. 9, paras. 1–2 (“Every individual
shall have the right to receive information. Every individual shall have the right to express and
disseminate his opinions within the law.”).
201. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 11; ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 21–22. See also UDHR, supra note
31, art. 20, para. 1; CRC, supra note 174, art. 15; Banjul Charter, supra note 197, art. 10.
202. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 21 (recognizing the right of States to restrict freedom of
assembly “in conformity with the law . . . [as] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
203. CERD, supra note 80, art. 5(b). The rights included in the other subparagraphs of Art. 6,
para. 1, are found in CERD, art. 5(d) (though expressly abrogable on the basis of citizenship and not
cited individually above).
204. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 16, para. 1.
205. Id. at art. 12, para. 1.
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explicitly granted only to migrants legally within a State.206 This document
confirms that documented migrants should be accorded freedom of move-
ment and residence within the host country. “Free choice of residence” refers
to the freedom of a migrant to choose the location of his or her residence; like
the ICCPR, this document does not recognize the right of aliens to reside in
the territory of a host State.207
(9) The situation of undocumented migrants is more complicated than that
of documented migrants. States may remove an undocumented migrant from
their territory, even if this infringes upon the migrant’s freedom of movement
and residence, so long as the process complies with the rights provided in this
document and other fundamental human rights protections. If a State is
unwilling or unable to initiate lawful removal proceedings, it may not then
resort to restricting the migrant’s freedom of movement or residence.
(10) Subparagraph (f) is inspired by the nearly identical language found in
ICMW Article 21. This responds to a practice among employers and
traffickers of rendering migrants subservient and dependent through abuse of
their positions of power and temporary control of migrants’ identity docu-
ments.
(11) Origins of Paragraph 2: This language builds on ideas found in
Article 20 of the ICCPR.208 Xenophobia has been added to the standard
language in this document, as hatred along these lines is of particular concern
to migrants. Beyond this, the language in this document has been modified
from that of the ICCPR in appreciation of the value of free speech, as
discussed below. The second sentence is taken largely from CEDAW.209
(12) CERD goes even further by condemning the dissemination of ideas
based on racial hatred or incitement to racial discrimination, prohibiting
organizations that promote or incite these ideas, and forbidding public
institutions from promoting or inciting racial discrimination.210 While an
ideal world would not include dissemination of ideas, organizations or public
institutions promoting hatred or discrimination against migrants, the Drafting
Committee favors the shorter, less specific and more practical language of the
ICCPR for this document.
(13) History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: Discrimination, hostility, and
206. Id. at art. 39, para. 1. But cf. Banjul Charter, supra note 197, art. 12, para. 1 (qualifying these
rights based not on migration status specifically but “provided he abides by the law”).
207. ICCPR, General Comment 15, supra note 191, para. 5.
208. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20, para. 2 (“Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”).
209. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 5(a),
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW] (“States Parties shall
take all appropriate measures . . . [t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women.”).
210. CERD, supra note 80, arts. 4(a)–(c).
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violence against migrants represent major problems in many countries.211
States should take affirmative steps to stop this phenomenon by discouraging
such behavior. Where possible, States should prohibit the advocacy of such
hatred by law, as required by the ICCPR.212 However, the ICCPR formula-
tion “prohibited by law” has led to a number of reservations, most notably by
the United States. This document seeks to strike a better balance by
recognizing this problem and the myriad ways States can counter it without
explicitly prohibiting certain speech. Hate crimes legislation is one example,
as is the “comprehensive framework for challenging the various forces that
have created and sustained discrimination,” including changing textbooks,
school programs, and teaching methods, envisioned by CEDAW.213
(14) Origins of Paragraph 3: This language, related to participation in
civil and political life, builds on ideas in the ICCPR and the CERD.214
Though these documents explicitly limit civic rights on the basis of citizen-
ship, they serve as evidence of the importance of these concepts to the full
enjoyment of human rights. This document is the first to extend these rights
to migrants, and the language was chosen with appreciation for the difficul-
ties described below.
(15) History and Purpose of Paragraph 3: Most important is that States
shall recognize the basic right and interest of all people to have a voice in the
policies that affect them. This document creates a duty for States to provide at
least some avenues for these voices to be heard, but stops short of requiring
direct electoral participation at any level. Alien suffrage is a growing trend,
currently available on some level in more than 40 countries.215 This reflects a
number of strong arguments in favor of enfranchising migrants, especially
those migrants who pay taxes, may be drafted into military service, and
otherwise bear the responsibilities of citizenship in the host country.216
211. Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 16, adopted by the World Conference
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 2001 (stating “xeno-
phobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of
the main sources of contemporary racism”); see also Amnesty Int’l, Living in the Shadows: A Primer
on the Human Rights of Migrants, AI Index POL 33/006/2006, Sept. 2006, available at http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL33/006/2006/en/f8aa4dfe-d3fd-11dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/
pol330062006en.html#1.3.Discrimination,%20racism%20and%20xenophobia|outline.
212. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20, para. 2; See also ICCPR, General Comment 11: Prohibition of
Propaganda for War and Inciting National, Racial or Religious Hatrred (Art. 20), para. 2, July 29,
1983.
213. CEDAW, supra note 209, Introduction.
214. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 25 (“Every citizen shall have the right . . . to take part in the
conduct of public affairs.”); CERD, supra note 80, art. 5(c) (“Political rights, in particular the right to
participate in elections—to vote and to stand for election—on the basis of universal and equal
suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to
have equal access to public service.”).
215. Immigrant Voting Project, http://www.immigrantvoting.org (last visited June 30, 2010)
(updated list of all countries that provide such rights, as well as extensive discussion of the topic).
216. See Gabriela Evia, Consent By All the Governed: Reenfranchising Noncitizens as Partners
in America’s Democracy, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (2002); Elise Brozovich, Prospects for Democratic
Change: Non-Citizen Suffrage in America, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 403 (2000) (arguing in
favor of non-citizen voting rights in America).
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(16) The language “participation in civil and political life” is intended to
allow a range of interpretations. In practice, this paragraph can, and perhaps
should, include voting rights in local elections, but it could also be satisfied
by soliciting comments on pertinent proposed laws or policies, soliciting
migrants’ opinions, through a representative on deliberative or advisory
bodies or otherwise, and providing full information about civic rights and
duties.217 Alternatively, it could also be realized in part by permitting or
facilitating association and assembly, whether on community or trade-group
grounds.
(17) The term “direct conduct of public affairs” has been interpreted by
the U.N. Human Rights Committee as “exercis[ing] power as members of
legislative bodies or by holding executive office . . . [or] taking part in
popular assemblies which have the power to make decisions about local
issues.”218 The rights secured by this document are much more limited, and
States preserve the ability to limit these activities to citizens. The meaning of
the term intended here is more akin to the interpretation in Paragraph 8 of
General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, describing those taking part in the
conduct of public affairs as “exerting influence through public debate and
dialogue with their representatives or through their capacity to organize
themselves.”219 Those rights of direct participation reserved to citizens in
Article 25 of the ICCPR220 may be denied to non-citizens in accordance with
Article 2 of the IMBR, although the Drafters encourage States to consider the
arguments in favor of greater suffrage for migrants mentioned above.
(18) Participation in civil and political life will necessarily be limited by
the extent to which a State does not provide meaningful avenues for
participation to its own citizens. This section is primarily directed towards
promoting non-voting participation for migrants. For instance, in States
where all or most local issues are decided by democratic vote, migrants
should be included in this process. European countries, and the European
Union as a whole, provide successful models of non-citizen participation in
civil and political life, including local elections.221
ARTICLE 11
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
(1) Migrants shall be entitled to emergency medical care and to disaster
relief.
217. See Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level, Explana-
tory Report, para. 6, Feb. 5, 1992.
218. ICCPR, General Comment 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and
the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25), para. 7, July 12, 1996.
219. Id. at para. 8.
220. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 25.
221. See, e.g., European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local
Level, Strasbourg, Feb. 5, 1992, Europ. T.S. No. 144.
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(2) Mothers shall, on the basis of equality of treatment with nationals, be
accorded special protection during a reasonable period before and after
childbirth.
(3) Migrants shall be provided access to medical care, social security, and
an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing, and housing.
(4) Migrants shall not, based solely on their status as migrants, be denied
the benefits of any social welfare or insurance program to which they have
contributed.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 11: Economic and social rights are addressed to the
basic needs of an individual to survive, participate in society, and take
advantage of other protected human rights. Economic and social rights
granted to both citizens and migrants vary according to State welfare
systems; these rights are often positive human rights highly associated with
citizenship, but may also entail negative obligations to provide services
without discrimination. State obligations created by these rights are often
costly (e.g. health services, social security), and States may balk at spending
funds on those non-citizens who are not juridical members of the community.
The purpose of this Article is to highlight existing international law on social
and economic rights, ensure that migrants are not marginalized by States
purely on account of their status as migrants, and emphasize economic and
social rights that have the most impact on migrants—health and benefits from
programs to which migrants have contributed.
(2) The bulk of international law on economic and social rights stems
from the UDHR and the ICESCR. General Comment 3 to the ICESCR
interprets the instrument to apply the principle of progressive realization,
defining it as “recognition of the fact that full realization of all economic,
social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short
period of time.”222 While the IMBR does not utilize the principle of
progressive realization, the principles in this article match the core obliga-
tions under the ICESCR regime, which, despite the progressive realization
principle, set a minimum standard of core rights for States: “a State party in
which any significant number of individuals is deprived of . . . essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing . . . is, prima facie, failing to
discharge its obligations under the [ICESCR]. If the [ICESCR] were to be
read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it
would be largely deprived of its raison d’eˆtre.”223 Therefore, the rights in this
222. CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, para. 9,
U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (Dec. 14, 1990), reprinted in Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 9 (2003).
223. Id. at para. 10.
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article align with core international law obligations.
(3) Origins of Paragraph 1: The rights to emergency medical care and
disaster relief are assured in the UDHR and the ICESCR.224 The right to
emergency medical care is explicitly stated in the International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families.225 Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires
member States to “ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and
health care to all children.”226 CERD and CEDAW also aim to protect the
right to health.227 The right to health is additionally protected in several
regional treaties228 and soft law instruments.229
(4) History and Purpose of Paragraph 1: Health is an issue of critical
concern to migrants, who often suffer poorer health than the rest of the
population. This provision regarding emergency medical care and disaster
relief balances the breadth of the right against the narrow population
endowed with it (i.e. an entitlement to care regardless of ability to pay, but
only to migrants in emergency situations). The term “disaster relief” encom-
passes more than medical care in that it is intended to secure wider relief in
times of disaster including temporary housing, clothing and food.
(5) Origins of Paragraph 2: Special care for mothers before, during and
after childbirth has been identified as a right in the UDHR, the CRC, the
ICESCR, and the CEDAW.230 In particular, the CEDAW explicitly states the
need for free services for women before, during, and after childbirth. The
CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No. 24 highlights the
special attention needed by vulnerable and disadvantaged groups of women,
such as migrants and refugees.231
(6) History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: Although improving maternal
health was one of the UN General Assembly’s goals adopted in the Millen-
224. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 27, art. 12 (“The steps to be taken by the
States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those
necessary for: . . . (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and
other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical
attention in the event of sickness.”).
225. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 28.
226. CRC, supra note 80, art 24.
227. See CERD, supra note 80, art. 5(e)(iv); CEDAW, supra note 209, art. 11.1(f).
228. See e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 110, art. 16; African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 14(2)(b), Jul. 11, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
24.9/49 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999); European Social Charter art. 11, Oct. 18, 1961, revised
May 3, 1996, Europ. T.S. 163 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965); Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 10, Nov. 17,
1988, O.A.S.T.S. 69 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999).
229. C.H.R. Res. 2002/31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/31 (Apr. 22, 2002); Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, supra note 36, at ¶¶ I.18, I.24, I.31, II.41.
230. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 25; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 10(2); CRC, supra note 80, art.
24(2); CEDAW, supra note 209, art. 12.
231. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 24:
Women and Health (Article 12), U.N. Doc. A/54/38/ Rev.1 (1999).
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nium Declaration,232 the reality remains that many migrant mothers receive
inferior care. Marginalized women, including ethnic minorities and those in
poverty, are particularly vulnerable to maternal mortality.233 Undocumented
pregnant women are more likely to receive delayed pre-natal care and be
victims of violence than legally resident pregnant women.234 The right of
mothers to protection before, during and after childbirth is a broad right, but
for a narrow and often vulnerable population. The purpose of the right is to
ensure that women receive reproductive health care that is adequate to meet
demand, accessible physically and economically, without discrimination, and
of good quality.235
(7) Origins of Paragraph 3: An adequate standard of living—including
food, clothing, housing, medical care and social security—stems from the
core social rights articulated in the UDHR and the ICESCR.236 Additionally,
the CRC binds State Parties to “strive to ensure that no child is deprived of
his or her right of access to [the highest attainable standard of health],”237
(emphasis added) and to recognize the right for every child to “benefit from
social security.”238 Health and social security rights are also guaranteed in the
Refugee Convention and in the CERD.239
(8) History and Purpose of Paragraph 3: This paragraph grants equality
in access to social and economic rights to migrants. Apart from legal status,
“availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of services depend on
various other influences, including social, cultural, structural, linguistic,
gender, financial and geographical factors.”240 In many countries, migrants
do not take advantage of the health care to which they are entitled because of
knowledge gaps and cultural differences. For example, studies have shown
232. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2
(Sept. 18, 2000).
233. The Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, ¶ 10, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/338 (Sept. 13, 2006).
234. Int’l Org. for Migration [IOM], Migration: A Social Determinant of the Health of Migrants,
at 12, Background Paper for the Assisting Migrants and Communities (AMAC): Analysis of Social
Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities project (2006) (prepared by Anita A. Davies, Anna
Basten, Chiara Frattini).
235. See, e.g., ICESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of
health, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6
at 12 (2003); The Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, supra note 233,
at ¶ 17.
236. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 33, arts. 9, 11(1), 12.
237. CRC, supra note 5, art. 24(1); See also CRC, supra note 5, arts. 2(4)-(2).
238. CRC, supra note 5, art. 26(1).
239. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 24(1)(b); CERD, supra note
80, art. 5(e).
240. IOM, Migration: A Social Determinant of the Health of Migrants, supra note 234, at 11;
CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, supra
note 235.
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that migrant women underutilize reproductive health services.241 Therefore,
countries may be able to improve migrants’ access to health care by meeting
the accessibility and quality requirements of the right to health.
(9) Although the ICESCR applies the progressive realization principle to
the right to health, the ICESCR sets a minimum standard of core obligations
for States Parties.242 The purpose of this article is to apply this non-
discrimination rationale to migrants and ensure that States do not arbitrarily
deny migrants access to health care based on their migrant status. Access
must convey different content in different circumstances. Particularly, States
may distinguish between offering paid and free access to economic and
social services as long as the distinction follows Article 2(2) of the IMBR, i.e.
is pursuant to a legitimate aim, has an objective justification, and is reason-
ably proportional. As noted in the commentary to Article 2 above, reasonable
proportionality should be seen as a continuum. In making such distinctions,
States should take into consideration, among other factors, the degree of a
migrant’s connection to the host State, as well as the degree of the develop-
ment of the right in that society.
(10) Issues Raised by Paragraph 3: Many countries do not link social
rights to citizenship, but rather entitle permanent residents and other legal
immigrants to certain social rights. Access varies according to immigration
status, type of social benefit and country. This paragraph is at the forefront of
State practice by guaranteeing a form of non-discrimination to all migrants.
(11) Origins of Paragraph 4: This Paragraph is analogous to Article 27 of
the ICMW243 and Article 9 of the ICESCR.244
(12) History and Purpose of Paragraph 4: In some States, migrants
contribute to social or health insurance programs, or to income and other
taxes, on the same basis as nationals. In such cases, contributions should
ensure enjoyment of the benefits. Thus, payment of taxes for the purpose of
health insurance, pensions or social security should ensure access to these
benefits, regardless of legal status. As a result, States may tax migrants
earning a salary in accordance with national laws and on the basis of equality
of treatment with nationals. Conversely, States that make distinctions among
and between migrants that conform to both Article 2 of the IMBR and the
present article cannot then tax migrants and also deny eligibility for benefits
derived from their contribution.
241. IOM, Migration: A Social Determinant of the Health of Migrants, supra note 234, at 11.
242. CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, ¶ 10,
U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
243. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 27(1).
244. ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 9 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”).
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ARTICLE 12
CULTURAL RIGHTS
(1) Migrants have the right to enjoy their own cultures and to use their
own languages, either individually or in community with others, and in
public or private.
(2) Migrants’ rights to manifest their religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice, and teaching shall not be indirectly restricted through
regulation that places disproportionate administrative or disproportionate
financial burdens on such activities.
(3) To ensure the religious, cultural, linguistic, and moral education of
their children in conformity with their own convictions, the liberty of migrant
parents to choose for their children schools other than those established by
the public authorities shall be respected. Such schools shall conform to such
non-arbitrary minimum educational standards as may be established by the
State.
(4) States shall not impede, but should encourage and support, migrants’
efforts to preserve their cultures by means of educational and cultural
activities, including the preservation of minority languages and knowledge
related to a migrant’s culture. Nothing in this provision shall mean that States
may not adopt measures to promote acquisition and knowledge of the
majority, national or official language or languages of the State.
(5) States should take appropriate steps to promote public awareness and
acceptance of the cultures of migrants by means of educational and cultural
activities, including minority languages and knowledge related to the mi-
grant’s own culture.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 12: Article 12 asserts the fundamental right of
migrants to enjoy their own cultures. Thus, the article proposes a framework
for respecting, protecting and promoting migrants’ cultural rights that derives
from both the civil and political rights regime as well as the economic, social
and cultural rights regime.
(2) Origin of Article 12: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that “[e]veryone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of
the community.”245 The UDHR also protects cultural rights that may be
“indispensible for [a person’s] dignity and the free development of [the
person’s] personality.”246 The ICCPR recognizes the right of migrants, as
“ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities . . . to enjoy their own cul-
ture . . . or to use their own language.”247 Article 27 of the ICCPR also
245. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 27.
246. Id. at art. 22.
247. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 27.
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recognizes minorities’ right “to practice their own religion.” This document
recognizes religion as an individual right, and not one that is necessarily
determined by one’s culture. Yet the IMBR promotes a framework that also
respects the communal nature of cultural development and practice. This
document, following the ICCPR, applies to all persons, without regard to
nationality or status.248 This article thus reaffirms States’ obligation to
provide equal protection of the cultural rights of all people, including
migrants. Drawing from both the ICCPR and the UDHR, this Article affirms
that migrants may participate and contribute to both their national culture and
the minority culture of a migrant community or communities.
(3) History and Purpose of Paragraph 1: A migrant’s right to a cultural
identity includes his or her right to reject—as well as accept—in whole or in
part, association with a particular group identity, as emphasized in the phrase
“individually or in community” in Article 12(1) of the IMBR. Thus, neither
the State nor a cultural group should assume that a person’s cultural
background automatically demonstrates adherence to particular loyalties,
beliefs or practices. The right to a cultural identity is rooted in the individual
right to self-determination and does not by itself provide a right to make
decisions on behalf of others without their consent. The Drafting Committee
emphasized that protecting cultural rights should be seen as opening doors
and never as coercive.
(4) History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: This article promotes parents’
rights to educate their children in conformity with their beliefs as a universal
human right with special bearing on migrants. Education affects one’s
cultural identity and beliefs. Human rights instruments recognize a parental
right to direct the moral upbringing of one’s children.249 This right takes on
additional practical importance when considered in the context of migration.
This paragraph should be construed to permit the education of temporary
migrant workers’ children in the language of the migrants’ State of origin
and, as far as possible, in accordance with the educational standards of that
State of origin. In the case of settled migrants, migrant children’s interest in
preserving their culture and maintaining a culturally-based support network
may be in competition with their interest in successful integration in the host
State. States should take measures to ensure that such balancing decisions are
left to the discretion of migrant parents. States with an objective of educating
all children within the State system should pursue this objective not through
compulsion, but through compromises, such as providing meaningful alterna-
tives to elements that infringe on the rights contained herein.
248. Id. at art. 2(1).
249. Id. at art. 18.4; UDHR, supra note 31, art. 2(3); ECHR, supra note 35, Protocol 1, art. 2;
ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 13(3); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, supra note 34, art. 5(1); UNESCO Convention against
Discrimination in Education art.2(b), Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force May 22,
1962).
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(5) History and Purpose of Paragraph 3: Religion is a key aspect of
cultural identity. This paragraph builds on the ideas about freedom of religion
discussed above and in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, as well as the
ICCPR framework, and applies them to a context with particular salience for
migrants. Many migrants practice a religion that is not familiar to the host
country and therefore not established in it. Thus, these migrants are often in a
disadvantaged position in their ability to freely practice their religion as
compared with nationals and adherents to established faiths. When States
impose or allow hurdles such as high fees, denials of applications or unequal
tax burdens to prevent the development of a religion (e.g. the construction of
places of worship or religious schools), this can constitute an impermissible
burden on the ability of the religion’s adherents to freely practice that
religion. Positive assistance to migrants regarding freedom of worship is
recognized in the European Union.250 Paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the IMBR
does not mandate providing religions practiced predominantly by migrants
with more benefits than religions practiced by citizens or nationals. Rather, it
suggests that signatory States provide the same level of assistance to migrant
religions as is available to nationals and prevent obstacles that are discrimina-
tory. Thus, states with one or more officially recognized religions could
theoretically give preferential administrative and financial treatment to those
religions without contradicting the provisions of the IMBR. Such circum-
stances shall be evaluated under Article 2 of this Document. Any burdens
placed by the State on the establishment or practice of certain religions must
be non-arbitrary and proportionate to the legitimate goal served by the
burden.
(6) History and Purpose of Paragraph 4: States are asked to recognize
their obligations regarding language and cultural preservation, duties that
primarily take the form of non-interference. Under Paragraph 4, States are
not obligated to allocate resources to language and cultural preservation, but
such a practice is encouraged and resources that are available should be
distributed on a non-discriminatory basis. Official support for such activities
should complement the activities of stakeholders from within relevant
migrant communities. Paragraph 4 also encourages efforts by signatory
States to promote the social, cultural and/or linguistic integration of migrants.
This recognizes the fundamental importance of understanding and communi-
cation in fostering tolerant relationships between migrant and non-migrant
communities. However, integration must be balanced against respect for
migrants’ rights. For example, the ECHR has suggested that, “pursu[ing] an
aim of indoctrination . . . might be considered as not respecting . . . [the]
250. European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers art. 10(3), Nov. 24, 1977,
Europ. T.S. 93.
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religious and philosophical convictions [of migrants].”251
(7) History and Purpose of Paragraph 5: According to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”252 Because tolerance
and respect for migrants will depend in part on knowledge of minority
cultures, States’ obligation to respect, protect and promote the human rights
of migrants requires States to encourage understanding and tolerance of
migrants’ culture through appropriate cultural activities. These efforts may
include, inter alia, incorporating the study of the migrants’ culture or history
in public education, providing funding for museums, teaching the minority
language as a second language in public school systems, facilitating the
organization of cultural fairs or support for public broadcasting in minority
languages.
ARTICLE 13
LABOR RIGHTS
(1) A migrant shall never be subject to servitude, slavery, or forced labor.
A migrant’s right to work and to free choice of employment shall only be
restricted pursuant to a legitimate aim, when the restriction has an objective
justification, and when reasonable proportionality exists between the means
employed and the aims sought to be realized.
(2) A migrant has the right to be remunerated at a just and favorable level
for his or her work. Migrants must be informed of working conditions, labor
laws, and means of seeking assistance and legal support in the receiving State
in a language they understand.
(3) States may not arbitrarily change or terminate a work permit.
(4) A migrant shall be protected by laws respecting, inter alia, minimum
wages, minimum working age, maximum hours, safety and health standards,
protection against dismissal, and the rights to join trade unions, to organize,
or to take part in collective bargaining.
(5) States must take all appropriate measures to protect migrants from
being compelled or induced to accept conditions of work below standards
mandated by national law. States must prohibit employers or employees from
privately contracting for worse conditions of work than those mandated by
national law.
(6) States shall seek to identify, eliminate, and provide remedies for
abusive labor conditions, with special attention to labor agreements that bind
251. Folgerø v. Norway, No. 15472/02, para. 84(h) (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jun. 29, 2007), http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?actionhtml&documentId819532&portalhbkm&source
externalbydocnumber&tableF69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
252. Universal Declaration of Human Rights Preamble, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at
71 (Dec. 10, 1948); see also ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 27; CERD, supra note 80, art. 7.
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migrants to particular employers. States should establish effective penalties
for violations of these rights and take appropriate measures to ensure that
these rights are ensured.
(7) Migrants have the right to claim these rights and receive remedies
regardless of their legal status.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 13: This Article reaffirms a number of existing
labor rights found in key international human rights instruments. It also seeks
to underscore the need for vigilance and diligence on the part of States in
providing access to accurate information on labor laws and working condi-
tions, ensuring domestic enforcement of labor rights, protecting vulnerable
migrants from abusive working conditions and prosecuting those who abuse
migrant labor. Finally, the Article reinforces the right of migrants, regardless
of legal status, to claim labor rights and receive appropriate remedies.
(2) Problems Addressed: Many migrants leave their native countries in
search of better economic prospects. Even those motivated by other factors
such as persecution, discrimination or armed conflict must earn a livelihood
upon settling in receiving States. Migrants often must overcome significant
obstacles in finding employment, including language barriers, lack of knowl-
edge of the local job market, non-recognition of qualifications from the State
of origin and poor understanding of local employment laws. As a result, they
are particularly susceptible to victimization through exploitative hiring
practices.253
(3) Upon securing employment, migrants face additional challenges,
including discrimination, harassment, poor and unsafe working conditions,
abusive and illegal contractual terms, persistent job insecurity and fear of
expulsion upon employment termination. These challenges often persist
because local labor laws may be inapplicable to migrants or governments
may simply refuse to apply relevant laws to situations of migrant employ-
ment. Migrants also are often employed in the informal economy where it is
much harder for them to obtain the protection of the State, particularly when
migrants are in an irregular status. Migrants also may not be aware of their
rights and available remedies and, even if they are aware, often lack access to
253. See U.N. Secretary General, Note by the Secretary General on Human Rights of Migrants,
¶¶ 35–36, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/292 (Aug. 9, 2002), available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/518/32/PDF/N0251832.pdf?OpenElement; Global Migration Group,
International Migration and Human Rights (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/
myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/partnerships/docs/int_migration_human_rights.pdf; U.N. Comm. on Migrant
Workers, Report of the Committee on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, U.N.
GAOR, 63rd Sess., Supp. No. 48, U.N. Doc.A/63/48 (2008), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G08/427/31/PDF/G0842731.pdf?OpenElement; ILO, Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the
Global Economy, Int’l Labour Conf., 92nd Sess., 2004 (Geneva, 2004) [hereinafter Towards a Fair Deal],
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/–dgreports/–dcomm/documents/meetingdocument/
kd00096.pdf.
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resources needed to claim and vindicate such rights.254
(4) Many migrants arrive in receiving States as the result of smuggling or
human trafficking operations. Such migrants are typically subject to highly
exploitative terms of employment and are sometimes compelled into prostitu-
tion or other forms of forced labor. Migrants are also often highly susceptible
to various forms of economic exploitation and physical abuse, as their ability
to remain in the receiving State may be tied to continued employment with
the same sponsoring employer. This last problem is particularly acute for
those migrants employed as domestic workers.255
(5) One of the reasons States typically restrict immigration is to protect
the domestic labor market, shielding native workers from competition and
attempting to ensure low levels of unemployment. However, States some-
times encourage the migration of certain classes of workers in order to fill a
lacuna or restructure the domestic labor market. Special categories or
conditions of employment are created to promote the inflow of these
migrants and to regulate their activities upon arrival. However, as indicated
above, such measures may facilitate exploitative or discriminatory practices
on the part of employers.256
(6) Origins of Paragraph 1: The right to work derives from UDHR
Article 23, as well as Article 6 of the ICECSR and Article 15 of the ACHPR.
The prohibition against servitude, slavery and forced labor has long been
recognized in international law. Slavery was first abolished by Great Britain
in 1807 and its prohibition has subsequently become enshrined in customary
international law as one of the few recognized jus cogens norms.257 Slavery
is outlawed by the 1926 Slavery Convention, and paragraphs outlawing
slavery and servitude can be found in UDHR Article 4, ICCPR Article 8,
ECHR Article 4, ACHR Article 6, ACHPR Article 5 and ICMW Article 11.
Forced labor is defined by International Labor Organization (“ILO”) Conven-
tion 29 as “all work or service for which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily”.258 Forced labor is banned in ICCPR Article 8, ECHR
Article 8, ACHR Article 6 and ICMW Article 11, as well as in ILO
Conventions No. 29 and 105 (174 and 169 ratifications respectively).
254. See Towards a Fair Deal, supra note 253; Report of The Committee on the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and their Families, supra note 253; International Migration and Human Rights,
supra note 253; Human Rights of Migrants, supra note 253.
255. See J.M. RAMIREZ-MACHADO, DOMESTIC WORK, CONDITIONS OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT: A
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (ILO 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/condtrav/
pdf/7cws.pdf; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur: Ms. Gabriela Rodrı´guez Pizarro on Specific Groups and Individuals: Migrant Workers,
Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/46, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/76 (Jan. 12,
2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/0/0032d58d2667f0b9c1256e700050f77f?
OpenDocument.
256. JEAN-MICHEL SERVAIS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW, 226–27 (2005).
257. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: “Jus Cogens” and “Obligatio Erga
Omnes”, 59 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 63, 68 (1996).
258. ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, June 10, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 55.
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(7) History and Purpose—Paragraph 1: The right to work does not place
a burden on the State to employ migrants or to specifically create private or
public sector jobs for them. Moreover, migrants may be precluded from
seeking or taking employment as per Article 2(2), which allows for certain
distinctions in the treatment of migrants. Similarly, access to any employ-
ment assistance, for example, could be limited by application of Article 2(2)
if appropriate. Nevertheless, those States party to ILO Convention 97 (49
ratifications) remain bound to provide such assistance (see infra para. 11).
(8) The prohibition against slavery is an absolute, non-derogable jus
cogens norm. However, with regard to forced labor, many human rights
instruments contain a list of exceptions under which such labor is permis-
sible. These include the imposition of compulsory labor as a criminal
sanction for the commission of a crime as pronounced by a competent court,
military service, emergency civil service, and any work or service compris-
ing normal civic obligations. The IMBR’s prohibition on forced labor
implicitly includes these same exceptions so as to avoid privileging migrants
over citizens.
(9) Origins of Paragraph 2: The right to “just and favorable” remunera-
tion is enshrined in UDHR Article 23. The Declaration links this right to the
ability of the individual to provide an “existence worthy of human dignity”
for himself and his family.259 This right is echoed in the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man Article XIV, ICESCR Article 7, CERD
Article 5 and the ILO Philadelphia Declaration. Article 25 of the ICMW
provides that migrant workers should enjoy treatment not less favorable than
that received by nationals with regard to remuneration.
(10) History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: The right to just and favorable
remuneration is essentially a right to a fair and decent wage. It should not be
confused with the right to “equal remuneration for equal work,” which is
captured in Paragraph 4 and is an equality/anti-discrimination provision. It
also does not per se impose an obligation on States to ensure remuneration of
migrants at a level above nationals.
(11) The obligation to inform individuals of working conditions, labor
laws and means of seeking assistance and legal support can be found in
several instruments. Article 6 of the ICESCR obliges States Parties to
provide technical and vocational guidance, while Article 2 of ILO Conven-
tion 97 requires States to provide migrants with an “adequate and free service
to assist migrants for employment . . . in particular to provide them with
accurate information.”260 Article 7 of the same convention requires ILO
Members to ensure that any public employment services provided to mi-
259. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 23.
260. ILO Convention No. 97 concerning Migration for Employment (Revised), July 1, 1949,
1616 U.N.T.S. 120.
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grants are rendered free of charge.261 The IMBR’s obligation to inform
migrants, as per the commentary to Article 2 above, includes the responsibil-
ity of States to legislate or otherwise ensure that employers inform their
migrant employees as required by this Article. Every migrant worker should
be informed, when beginning employment, in a language he or she under-
stands, of his or her labor rights in the receiving state.
(12) Issues Raised by Paragraph 2: In addition to “fair and just remunera-
tion,” many international instruments (ICMW Article 25, ICESCR Article 7,
ACHPR Article 15, ILO Convention No. 97 Article 6, CEDAW Article 11)
speak of “equal remuneration for equal work.” This principle can mean both
equal remuneration between categories of migrants (e.g. between women and
men, or migrants of different ages and ethnicities) and between migrants and
non-migrants. The principal is thus important to preventing both inter-
migrant discrimination and discrimination between migrants and citizens.
Therefore IMBR embraces both such interpretations.
(13) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 3: This paragraph is inspired by
the nearly identical language found in ICMW Article 21. Article 8 of ILO
Convention 143 (23 ratifications) prohibits States from expelling legally
present migrants on the basis of loss of employment. Similarly, Article 8 of
ILO Convention 97 prohibits the expulsion of migrants whose employment
is terminated on the basis of illness contracted or injury sustained subsequent
to the migrant’s arrival. The IMBR’s wording implies that the only legitimate
way to change or terminate a migrant’s work permit will be as a result of a
legally enacted process, and after ensuring the migrant’s right of due process.
(14) Origins of Paragraph 4: The protections found in Paragraph 4 most
closely echo Articles 25 and 54 of the ICMW and Article 6 of ILO
Convention 97. Similar language can be found in ICESCR Article 7, which
provides for fair wages and safe and healthy working conditions; ACHPR
Article 15, which asserts the right to work under equitable and satisfactory
conditions; Articles 10 and 12(g) of ILO Convention 143; and Article 5 of
CERD.
(15) History and Purpose of Paragraph 4: This paragraph asserts that
migrants shall be protected by laws protecting laborers. The itemized list of
labor laws provided in this paragraph is inclusive and non-exhaustive. Where
such laws do not already exist, such as in unregulated sectors of the economy
that disproportionately employ migrants, this paragraph imposes an obliga-
tion on States to create such laws, thereby ensuring a basic minimum
standard for migrants.
(16) The right to form trade unions is a more specific application of the
right to freedom of association indicated in Article 10. The explicit right to
form and join trade unions is found in UDHR Article 23, CERD Article 5,
261. Id.
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ICCPR Article 22 and ECHR Article 11. ACHR Article 16 and ACHR
Article 15 do not mention union organization, but do recognize the right to
freedom of association, a right that has commonly been interpreted to
encompass the right to join unions. However, it must be noted that none of
these treaties explicitly recognizes the right to collective bargaining. In
mandating this right, the IMBR draws inspiration from ILO Conventions 87
and 98 (150 and 160 ratifications respectively), which both provide for the
right to union organization as well as the right to collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining right is further guaranteed by ILO Convention 154 (40
ratifications), is part of the ILO’s Philadelphia Declaration, and is implicit in
the ILO Constitution.262
(17) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 5: This paragraph is intended to
ensure that migrants receive the full benefit of national laws regulating
conditions of employment. Its wording is borrowed substantially from
Article 25 of the ICMW, which prohibits any “derogation in private contracts
from the principle of equality of treatment” for migrants with regard to
conditions of employment.263
(18) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 6: This paragraph specifically
aims to eliminate the practice of ‘binding,’ whereby a migrant’s continued
stay in the receiving State is conditioned upon continued employment by the
same (often sponsoring) employer. In Israel, a 2006 High Court of Justice
ruling held that binding was no longer permissible in the Israeli agriculture,
light industry and care-giving sectors.264 The practice does, however, remain
lawful in the construction sector. In many other States, binding is common-
place and remains a major contributing factor in the creation of coercive and
exploitative labor conditions, as bound employees are typically loath to
report such conditions for fear of removal. The IMBR thus seeks to prohibit
this practice.
(19) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 7: ICMW Articles 54 and 83
guarantee migrant workers effective remedies against violations of the
Convention, as well as the right to address complaints regarding violations
of work contracts to a competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authority. ICMW Article 25(3) requires States Parties to take all appropriate
measures to protect the rights of migrant workers. ICMW Articles 54 and
83 guarantee migrant workers effective remedies against violations of
the Convention, as well as the right to address complaints regarding viola-
tions of work contracts to a competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authority.
262. Virginia Leary, The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29 (Lance A. Compa and Stephen F. Diamond, eds., 1996).
263. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 25.
264. See Kav LaOved Worker’s Hotline v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006] (1) IsrLR (1) 260.
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ARTICLE 14
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Migrants have the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others. No migrant shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her property.
Any lawful taking shall be accompanied by just compensation at a level
equal to nationals and that is prompt, adequate, and effective.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 14: Article 14 addresses an important civil and
political right that directly impacts the livelihoods of migrants and their
families residing in the migrant’s host country, the migrant’s country of
origin or in a third country. The right to own property necessarily includes
corollary rights to purchase, or otherwise lawfully acquire, manage, enjoy,
administer, sell, transfer, remit or dispose of such property, whether free of
charge or with compensation. The term “alone” denotes a migrant’s right to
own property solely and indivisibly in his or her personal capacity. The
phrase “in association with others” denotes a migrant’s right to own a single
or multiple stakes in property interests that are owned by more than one
individual, regardless of whether such other individuals reside in or are
nationals of the migrant’s host state, country of origin or a third state.
(2) Problem Addressed: As non-citizens, often with unregulated status,
migrants are particularly susceptible to intimidation, discrimination and
confiscation measures that may arbitrarily deprive them of their property.
Article 14 therefore recognizes the central economic reality of property
ownership among migrants and prohibits States from taking migrants’
property without legal justification and compensation. The ability to own
property, and have this property safeguarded against unlawful confiscation, is
central to ensuring the economic safety, stability and prosperity of migrants
and their families. As a tool of economic prosperity, property ownership can
facilitate other related rights, including civil, social, health, education and
other rights delineated in the IMBR. Moreover, migrants will, often by
necessity, engage in economic transactions that involve purchasing, selling,
transferring, remitting or otherwise disposing of various forms of property
across, between and within State boundaries.
(3) Origins of Article 14: The right to own property and the concomitant
right against the arbitrary deprivation of property have long been recognized
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).265 These interrelated
principles, including the right to just compensation, have also been affirmed
265. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 17 (“(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as
in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”).
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in other international266 and regional267 human rights and refugee instru-
ments. Article 14 purposefully does not draw a distinction based on the
migrant’s legal status with regard to rights associated with property owner-
ship.
(4) Article 14 places a legal obligation on States to ensure that all takings
of property owned by migrants must be carried out in accordance with law.
Property cannot be seized arbitrarily, without reasonable cause or just
compensation, or pursuant to discriminatory policies. If a taking is carried
out in accordance with national law, it must, by necessity, be compensated for
under international law.268 Article 14 thus requires States to provide compen-
sation to migrants and their families that reflects a just remedy for losses
caused by a lawful taking.
(5) History and Purpose—Definition: The scope of Article 14 is inspired
primarily by the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1954 Statelessness Conven-
tion269 and the ICMW. The definition therefore covers all private possessions
and assets that migrants may have acquired in their country of origin prior to
entering the host country, in a third country en route to their present host
country or in their host country.270 Furthermore, similar to the property rights
set forth in the ICMW for migrant workers,271 the IMBR guarantees this right
for all migrants and their families regardless of their nationality, or their
immigration or asylum status.272
(6) Origins—Arbitrary Deprivation: International,273 regional274 and mu-
266. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 15; CEDAW, supra note 209, arts. 15(2), 16(1)(h); CERD, supra
note 80, art. 5(d)(v); Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons arts. 13–14, Sept. 28,
1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117; Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, arts. 13–14.
267. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217
(1982); American Convention on Human Rights art. 21(1), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143,
9 I.L.M. 99 (1969); ECHR, supra note 35, art. 1; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, Res. XXX, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States (Pan American
Union), Bogota, Colombia, Mar. 30–May 2, 1948, at 38, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003).
268. A.R. Albrecht, Taxation of Aliens in International Law, 29 B.Y.I.L. 145 (1952).
269. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 13; see also Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 13, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
270. Although Article 12’s compensatory scope is restricted to lawful takings within migrants’
host countries, the same human rights instruments that protect migrant property regardless of
citizenship also protect against unlawful property expropriation in their countries of origin.
271. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families art. 15, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93.
272. Article 12 mirrors the detailed provisions of Articles 13 and 14 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention. As such, the property rights elaborated in this Article are applicable to refugees as well
as asylum seekers, regardless of their status. See Commentary to Article 1 defining who qualifies as a
“migrant,” Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 1. As migrants, their
status, whether regulated or not, does not impinge on their right to own property and not have it
arbitrarily confiscated. As noted above, this right is limited by the legitimate public interests of and
lawful provisions enacted by host states, as stipulated in particular IMBR Articles.
273. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 17(2); see also ICMW, supra note 6, art. 15.
274. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217
(1982); Council of Europe, ECHR, supra note 35, art. 1.
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nicipal law275 have long prohibited arbitrary deprivation of property. The
term “arbitrary” restricts the State’s ability to take, destroy, or otherwise
render unusable, private property owned, in whole or in part, by migrants and
their families. A State can only expropriate private property with reasonable
justification, in accordance with laws of general application and subsequent
to clearly defined, non-discriminatory procedures. As such, the State may not
deprive a migrant of his or her property absent due consideration of the
interests and legitimate expectations of the individual migrant and his or her
family, which are required to be weighed against the legitimate public
interests of the State. Correspondingly, the State may not take a migrant’s
private property pursuant to a law that permits arbitrary deprivation of
property.
(7) Although Article 14 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property, it
implicitly recognizes that States may have legitimate peacetime and wartime
interests in taking or managing property to serve legitimate public ends.
These include, but are not restricted to, regulating the purchase, use,
distribution, transfer, remittance or disposal of various types of property and
assets, in whole or in part, as well as securing “payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”276
(8) History and Purpose—Compensation: In circumstances of lawful
taking by the State, Article 14 seeks to ensure migrants and their families
receive just compensation for their losses. Hewing close to the language of
Article 15 of the ICMW,277 the IMBR provides a more detailed compensa-
tion blueprint for States Parties engaged in lawful takings. If a taking, either
in whole or in part, is carried out in accordance with law, the IMBR requires
States to (1) provide compensation equal to, or exceeding, compensation
levels accorded to nationals of the host state that represents full indemnity for
the loss or damage sustained by the owner of the property and (2) this
compensation must be delivered in a manner and speed that allows for the
owner to be adequately compensated in a reasonable amount of time.
(9) History and Purpose—Corollary Rights: Implied in Article 14 are
corollary rights and prohibitions implied by the right to property, such as:
(1) the right of migrants to transfer property, including goods and assets,
which they have brought into or acquired in the host state to another country
or back to their countries of origin (including remittances);278 and (2) the
275. See, e.g., IR. CONST., 1937, art. 43; GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 14 (F.R.G.);
S. AFR. CONST. sec. 25 (1996); Canadian Bill of Rights Act sec. 1 (1960); Act for the Recognition
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms S.C. 1960, ch. 44 (Can.).
276. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 1.
277. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 15. (“Where, under the legislation in force in the State of
employment, the assets of a migrant worker or a member of his or her family are expropriated in
whole or in part, the person concerned shall have the right to fair and adequate compensation.”).
278. Migrants often need to transfer assets, including remittances, between countries, by virtue
of migration patterns to and from countries of origin, host states or third countries. Article 12
therefore implicitly provides for a right to transfer assets within and outside the borders of the host
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prohibition of racial and gender discrimination with respect to the rights of
migrants to own property alone as well as in association with others.279
(10) Article 14 is particularly important in contexts of war and occupation
and incorporates the protections afforded to protected persons under interna-
tional humanitarian law and the laws of war. Prohibitions against the
destruction and seizure of property of protected persons, inclusive of mi-
grants,280 are long established in international law.281 Finally, existing
humanitarian law protections also extend to the property rights of migrants
and their families in situations of internment or assignment of residence
during war.282
state. This right is articulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention for refugees undergoing resettlement.
See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 30. This right is of particular
significance in the contexts of individual or mass removals, expulsions or deportations. See id. at
art. 4. Article 12 also implicitly permits migrants and their families to transfer assets following lawful
removal proceedings. At the same time, it prohibits States from confiscating and thus arbitrarily
depriving migrants and their families of property through deportation, expulsion or other forms of
removal. The right to transfer property, however, is not absolute. The transfer of goods and assets, in
whole or in part, across state boundaries falls within the legitimate purview of host states. Transfers
may be subject to State customs and taxation regulations and may be scrutinized and regulated to
conform to legitimate national security policies.
279. As stated in Article 2 (Equal Protection of the Law), Article 12 is to be applied in a
non-discriminatory fashion. It prohibits racial and gender discrimination vis-a`-vis the rights of
migrants to own property alone as well as in association with others, in accordance with the CERD
(Art. 5(d)(v)) and the CEDAW (Art. 15(2) and 16(1)(h)), respectively. CERD, supra note 80, art.
5(d)(v); CEDAW, supra note 209, arts. 15(2) & 16(1)(h). In particular, Article 12 incorporates the
detailed discrimination prohibitions elaborated in Articles 15 and 16 of the CEDAW. CEDAW, supra
note 209, arts. 15 & 16. These include the obligation of State Parties to “give women equal rights to
conclude contracts and to administer property and to treat them equally in all stages of procedure in
courts and tribunals,” CEDAW, Art. 15(2), as well as to ensure “the same rights for both spouses in
respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of
property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration,” CEDAW, Art. 16(1)(h)).
280. In particular, Article 73 of Protocol I “extends the full protection of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to refugees and stateless persons ‘in all circumstances and without any adverse
distinction.’” Weissbrodt, supra note 28, at 234.
281. In contexts of military occupation, moreover, the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits “any
destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or col-
lectively to private persons . . . except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by
military operations. ” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. In such contexts, “extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly” is considered a “grave breach” of the Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
282. If located within a belligerent state’s territory, “the civil capacity of internees in the territory
of a belligerent will often be limited by war legislation, especially with regard to property.” Migrant
internees, as with other civilian internees “will be justifiably limited in their ability to manage their
property.” Weissbrodt, supra note 28, at 227. However, occupying powers cannot, with justification,
limit the property rights of migrants and their families who are located within occupied territory to
the same extent, “since their property cannot properly be considered ‘enemy property.’” Id. The
Fourth Geneva Convention also stipulates in particular detail the property rights available to
internees, including their right to retain articles of personal use, the necessity for States to establish
procedures for taking internee possessions, as well as the creation of procedures for returning
possessions upon the release or repatriation of internees. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 97, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. In addition, the
Fourth Geneva Convention requires Detaining Powers to “afford internees all facilities to enable
them to manage their property, provided this is not incompatible with the conditions of internment
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ARTICLE 15
INTEGRATION
(1) Because prolonged irregular status often leads to abuse of migrants,
States should take appropriate measures to ensure that such situations do not
persist. When providing opportunities for regularization, States may require
that the migrant must show a substantial connection to the host country.
(2) States shall take appropriate steps to support migrants in learning the
majority, national, or official language(s) of the State.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 15: States should respond to the issues associated
with the integration of migrants in conformity with their duties to prohibit
discrimination and respect migrants’ economic, social, cultural, civil, and
political rights.283 Failure to integrate migrants can create vastly different
circumstances for migrants and nationals and thus become discriminatory.
(2) Problems Addressed: The dangers posed by irregular status extend
beyond the area of employment, and affect migrants’ rights to housing,
education, social security, health, and social services.284 Furthermore, when
migrants’ irregular status is used coercively, migrants avoid interaction with
law enforcement officials and other channels of legal protection.285 For these
reasons, the IMBR takes the position that regularization promotes the human
rights of migrants.
(3) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 1: This paragraph requires States
with large populations of migrants in irregular status to acknowledge all
migrants and take appropriate action.286 In accordance with the sovereign
right of States, such action could include effective and fair removal, on an
individual basis and in accordance with other provisions of this document.
However, Paragraph 1 implicitly acknowledges that migration creates mutu-
ally beneficial relationships and thus urges States to take steps to legally
recognize the residency of all migrants. In providing such opportunities,
States might consider the duration of residence; economic, social and family
ties; community and linguistic integration; legal status; the best interest of the
and the law which is applicable.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 114, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
283. See Walter Ka¨lin, Human Rights and the Integration of Migrants, in MIGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 271, 273–274 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., 2003).
284. RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI, STUDY ON OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE ACCESS OF IRREGULAR MI-
GRANTS TO MINIMUM SOCIAL RIGHTS 73 (2005).
285. See Living in the Shadows: A Primer on the Human Rights of Migrants, supra note 207,
at 9–10.
286. Cf. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 69(1) (“States Parties shall, when there are migrant workers
and members of their families within their territory in an irregular situation, take appropriate
measures to ensure that such a situation does not persist.”).
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child; and humanitarian grounds.287 Such factors are non-exhaustive.
(4) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 2: This document recognizes that
integration is a two-way process, and that States and migrants benefit from
integration.288 Language acquisition is the most important mechanism for
facilitating the integration of migrants.289 In most circumstances, proficiency
in the majority language is crucial to meaningful employment opportunities,
an understanding of one’s legal rights, participation in civil society, and
socioeconomic mobility.
ARTICLE 16
CITIZENSHIP
(1) States shall provide for, and encourage, the naturalization of migrants,
subject to limitations and conditions that are non-arbitrary and accord with
due process of law. Factors that strengthen a claim to naturalization include:
duration of residence; economic, social, and family ties; community and
linguistic integration; legal status; the best interest of the child; and humani-
tarian grounds.
(2) Migrants who have not yet gained citizenship in their host country
shall maintain the citizenship of their country of origin and should as far as
possible enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizens of their country of
origin.
(3) States shall recognize the right of expatriation and renunciation of
citizenship, subject only to conditions and limits based on compelling con-
siderations of public order or national security.
(4) States shall allow children having multiple nationalities acquired
automatically at birth to retain those nationalities.
(5) States shall allow nationals to possess another nationality acquired
automatically by marriage, and shall not remove the nationality of a citizen
who marries a non-citizen unless the citizen takes affirmative steps to
renounce his or her citizenship.
287. For instance, States might consider time within the country, criminal record, family ties,
children born in the host country, as well as many other factors that evidence a migrant’s positive
social contributions as a “resident-in-fact.” The International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families requires that “[w]henever States
Parties concerned consider the possibility of regularizing the situation of such persons in accordance
with applicable national legislation and bilateral or multilateral agreements, appropriate account shall
be taken of the circumstances of their entry, the duration of their stay in the States of employment and
other relevant considerations, in particular those relating to their family situation.” ICMW, supra note
6, art. 69(2). See also supra Article 5 for a list of factors to be considered for relief from removal.
288. EUR. PARL. ASS., State of Democracy in Europe: Measures to Improve the Democratic
Participation of Migrants, Res. No. 1618, art. 3 (2008) (“Integration is the key to the democratic
participation of migrants and such participation favours integration. It not only facilitates participa-
tion but also leads to a better understanding of shared values and respect for cultural differences, both
of which are essential for democratic development. It should always be regarded as a two-way
process involving migrants and the majority population.”).
289. EUR. PARL. ASS., European Social Charter (revised), art. 19(11), ETS No. 163 (1999).
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(6) States should not consider a migrant’s acquisition of foreign national-
ity to be an automatic or implied basis of renunciation of the nationality of
the State of origin.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 16: The foundation of this article is the fundamental
right of every person to a nationality. This right includes the ability to change
one’s nationality without arbitrary interference by a sovereign State.290 States
should also take reasonable measures to combat statelessness, and should not
behave so as to render persons stateless. This article affirms that unreason-
able barriers to the renunciation or acquisition of a nationality must not be
erected. Furthermore, in order for migrants to achieve full enjoyment of the
social, political, cultural, labor, and other rights within this Declaration, it is
necessary for States to encourage the naturalization of resident lawful
migrants. While this article recognizes the general right of sovereign States to
determine when to bestow citizenship and nationality rights,291 this article
also recognizes necessary limits292 on this power: in particular, States may
not unreasonably burden the free movement of persons by way of unduly
restrictive citizenship and nationality laws, nor may States exercise their
sovereign powers over citizenship and nationality in a manner which con-
flicts with international law norms. A non-exhaustive listing of such norms is
directly invoked by this article’s references to preserving gender equality,
marriage rights, and rights of the child. This article articulates the limits
applicable to States’ sovereign power to prescribe citizenship and nationality
laws. Pursuant to Article 1, of course, a migrant who gains citizenship in a
host State ceases to be a migrant.
(2) Problems addressed: Migrants frequently encounter problems of legal
290. See UDHR, supra note 31, art. 15.
291. International law has long recognized citizenship and nationality laws as falling within the
sovereign powers of States. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws arts. 1 & 2, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89; see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 39 (1983) (arguing that the survival of democratic communities depends upon their exercise
of some control over membership status within their own national communities).
292. There is ample modern and historical support for placing boundaries around the scope of a
sovereign State’s power to draft its citizenship and nationality laws. Article I of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Nationality recognized that such laws must be consistent with international conven-
tions, international custom, and general principles of international law. See Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra note 291, art. 1. The earlier advisory
opinion of the PCIJ in the Tunis-Morocco case already suggested that, in the future, international law
would develop so as to impose restrictions on sovereign States’ authority to draft and administer
nationality laws. See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November
8th, 1921, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7). The Nottebohm case directly
incorporates considerations of international law norms in evaluating the legitimacy of a sovereign’s
nationality laws. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). More recently, the
Strasbourg European Convention on Nationality of 1997 declared in Article III, Paragraph 2 that
States shall determine their own nationality laws only insofar as such laws are consistent with
international conventions, customary international law, and general international principles regarding
nationality. European Convention on Nationality art. 3.2, Nov. 6, 1997, ETS No. 166.
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status as a result of the citizenship and nationality laws of both receiving
States and States of origin. In particular, migrants may encounter resistance
in naturalizing where they reside, and they may risk the unwanted forfeiture
of nationality rights and privileges in a State of origin as they seek or obtain
nationality in another State. In each of the aforementioned circumstances,
this article favors inclusion under citizenship and nationality laws, and this
article strongly disfavors the involuntary renunciation of one’s citizenship
and nationality under a State’s internal laws. In the case of an otherwise
stateless person, this article very strongly encourages naturalization in the
State of residence as a minimum protection of the migrant’s nationality
rights.
(3) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 1: Naturalization of resident
lawful migrants should be encouraged, as naturalization furthers the exercise
of a migrant’s other rights and preserves the right to change one’s nationality.
The goal of naturalization is justified by the inherent inequality involved in
having two distinct classes of residents within one State. This dichotomy of
legal status is particularly problematic when a non-naturalized class is
subject to the laws of a State without enjoying participation and voting rights
within the sovereign State.293 Temporary workers present one example of
such a problem: Despite formal guarantees of legal protections, these
migrants frequently encounter difficulties in exercising their rights and in
enforcing fair working conditions, while the availability of such vulnerable,
often low-wage workers may also damage the bargaining power of local
unions and worsen wage and working conditions for naturalized workers in
the same industry.294 Thus, naturalization not only improves the condition of
the migrant, but it also preserves the legal rights of already naturalized
residents and citizens in the receiving State.
(4) The list of factors provided by this article for evaluating the strength of
a naturalization claim is non-exhaustive, and these factors must be applied
via a case-by-case analysis of naturalization claims. Under such an analysis,
the absence of any one factor or set of factors is not per se dispositive of a
claim to naturalization; conversely, a very strong claim under any one
factor—such as the right to family unification or the necessary interests of the
child—may suffice on its own to sustain a claim. A necessary result of this
balancing of factors favoring or disfavoring a claim to naturalization is that
the “illegal” status of one’s entry into a State shall not absolutely bar one’s
ultimate naturalization in that State.
(5) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 2: This paragraph presents a
necessary elaboration on the right to a nationality and the right to be free
293. See PHILLIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES OF EXCLUSION 10 (2000).
294. See generally Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503,
553–56 (2007) (regarding the domestic and foreign workers’ rights problems posed by the existence
of a temporary worker system instead of one resulting in the naturalization and subsequent
unionization of foreign workers).
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from arbitrary deprivation of one’s nationality elaborated in Article 15 of the
UDHR.295 Where a migrant has not obtained a new citizenship, that migrant
must not be rendered stateless or otherwise be deprived of any of the rights
and privileges of a citizen of the State of origin merely because he or she may
seek citizenship abroad and may no longer be present within the State of
origin.
(6) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 3: The right of expatriation is itself
a norm of international law.296 To properly protect this right, exceptions
allowing for States to refuse expatriation must be read narrowly: “[C]ompel-
ling considerations” should be limited to necessary, proportional responses to
existing exigencies, and not merely broad-based, preemptive policies di-
rected at hypothetical, future threats to State sovereignty. Thus, while an
imminent threat of grave national harm may sustain a refusal to allow one’s
citizens to expatriate, more abstract concerns regarding the long-term preser-
vation of State resources will not justify refusing expatriation.
(7) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 4: This paragraph builds upon and
clarifies the existing nationality rights of children. Just as every person is
entitled to a nationality, every child must have the right to acquire a
nationality.297 The right to acquire a nationality necessarily includes the right
to preserve that nationality.298 Paragraph 4 of this article establishes that a
full recognition of these rights should extend to the recognition of a child’s
plural nationalities acquired automatically at birth. Moreover, preserving
equality between men and women with respect to the nationality of their
children299 requires the acceptance of plural nationality under this paragraph.
Traditionally, there has been some resistance in international law to allow-
ance for dual or plural nationalities.300 However, there is a very strong
movement towards the recognition of plural nationalities, and those States
still formally rejecting the practice often acquiesce by failing to enforce
internal laws requiring exclusive nationality.301 The Drafting Committee
favors the trend towards recognition and adopts the position that, in general,
the interests of the children covered by this paragraph shall best be served by
permitting plural nationality.
295. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 31, art. 15.
296. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 31, art. 15 (noting that “no one shall be . . . denied the right to
change his nationality”).
297. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 24.3; CRC, supra note 80, art. 7.1.
298. See CRC, supra note 80, art. 8.1.
299. See CEDAW, supra note 209, art. 9.2.
300. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics: The Direction of U.S.
Citizenship, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS 137–41 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer
eds., 2000), reprinted in THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY, 90–91 (2008).
301. See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411,
1453–58 (1997). But see Karin Scherner-Kim, The Role of the Oath of Renunciation in Current U.S.
Nationality Policy—To Enforce, To Omit, or Maybe To Change?, 88 GEO. L.J. 329, 370 (2000)
(arguing that States should enforce the laws refusing to allow for recognition of plural nationalities).
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(8) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 5: This paragraph incorporates two
important concerns. First, the renunciation of nationality should be an
affirmative process; second, States should not construct “trap doors” through
which the enjoyment of one’s rights in areas such as marriage results in the
inadvertent loss of nationality. One has a clear right under international law
to marry the person of one’s choosing.302 Exercise of this right must not
nullify the enjoyment of other essential rights, such as those regarding
nationality. In particular, the act of marriage must not result in gender
discrimination by automatically changing the nationality of one spouse to
reflect that of the other—as has most often been the case with women having
their nationalities changed forcibly to reflect the nationality of their hus-
bands.303 Second, this paragraph further incorporates important consider-
ations of gender equality as, in the case of illegal forced marriages, this
paragraph prevents further harm from being visited upon forced migrants by
ensuring that nationality in the involuntary spouse’s State of origin is not
simultaneously and involuntarily surrendered upon marriage.
(9) Origins and Purpose of Paragraph 6: This paragraph is the clearest
articulation of this article’s policy favoring the recognition of plural citizen-
ship, as well as the policy strongly disfavoring any renunciation of citizen-
ship not involving an active declaration of intent from the individual citizen
directly affected by the loss of citizenship. While this paragraph continues to
respect States’ authority to draft domestic citizenship laws by not requiring
any particular recognition of a (plural) citizenship right, this paragraph does
suggest that transparency and effective notice should always characterize
citizenship laws. This paragraph also favors trends towards the recognition of
plural citizenship in at least some circumstances. It must be read to comple-
ment Paragraph 5, such that plural nationality acquired automatically by any
means—just as plural nationality acquired automatically and specifically
through marriage—should not constitute an automatic renunciation of one’s
original nationality.
ARTICLE 17
EDUCATION
On the basis of equality of treatment with nationals, children of migrants
have the right to education. States should make primary education free and
compulsory for children of migrants. States should encourage the develop-
ment of secondary education and make it accessible to migrants and their
children without discrimination.
302. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 31, art. 16.
303. See CEDAW, supra note 209, art. 9(1).
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Commentary:
(1) General Purpose of Article 17: This Article clarifies that the well-
established right to education applies to children of migrants regardless of
their legal status. The “equality of treatment” clause mandates that States
provide educational opportunities for migrant children on par with nationals.
The second clause of the Article gives practical effect to the “right to basic
education” by creating a universal free and compulsory primary education
regime. The third clause recognizes the value that host countries stand to gain
by developing secondary educational opportunities and encourages States to
grant migrants access to those opportunities.
(2) In spite of the numerous international conventions that recognize and
reiterate the right to education for all people, this right is not always
practically accessible to children of migrants. The inaccessibility of educa-
tion is particularly acute for the children of migrants whose parents are not
lawfully settled in the host state. This situation violates international conven-
tions that guarantee the right to education without discrimination of any kind.
This Article both highlights the non-discrimination principle and provides a
universal floor by guaranteeing primary education for all children.
(3) Origins of Clauses 1 and 2: The right to education and specifically the
right to free and compulsory primary education was formally recognized in
the UDHR,304 the ICESCR,305 the CEDAW306 and the CRC.307 This right to
education has also been incorporated into regional organizations such as the
Charter of the OAS and the ECHR.308 However, few national constitutions
recognize the right to education. Article 13 of the French Constitution says
304. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 26(1) (“Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.”).
305. ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 13 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to education . . . . Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to
all.”).
306. CEDAW, supra note 209, art. 10 (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field
of education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women . . . .”).
307. CRC, supra note 80, art. 28 (“States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and
with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in
particular . . . [m]ake primary education compulsory and available free to all.”).
308. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 49, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3 (“The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance with their constitutional
processes, to ensure the effective exercise of the right to education . . . . Elementary education,
compulsory for children of school age, shall also be offered to all others who can benefit from it.
When provided by the State it shall be without charge.”); 1st Protocol of ECHR, supra note 35, art. 2
(“[n]o person shall be denied the right to education”). Unlike the OAS Charter that creates an
affirmative obligation to provide compulsory elementary education, the EU protocol, the 1st Protocol
of European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, creates a “negative” right
under which States may not deprive people of educational opportunities. Publicists have interpreted
this negative construction of the right as deriving from the fact that the EU Member States did not
think about the necessity of establishing a public education system, since each of the Member States
already had a system in place. Further, since the adoption of Article 28 of the CRC all signatories have
an affirmative obligation to provide free primary education to all children. CRC, supra note 80,
art. 28.
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that the organization of free and secular public education at all levels is a duty
of the state.309 France, however, is an exception. In other countries such as
Canada, the United States, and Germany, the right to education is not a
recognized social right. Nevertheless, courts in these countries have effectu-
ated a right to education for all classes of people by incorporating other
principles such as equal rights. For example, although the United States
Constitution does not discuss the right to education, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Plyer v. Doe held that States could not use the legal status of
migrants as grounds for denying migrant children the educational resources
that are available to citizens.310 However, some States do not recognize the
right to education in their constitutional laws. In Israel, for example, the right
to education has not been included in the Basic Laws, which possess a
constitutional character, though there are laws that establish the State’s
obligation to provide free education for all and require that all children
complete twelve years of primary and secondary schooling.
(4) History and Purpose of Clauses 1 and 2: Education is a critical part of
a person’s autonomy because it “creates the ‘voice’ through which [other]
rights can be claimed and protected.”311 Thus, a lack of education limits a
person’s ability “to achieve valuable functionings [sic] as part of the
living.”312 This is especially true for migrant children who are disenfran-
chised because of their inability to speak the language or understand the
social and political framework of the host country. Access to education will
empower the children of migrants, and in turn their parents, by helping them
develop: an understanding of their rights; information about the government
mechanisms created to protect those rights; and the capacity and confidence
necessary to access and secure other rights. Thus, a right to education furthers
the legal, social, and political rights declared in the preceding Articles of this
document.
(5) The “compulsory primary education” requirement affirms the univer-
sal floor for education. States must, at a minimum, require that all children
complete primary education and provide funding for that education. The
“equality of treatment” phrase emphasizes that children of migrants must
have access to primary education that is the same or on par with the primary
education provided to the children of nationals. Thus, for example, children
of migrants also have the right to all services provided by a school to the
student community, such as counseling, meals, and extracurricular activities
including sports and arts programs. A migrant child’s legal status cannot be
309. 1946 Const. pmbl. (Fr.).
310. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
311. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Right to Education
Project Launches Website, http://www.unescobkk.org/education/efa/efanews/news-details/article/right-
to-education-project-launches-website (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
312. Right to Education Project, Defining the Right to Education, http://www.right-to-
education.org/node/233 (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
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used to disqualify him or her from access to services strictly limited to the
classroom because of the special vulnerability of children, their lack of
choice on how they came to live in the host State and their legal status. The
“equality of treatment” phrase also requires States to “integrate” migrants’
children in the entire primary school system. States cannot segregate children
of migrants into different schools because of their migrant or legal status.
(6) Origins of Clause 3—Legal Status: Article 13 of the ICESCR and
Article 28 of the CRC support the right to education for children regardless of
legal status.313 This article states that the rights enumerated in these Conven-
tions, including the right to primary education, will apply without discrimina-
tion of any kind. This parallels the language in the UDHR, which also
emphasizes that all people are entitled to the rights enumerated in the
Declaration.314 That the right to education is not affected by legal status has
also been recognized in national jurisprudence.315
(7) History and Purpose of Clause 3—Legal Status: The guarantee of the
right to education for all migrant children including those whose parents
entered the host country illegally means that States cannot deny primary
education to children of migrants based on legal status. Thus, resource-based
distinctions are not justified at the primary school level. A State can argue that
it cannot afford to provide secondary education to children of illegal migrants
without limiting education services for everyone. However, the same argu-
ment cannot be used as a reason to deny primary education to children of
illegal migrants.316 States should also refrain from using school lists as a way
to find and remove illegal migrants. Such a practice would force migrant
parents to not send their children to school because of the threat of
deportation—rendering the right to education a nullity for migrant children
lacking sufficient legal status.
(8) Educating migrant children regardless of their legal status also serves
a utilitarian purpose.317 Education increases the country’s prosperity and
development. Primary education is generally the way in which States teach
children about the foundational principles of the society and the rules of
acceptable behavior. States must recognize the probability that many mi-
grants, regardless of legal status (excluding, perhaps, temporary migrants),
have children who stay in the host country for long periods of time. As such,
313. ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 2; CRC, supra note 80, art. 2.
314. UDHR, supra note 31, pmbl.
315. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 (stating that a State may not “deny to undocumented school-age
children the free public education that it provides to children who are citizens of the United States or
legally admitted to aliens”).
316. Id. at 220 (distinguishing between illegal immigrants who are responsible for the criminal
act of living in the U.S without authorization, and their children, who are not responsible for their
situation and therefore cannot be punished or discriminated against).
317. Id. at 221 (noting that education was a matter of “supreme importance” and emphasizing the
significant social costs the nation will bear if some groups would be denied “the means to absorb the
values and skills upon which [the] social order rests.”).
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host States have an interest in educating the children of those migrants while
they remain within their territory in an effort to ensure their positive
contribution to society.318
(9) History and Purpose of Clause 3—Development of Educational Oppor-
tunities: The hope that States will develop secondary educational opportuni-
ties has been mentioned in numerous international legal sources, such as the
UDHR,319 ICESCR,320 and CRC.321 This article, in fact, adopts the wording
of Article 28 of the CRC. However, it does not specifically include the
elaborations mentioned in CRC, Article 28(c)–(e).322 This article does not
include these specific requirements because the “equality of treatment”
phrase is an overarching theme throughout the article that captures the
essence of the three sub-sections.
ARTICLE 18
FAMILY RIGHTS
(1) Migrant families are entitled to protection by society and the State,
irrespective of the citizenship status of any member of the family.
(2) For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “members of the family”
refers to persons married to migrants or having with them a relationship that,
according to applicable law, produces effects equivalent to marriage, as well
as their dependent children and other dependent persons who are recognized
as or are the substantial equivalent to members of the family according to
applicable legislation or applicable agreements between the States con-
cerned.
(3) States shall take all appropriate measures to facilitate the reunification
of migrant family members with nationals or citizens. Children with no
effective nationality have the right to return to their parents’ country of origin
and to stay indefinitely with their parents regardless of the children’s
citizenship.
(4) Dependent family members of migrants have a right to derivative
immigration status and timely admission to the country in which a migrant is
lawfully settled.
318. Id.
319. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 26(1) (“Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.”).
320. ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 13 (“Secondary education in its different forms, including
technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education.”).
321. CRC, supra note 80, art. 28 (States “[e]ncourage the development of different forms of
secondary education, including general and vocational education, make them available and accessible
to every child, and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering
financial assistance in case of need.”).
322. CRC, supra note 80, art. 28 (“(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of
capacity by every appropriate means; (d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance
available and accessible to all children; (e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools
and the reduction of drop-out rates.”).
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(5) States should consider extending derivative immigration status to
non-dependent family members of lawfully settled migrants.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 18: This article establishes the importance of the
family and addresses family rights that are especially pertinent to migrants.
The most crucial and basic social grouping is the family, fulfilling a host of
functions in human life. This grouping is generally characterized by biologi-
cal ties, but also by mutual dependencies. As migration can lead to extended
periods of family separation and uncertainty, State treatment of the family
can greatly impact the protection families receive in regard to other rights.
The right to family is important to migrants, because migrants are particu-
larly vulnerable when separated from their family. For migrants, the family’s
right to be together and the family’s right to reunify once separated are of
utmost importance.
(2) Origins of Paragraph 1: This paragraph defines the protection given
by society and the State to the family grouping. A State is responsible for
protecting families, with no discrimination between citizens and non-
citizens. This right to protection stems from several international conven-
tions: namely, the ICCPR,323 ICESCR,324 UDHR,325 CRC,326 Refugee
Convention,327 CEDAW,328 and ICMW.329 By mentioning society in this
paragraph, the social importance of the family is emphasized.
(3) History and Purpose of Paragraph 1: The conception of the family as
the fundamental group unit of society is derived from social needs, biological
connections, and dependency relationships between the individuals in the
family unit. The right to protection of the family implies the right of family
members to live together.330
(4) Origins of Paragraph 2: This paragraph broadens the definition of ‘mem-
bers of a family’ in the ICRMW.331 This broadening intends to protect alternate
family arrangements common to migrants, especially refugees, such as de facto
adoptions of nieces and nephews whose parents are casualties of war.
323. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 23(1).
324. ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 10(1).
325. UDHR, supra note 31, arts.12, 16(3).
326. CRC, supra note 80, arts. 8, 9, 10, 16.
327. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 12.
328. CEDAW, supra note 209, arts. 9, 16.
329. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 44.
330. U.N. Human Rights Comm., ICCPR General Comment No. 19: Protection of the Family, the
Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses (Art. 23) (July 27, 1990), Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 149 (2003).
331. ICMW, supra note 6, art. 4 (“For the purposes of the present Convention the term ‘members
of the family’ refers to persons married to migrant workers or having with them a relationship that,
according to applicable law, produces effects equivalent to marriage, as well as their dependent
children and other dependent persons who are recognized as members of the family by applicable
legislation or applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements between the States concerned.”).
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(5) History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: This paragraph defines what
constitutes “members of the family.” The broad definition encompasses the
diverse conceptions of the family and the desire to provide protection equal
to existing human rights instruments. ‘Members of the family’ is defined to
include different family structures according to the varying social, cultural,
and religious characteristics of different societies, as well as family structures
which are more common among migrants, especially refugees.
(6) Issues Raised by Paragraph 2: “Applicable law” should apply to the
country of origin as well as international and human rights law, understand-
ing that family ties are created in a particular cultural framework. Given the
desire to protect familial relationships not necessarily recognized by appli-
cable law, the phrase “equivalent” should be interpreted broadly in order to
support less common family ties (e.g. de facto adoption, LGBT mar-
riages).332
(7) Origins of Paragraph 3: The rights contained in this paragraph derive
from the CRC’s right of a child to be raised by his or her family.333 Children
should not be separated from their parents against their will, and in cases
where children are separated, family reunification should be pursued unless
contrary to the best interests of the child.334 Therefore, understanding that the
migration process can cause differences in citizenship and effective national-
ity between children and their parents, this paragraph ensures that citizenship
will not prevent children from joining their parents, should they return to the
State of origin.
(8) History and Purpose of Paragraph 3: A child should grow up in a
family environment335 and should be raised by his or her parents.336 Children
separated from their parents “face greater risks of, inter alia, sexual exploita-
tion and abuse, military recruitment, child labour (including labour for their
foster families) and detention.”337 This paragraph intends to prevent situa-
tions in which a migrant child is born in the parents’ host country and granted
legal status or citizenship in that country only to be forbidden from returning
with the parents to the parents’ country of origin. In accordance with the
CRC, separation should only occur when it is in the best interests of the child,
and should not occur on the basis of citizenship. This right should be read in
the context of the IMBR’s broad non-refoulement provision.
332. See, e.g., Yogyakarta Principles, http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org (last visited Feb. 19,
2010).
333. CRC, supra note 80, art. 9(1).
334. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside of Their Country of Origin, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/
2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005).
335. CRC, supra note 80, pmbl.
336. See Adalah, Expert Opinion on the Right to Family Life and Non-discrimination, Open
Society Justice Initiative (2008), available at www.adalah.org/.../ECD-0822-Adalah-5-Expert_
Opinion-RS-11.24.08(ENG)%5B1%5D.doc; CRC, supra note 80, art 9.
337. See General Comment No. 6 (2005), Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children
Outside of Their Country of Origin, supra note 334.
488 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:411
(9) Origins of Paragraph 4: This paragraph builds on the foundation of
the family as the fundamental group unit of society. More specifically, the
CRC provides that “applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or
leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with
by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.” Addition-
ally, the ICMW instructs States to “take measures that they deem appropriate
and that fall within their competence to facilitate the reunification of migrant
workers with their spouses or persons who have with the migrant worker a
relationship that, according to applicable law, produces effects equivalent to
marriage, as well as with their minor, dependent, unmarried children.”338
(10) History and Purpose of Paragraph 4: Building on Paragraphs 1 and
2, the right to protection of the family implies the ability of family members
to live together.339 The European Court of Human Rights has upheld the
right of a child (or of a substantial equivalent) to join her/his legal resident
parents under the European Convention on Human Rights’ right to family.340
This paragraph applies only to lawfully settled migrants, and to dependent
members, emphasizing the social importance of unity among dependent
members of the family. Furthermore, distinctions among family members
that follow the standard presented in Article 2, Paragraph 2 of this Document
(made pursuant to a legitimate aim, with an objective justification, and with
reasonable proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought
to be realized) are valid; this paragraph is not meant to supplant Article 2,
Paragraph 2 of this Document.
(11) Issues Raised by Paragraph 4: Given the broad definition of family
members, this paragraph limits the right to migrate only to dependent family
members of legally settled migrants.
(12) Origins of Paragraph 5: This paragraph is aspirational, but it follows
from several human rights instruments that establish the family as the
“fundamental group unit of society,”341 deserving of State protection.
(13) History and Purpose of Paragraph 5: This paragraph encourages
States to consider extending legal status to non-dependent family members of
lawfully settled migrants. The phrase ‘States should consider’ provides a
recommendation, rather than a binding statement, because of the aspirational
nature of the paragraph, as well as the potential for abuse of such rights.
Therefore, this paragraph leaves the right to reunify non-dependent family
members to the consideration of the State.
338. CRC, supra note 80, art. 10(1); ICMW, ¶ 3, supra note 6, art. 44(2).
339. See ICCPR General Comment No. 19: Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and
Equality of the Spouses, ¶ 5, supra note 330.
340. Sen v. The Netherlands, No. 31465/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
341. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 23(1); ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 10(1); UDHR, supra
note 31, arts. 12, 16(3); CRC, supra note 80, arts. 8, 9, 10, 16; ICMW, supra note 6, art. 44.
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ARTICLE 19
ADDITIONAL CLAUSES
(1) Nothing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as implying for any
State, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any
act that limits, intrudes on, or interferes with the internationally recognized
rights of others.
(2) Governmental, administrative, and other bodies charged with enforce-
ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms should invoke this Declara-
tion as appropriate in the recognition and development of principles, stan-
dards, and remedies.
Commentary:
(1) Purpose of Article 19: This article enumerates two fundamental
principles of documents protecting and promoting human rights: the prohibi-
tion of the abuse of rights principle and the self-executing or directly
applicable nature of the Declaration. The prohibition of abuse of rights clause
prevents any entity or person from using the rights enumerated in this
Declaration to deprive or hamper another person’s ability to access and enjoy
rights guaranteed elsewhere in the Declaration or in any other human rights
document. The second clause encourages States to implement and enforce
this Declaration and apply its development of international human rights
norms.
(2) Origins of Paragraph 1: A clause prohibiting the abuse of rights is
traditional in instruments that protect and promote human rights and free-
doms. Such a clause was included as Article 30 of the 1948 UDHR,342
Articles 5 of the ICCPR and ICESCR,343 and Article 17 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.344 Further,
national governments also adhere to this principle in domestic law: Article 4
of Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic,
Article 18 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 10
of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, Article 25 of the Constitution
of the Hellenic Republic (Greece), Article 34 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Cyprus, Article 12 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic
and Article 17 of the Human Rights Act (United Kingdom).345
(3) History and Purpose of Paragraph 1: The general purpose of the
342. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 30 (“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”).
343. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 5; ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 5.
344. ECHR, supra note 35, art. 17.
345. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 54, Dec. 7, 2000, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/libe/elsj/charter/art54/default_en.htm (last visited June 30,
2010).
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prohibition of abuse principle is to prevent groups or individuals from
deriving a right from the present document that allows them to “engage in
any activity or perform any act aimed at destroying any of the rights and
freedoms” recognized in this Declaration or any other human rights instru-
ment.346 However, “this provision which is negative in scope cannot be
construed a contrario as depriving a physical person of the fundamental
individual rights guaranteed” by any human rights document.347 A State
cannot rely on this provision to deny a right guaranteed in this Declaration
unless it shows that (1) the group or person targeted attempted to use the right
in question to deprive or hamper another person’s access to or exercise of a
human right and (2) allowing the person or group to exercise the denied right
would in fact facilitate the person or group’s ability to deny another of his or
her rights.348
(4) Origins, History and Purpose of Paragraph 2: This Declaration is
both a compilation of existing human rights norms and a statement of the
continuing evolving standards of human rights. In this respect, the second
clause encourages all institutions charged with the implementation and
protection of human rights to apply the rights, standards and remedies
enumerated in this document as appropriate. In applying any remedies
enumerated in this Declaration, if more favorable remedies exist on the
national level or in other human rights documents, those more favorable
remedies should be applied.
346. See Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1961).
347. Id.
348. See United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998).
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BILL OF RIGHTS
ADDENDUM
On April 9, 2010, the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, in partner-
ship with the Global Law Scholars program at Georgetown University Law
Center, the Minerva Center for Human Rights at Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, and the Migration Studies Unit at the London School of Econom-
ics, hosted an expert symposium to discuss the International Migrants Bill of
Rights (IMBR) and its accompanying commentaries. Divided into four
thematic panels, the symposium sought to elicit expert feedback and to spur
debate on the IMBR and crucial legal questions facing human rights
protections for migrants.
This addendum highlights specific revision suggestions and unresolved
questions, raised by panelists and participants during the symposium, which
warrant more research and debate as the IMBR and commentaries are further
refined during the 2010/2011 academic year.
Immediately following the symposium, the IMBR drafting team incorpo-
rated a small number of changes to the IMBR and its accompanying
commentaries, three of which are elaborated below, in response to sugges-
tions provided by invited participants. These modifications are reflected in
the published version of the IMBR and commentaries in this issue of the
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal.
First, during the Symposium’s first panel, “Defining and Protecting Mi-
grants in International Human Rights Law,” participants noted that the draft
definition1 provided in Article 1(1) inadvertently excluded stateless migrants.
Bill Frelick (Human Rights Watch), in particular, noted three problems with
the draft definition: “(1) It would exclude stateless people who are not
nationals or citizens of any state. (2) It does not convey the meaning at the
root of the word migrant—which involves migration/movement. (3) The
definition doesn’t, but should, exclude dual nationals.”2 The current defini-
tion3 and its accompanying commentary seek to respond to and eliminate
these definitional and protection gaps.
Second, Dr. Ryszard Cholewinski (International Organization for Migra-
tion), along with several participants, stressed that the commentary to Article
1(1) should more clearly delineate categories of migrants that are to be
1. The original definition of Article 1(1) read: “The term ‘migrant’ in this Declaration means a
person outside of a State of which he or she is a citizen or national.”
2. E-mail from Bill Frelick, Director, Refugee Policy Program, Human Rights Watch, to Ian
Kysel, Georgetown University Law Center (Apr. 20, 2010, 13:01 EST) (on file with author).
3. Article 1(1) currently reads: “The term ‘migrant’ in this Declaration means a person who has
left a State of which he or she is a citizen, national, or habitual resident.”
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included or excluded, including refugees, stateless persons, non-working
tourists, diplomats, and international organization employees, among others.
As a result, Paragraph 7 of the commentary to Article 1 has been expanded to
more robustly address specific categories of forced migrants, regardless of
whether they qualify for special status under international law.
Third, several participants asked whether the IMBR should also encom-
pass internally displaced persons (IDPs).4 Following a vigorous debate, the
IMBR Drafting Committee decided to exclude IDPs from the IMBR, be-
cause the rights delineated in the IMBR are specifically triggered once an
individual leaves the internationally-recognized borders of their country of
origin. As such, Paragraph 2 of the commentary to Article 1 states that the
definition in Article 1(1) “does not apply to individuals who migrate—
forcibly or voluntarily—within the borders of a State in which they are
citizens, nationals or habitual residents.”
Participants also highlighted areas in need of further debate and revision,
both with respect to the document as a whole as well as with regard to
specific Articles. Looking at the entire document, participants first stressed
that the IMBR must guard against promoting retrograde protections, includ-
ing with regard to family reunification and labor rights. Dr. Cholewinski
emphasized that subsequent revisions of the IMBR should pay particular
attention to the latest developments in human rights protections for specific
migrant categories, including migrant workers and refugees. Advances in
human rights protection for particular migrant groups should be reflected in
the IMBR and, as far as possible, these rights should be applied to migrants
across the board.
Second, participants proposed that the IMBR incorporate innovative
protections for specific vulnerable groups and categories. Professor Andrew
Schoenholtz (Deputy Director, Georgetown University Institute for the Study
of International Migration) argued that the IMBR should recognize protec-
tions relating to gender and physical and mental disability. Maria Teresa
Rojas (Open Society Institute) and other participants also flagged the
potential need to specifically recognize the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender (LGBT) migrants, migrant domestic workers, particularly
women, as well as migrants belonging to indigenous populations.
Finally, several participants argued that the IMBR should make a persua-
sive argument as to why States should look positively upon the IMBR and
view protecting migrant rights as beneficial and in their self-interest. To do
so, the final IMBR draft could include a persuasive note, perhaps as a
separate introductory section, introducing the IMBR and its value for and
benefit to States and migrants alike. This note, moreover, could incorporate
4. See U. N. Comm. on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General,
Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
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cutting-edge quantitative and qualitative social science research on the
economic, social, and legal effects, among others, of international migration.
With regard to specific articles, participants provided concrete suggestions
and raised important questions that will be addressed in the IMBR’s subse-
quent revision process. For Article 1 (Definition of Migrant), two areas in
particular need to be further explored: The migration life cycle and the status
of war criminals and other excludable persons.
Article 1(1) does not capture all elements and stages of the ‘migration life
cycle.’ Several symposium participants argued that the IMBR definition, or at
least the accompanying commentary, should reflect a more holistic view of
the migration life cycle, where relevant human rights protections are afforded
to migrants prior to their departure, or attempted departure, as well as upon
their return to their country of origin. Although the current definition in
Article 1(1) uses the descriptive term “left” (to leave) rather than “outside”
their home country to specify at what point an individual becomes a migrant,
it still does not address the need for human rights protections during these
two potentially vulnerable stages: pre-departure and post-return. Therefore,
subsequent IMBR consultations and revisions should address the following
two questions: (a) What protections do migrants need before leaving their
home country and (b) what protections do migrants need after returning to
their home country?
Should Article 1 of the IMBR exclude from its human rights protections
individuals who have committed war crimes or other internationally recog-
nized crimes, as delineated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court?5 For instance, should individuals who fall within the refugee defini-
tion of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and therefore
who fall within the definition of Article 1(1) of the IMBR, be excluded from
the protections of the IMBR if UNHCR or any State party deems the
individual ineligible for refugee status, and in extension refugee protection,
under the provisions of Article 1F6 of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees? Former child soldiers present particularly challenging
cases. Should former child soldier migrants who have committed internation-
ally recognized crimes be excluded from the protections of the IMBR?
With respect to Article 2 (Equal Protection of the Law), panelists and
participants debated whether the IMBR should incorporate a robust equality
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered
into force on July 1, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_
Statute_English.pdf.
6. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1F, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (“The
provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious
reasons for considering that: (a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of
such crimes; (b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to
his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.”).
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provision. Professor Gerald Neuman (J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of
International, Foreign, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School) cau-
tioned that the application of the equal protection clause did not seem
consistent across all provisions. Moreover, the IMBR does not adequately
clarify how each article applies to different categories of migrants, especially
given the diverse set of migrant categories covered by the Bill, including
tourists, long-standing immigrants and irregular migrants, among others.
Article 3 (Non-Refoulement) and its commentary should consider the
potential ramifications of safe third country agreements, as well as “chain
refoulement.” In this context, the IMBR must clearly define the obligations
of sending states, including the possibility of individual assessments of third
countries. Additionally, is the emphasis on threats to a migrant’s “life or
freedom” too narrow vis-a`-vis other international conventions relating to
State non-refoulement obligations? Participants suggested that the IMBR
drafting team look to Article 3 of the European Convention, which pushes
beyond the Convention against Torture to include inhuman treatment or
punishment.
Due process rights in Article 4 (Due Process), according to several
participants, should include an affirmative obligation to facilitate access to
representation, especially since lack of representation is a leading cause of
unnecessary and disproportionate migrant detention.
In the context of removal, numerous participants questioned whether
Article 5 (Removal) unduly restricts due process rights at the border,
particularly in relation to terminally ill or otherwise sick migrants. Moreover,
in Article 5(1), the term “national security” must be clearly defined so as to
preclude unnecessarily expansive interpretations, such as to justify deter-
rence measures. Mark Fleming (Rapporteurship on the Rights of Migrant
Workers and their Families, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights)
proposed that, in addition to collective removal, Article 5(2) may want to
consider class-based removal, such as for individuals convicted of certain
crimes or considered undesirable for other State-sponsored reasons.
Article 6 (Detention) also elicited lively debate. Numerous participants
stressed that Article 6 did not provide a sufficiently clear presumption of
non-detention. Detention should only be justified as a last resort and, when
necessary, detention conditions must be humane. Additionally, several partici-
pants stressed that all legal proceedings and determinations must be individu-
alized, so as to guard against potentially arbitrary removals, and to safeguard
migrant rights to appeal conditions, legality and length of detention. Partici-
pants also suggested that the accompanying commentary should include a
brief discussion of State accountability in cases where detention facilities are
run exclusively or for the most part by private entities not subject to State
guidelines and legal accountability mechanisms.
With regard to the rights of migrant children in Article 9, several partici-
pants questioned whether the IMBR extends these rights far enough by
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setting children’s rights on the basis of equality of citizens. Should the IMBR
go further and provide for increased protection? Moreover, is there a right to
a guardian or to counsel under international law for unaccompanied children?
At the concluding panel of the symposium, panelists and participants
discussed the overall purpose and structure of the IMBR and commentaries.
In particular, disagreement rested on whether the IMBR should solely reflect
hard law, whether it should incorporate and clearly delineate both hard and
soft law, or whether the document should be an exercise in norm promotion
and implementation through a soft law framework. Professor Schoenholtz, in
particular, identified the IMBR as an important step in articulating and
establishing a set of international norms relating to migrant rights. As the
concluding discussion made clear, such a project has the potential to establish
important benchmarks in the area of migrant rights. The international
community has only one chance to shape a migrants’ bill of rights, and it is
therefore imperative to fashion a comprehensive, holistic and far-reaching
document.
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HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS
BILL OF RIGHTS PROJECT
The International Migrants Bill of Rights (IMBR) project began in 2008 as
a part of Georgetown Law’s Global Law Scholars program. Since then,
students, academics, and practitioners with interest and expertise in migra-
tion issues and international human rights have discussed, commented on,
and contributed to the project. As part of the ongoing effort to improve and
publicize the IMBR, the Global Law Scholars collaborated with the George-
town Immigration Law Journal to hold the IMBR Symposium on April 9,
2010, at Georgetown University Law Center. This history lays out the path
this project has taken and the people who have worked along the way to make
it the success it has been.
I. THE GLS PROGRAM
The Global Law Scholars program began in 2000 as part of Georgetown
Law’s response to the increasing internationalization of the legal field. The
school’s administration recognized that even practice areas that were pre-
viously domestic now often have an international component, and that
lawyers with skills and training in these areas will be called on to address the
increasing transnational component of all areas of legal practice. Further-
more, the administration sought a way to increase networking and connec-
tions among students with mutual interests and similar experiences.
The program seeks to connect internationally-minded students with previ-
ous exposure to and interest in issues raised by work across borders and
cultures. Each year, approximately 15 students from the entering class of
roughly 600 are selected through a competitive application process. Selection
is based on international experience and career goals in international fields;
proficiency in a language other than English is also required.
Throughout their three years in the program, GLS students are involved
in international activities and coursework. Guest speakers active in various
areas of international law address the group during their first year. During
their second year, students participate in a special seminar focused on an
international law topic chosen by the group. Students must complete an
introductory course in public international law and a course focused on
international trade. They must also complete Georgetown’s upper-class
writing requirement in a class with an international theme. Upon starting in
the program, each new student is assigned an upper-class mentor. Upon
completion of the program, GLS students graduate with special honors.
The program is largely student-run, with leaders chosen by the group to
plan social events, facilitate the mentor program, and arrange all necessary
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logistics. In addition, a faculty sponsor is responsible for overseeing the
academic aspects of the program, including selecting guest speakers and
selecting readings once students have chosen a topic for their second year
seminar. The faculty sponsor for the beginning years of the program was
Professor Julie O’Sullivan. Though she remains involved with the program,
stewardship of the program passed to Professor David Stewart in 2009.
II. 2008–2009
The IMBR project began with the 2007 GLS entering class. At the end of
their first year, the students brainstormed interesting international law topics
around which to focus their 2L seminar. From among a diverse list of
suggestions, from law of the sea to international water sharing agreements,
the students chose to focus on the human rights of international migrants.
This project had the advantages of drawing on Georgetown’s rich resources
in the field of migration law and policy, and dealing with a relevant,
interesting topic that has not been fully addressed in international law. Also
particularly appealing to the students was the idea of centering their aca-
demic work on a concrete long-term project, namely a document framing the
international legal norms protecting migrants that could be promoted by
states and civil society alike.
The idea of a migrants bill of rights also found strong support with
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, then Dean of Georgetown Law, who had been
calling for such a document in his own scholarship for years. Dean Aleinikoff
took the lead on directing the seminar, assembling a reading list of important
books and articles on human rights, migrant and refugee issues, and relevant
international law. Drawing on his extensive contacts in the migration world,
Dean Aleinikoff also put together an impressive list of speakers to discuss
migration issues with the group during the fall semester, including President
of the Migration Policy Institute Demetrios Papademetriou, Executive Direc-
tor of the Institute for the Study of International Migration Susan Martin,
migration law expert Andrew Schoenholtz, and others. The students also
divided into groups to conduct research and give presentations on specific
topics in migrants’ rights.
As the Georgetown Law students spent the fall of 2008 exploring interna-
tional migration and human rights issues, similar studies were taking place at
schools around the world. As the project took shape, the GLS students
reached out to partner schools and found willing and able collaborators. At
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Avinoam Cohen led a seminar of third and
fourth year students in the undergraduate law program. The Hebrew Univer-
sity students were selected based on international coursework and interest,
and many of them had participated in international moot court competitions
and completed substantial coursework in the discipline. Basic courses in
public international law and human rights law were prerequisite for participa-
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tion, and the group conducted research and met with experts in the fields of
migration and human rights to prepare for collaboration on the bill. The
project was supported by the HU law faculty and the Minerva Center for
Human Rights, headed by Professor Yuval Shany. In Cairo, Michael Kagan
carried out a similar process of selecting students from his refugee law
program at the American University. He led a diverse group, including
students from Kenya and Canada, in researching issues related to refugees
and forced migrants.
In early 2009, the Georgetown Law and Hebrew University students
divided up into groups, each focusing on a specific theme. Topics included
economic, social, cultural, and family rights. Meanwhile, the American
University in Cairo students focused on refugee issues. Students researched
gaps in the current international instruments and considered provisions to
include in a draft bill. They also familiarized themselves with some of the
political issues that could prevent provisions from gaining acceptance among
states and in the international community.
New technologies greatly facilitated the students’ global collaboration.
Within each small group, students discussed their topics extensively via
email, chat programs, and Skype. Students also reported on their progress
and discussed planning and strategy issues at internet meetings attended by
the entire group from all three schools, which was made possible by
Georgetown’s state-of-the-art classrooms and video conference technology.
Time differences, of course, caused some problems, as did language differ-
ences and divergent collaborative styles, but students were able to work
through these issues and learn valuable lessons about international legal
work.
The culmination of a year of academic work on these topics was a four-day
meeting in London in April, 2009. The first two days were spent drafting
language for the bill, followed by two days of discussion and editing. The
meeting was hosted by Georgetown’s Center for Transnational Legal Studies.
The Georgetown Law delegation was led by second-year students Randy
Nahle and Lorinda Laryea and advised by David Stewart, a long-time veteran
of the State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser and visiting professor
at Georgetown Law. The group from Hebrew University was led by Avinoam
Cohen and included nine students. The six students from American Univer-
sity in Cairo were led by Michael Kagan. Dean Aleinikoff was able to join the
group for a debriefing session at the end of the weekend.
Upon arrival in London, the students met their international partners for the
first time. The groups that had been working together virtually worked together
during the first two days to draft the language of the articles pertaining to their
subject areas. The students often used the phrasing of existing human rights
instruments, such as the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR, but they also brought to the
table their own research over the last nine months and their perspectives on the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing documents.
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As a group, all of the students from all three schools went through article
by article and voted on the provisions drafted by their peers. Discussions surround-
ing the language of the bill were vigorous and thorough, and students honed their
negotiating skills by wrestling with a number of complex issues. Not only did the
three delegations see the issues through the differing lenses shaped by the
migration situations in their own countries, but they also came face to face
with the differences in customs and negotiating styles that make international
transactions interesting and challenging. The resulting document represented
a number of compromises, but left some particularly intractable questions
open for further consideration. Due to time constraints, the participants
agreed to think more about these open questions in the following weeks and
votes were held over email to arrive at a final first draft.
In addition to long days of active discussion, the participants also had
some time to get to know each other and the city. At the end of the weekend,
the students agreed to not only reconsider the open issues, and to continue
researching and refining the bill, but also to stay in touch as they went their
separate ways.
Directly following the meeting in London, Hebrew University students
prepared preliminary commentaries explaining the initial drafting choices.
These commentaries described the influence of existing international human
rights instruments, various policy considerations, and the actual drafting
process of the students in London. In May 2009, on the occasion of an
international conference on Human Rights and Justice in Immigration held
by the Minerva Center at Hebrew University, the Hebrew University group
discussed the bill with Dean Aleinikoff. The students highlighted a number of
particular provisions of the bill for reconsideration, setting the stage for the
continuation of the project.
III. 2009–2010
With the new academic year, the group of students working on the IMBR
project changed. Of the 11 Georgetown Law students who helped craft the
original draft of the bill in London, only Brian Cooper, Julia Follick, Lorinda
Laryea, and Randy Nahle remained substantially involved with the project in
the fall. These four were joined by seven Global Law Scholars from the class
of 2011. The student leadership also shifted, as previous leaders Laryea and
Nahle studied abroad for a semester and a year, respectively. Though they
remained involved with the project, Laryea and Nahle passed major organiz-
ing responsibility to second year student Ian Kysel. At Hebrew University,
Avinoam Cohen selected a new cohort of students to continue the collabora-
tion and work more closely on the commentaries.1 Please see the attached
1. For a complete list of all students who have participated in the project to date, see the IMBR
Contributors on page 397.
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appendix for a complete list of all students who have participated in the
project to date.
A. Revising the Bill and Writing the Commentaries
While the draft of the IMBR that came out of the London conference
represented the hard work and negotiating of many engaged students from
around the world, it was not a polished document ready to be shared and
promoted amongst the international community. Over the summer of 2009,
Dean Aleinikoff carefully read and edited the bill, making both minor
stylistic changes and suggestions for larger structural changes. David Stew-
art, Avinoam Cohen, and Michael Kagan also provided extensive comments
on the draft based on their experience and expertise with international human
rights instruments.
Throughout most of the fall semester, the students met bi-weekly to
discuss any changes suggested by Dean Aleinikoff, Professor Stewart, or
their own continuing research and reflection. To focus this reflection, the
students divided themselves into five groups covering various topical
areas: equality and due process; removal and asylum; civil and political
rights and citizenship; property and labor rights; and integration, educa-
tion, family, and social and cultural rights. A sixth group examined the
preamble and a definition of “migrant.” Each group was comprised of
three to five students, including at least one student from Georgetown
Law and at least one student from Hebrew University. These groups
conducted further research on their assigned topics, discussed the existing
language and potential changes using Skype or email, and started work on
the commentaries.
Drawing from the papers prepared by the Hebrew University students as
part of their 2008–2009 seminar and from discussions with their counterparts
in the topical groups, the Georgetown Law students wrote commentaries in
an agreed-upon format similar to that used in existing instruments. Of the
eleven Georgetown Law students involved with the project during the
2009–2010 academic year, each student was responsible for the commentar-
ies attached to one or two articles.
In writing the commentaries, students drew heavily upon the major
instruments of human rights law. In addition, the students used all other
forms of international law looked to by the International Court of Justice,
including treaties, customary international law, the writings of publicists, and
state practice. Though each did their own research, students used Google’s
online forum to share particularly interesting or helpful articles, treatises, and
websites. In addition, a shelf in Georgetown’s International Law Library was
devoted to the project so that the students could share books as well. When
they came across open questions or particularly tricky provisions, the
Georgetown Law students again engaged their counterparts at Hebrew
University in discussion and debate.
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A polished draft of the bill was finished in late October, and the commen-
taries were completed over the winter holidays. Georgetown second-year
Jordan Sagalowsky compiled the commentaries written by eleven different
authors into one uniformly formatted and footnoted document. The bill was
ready to be shared more widely.
B. Expert Consultations
This second draft of the bill was shared with local experts in human rights
and migration issues in late October, 2009. Many of these experts were
able to join the student authors for a productive three-hour session on
November 16, 2009 on the Georgetown Law campus. Those experts present
included Jeanne Butterfield (National Immigration Forum), Jesse Bernstein
and Anne Sovcik (Human Rights First), Bill Frelick (Human Rights Watch),
Juan Mendez (American University College of Law), and Debi Sanders
(Catholic Charities). Dean Aleinikoff and Professor Stewart also attended
and contributed to the discussions.
In addition to those in Washington, D.C., who were able to attend
physically, project participants abroad were able to attend the meeting
virtually. This was the group’s first experience with WebEx, an internet-based
platform that allows video and audio participation and document sharing
during meetings. As is often the case, this technology did not function
flawlessly, but those abroad were able to listen in to the discussions, if not
participate fully. This experience served as a valuable introduction to this
powerful technology, which has since been used for a number of international
meetings to discuss the IMBR project.
The November meeting touched on many different aspects of the bill, but
the session began with a discussion of the purpose and scope of the bill. The
experts pushed the students to take a firm stance with regard to whether the
document is aspirational or merely restating existing law, which led to
important reflection on the goals and future of the project. The majority of the
time was spent discussing the problems of defining migrants, equal protec-
tion, detention, and vulnerable migrants. The result was a major reworking of
the due process and equal protection provisions, and the addition of separate
articles focusing on detention, trafficking, and children. As the students
continued their revisions after the meeting, these helpful discussions were
referenced for various minor changes.
On December 4, 2009, Georgetown Law IMBR drafting team members
Randy Nahle, Lorinda Laryea and Maher Bitar were joined in London by
Justin Gest and Carolyn Armstrong of the Migration Studies Unit at the
London School of Economics (LSE) for the second in a series of expert
consultations. The outside experts present were: Professor Chris Brown (LSE
Department of International Relations), Professor Paul Kelley (LSE Depart-
ment of Government), Dr. Alexander Betts (Oxford University Department
of Politics and International Relations), Dr. Eiko Thielemann (Academic
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Chair, LSE Migration Studies Unit), Stephen Shashoua (Director, Three
Faiths Forum), Juan Cock (Migrants Rights Network, on behalf of the
Network’s Director Don Flynn) and Peter Sutherland (UN Special Represen-
tative for Migration), who attended the final session of the Consultation.
Students at Georgetown Law followed along via WebEx or listened later to a
recording of the session.
At the meeting’s outset, each expert provided a brief overview of his or her
general impressions of the IMBR and accompanying legal commentary, as
well as specific concerns and suggestions regarding specific articles. In
comparison to the consultation in Washington, D.C., in November, most
attending experts approached the IMBR draft from a political science and
public policy vantage point, rather than from a legal perspective. From the
beginning, the participants focused on how the IMBR could move forward
and on the political hurdles that may consequently arise, as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of a soft law approach as compared to a hard
law approach. The participants then turned to discussing whether the IMBR
should incorporate an international minimum standard or an equal protection/
treatment of nationals standard. The experts also analyzed various options for
enforcement of the bill and proposed additional articles in areas of the bill
with less coverage.
The London consultation represented another step in the increasingly close
working relationship between Georgetown Law and LSE’s Migration Studies
Unit (MSU). The MSU hosted the London meeting and also contributed to
the April symposium. MSU’s Justin Gest wrote an article on the bill for the
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal and attended the symposium. Both
schools agreed that future collaboration on the project would be fruitful and
mutually beneficial.
Finally, on December 23rd, a third round of consultation was held in
Jerusalem. The meeting was attended by all Hebrew University student-
authors from both years, as well as by immigration experts, including:
Dr. Yuval Livnat (Refugee Clinic, Tel Aviv University, formerly the Hotline
for Migrant Workers and Physicians for Human Rights); Adv. Anat Ben Dor
(Refugee Clinic, Tel Aviv University); Adv. Oded Feller (Association for
Civil Rights in Israel); Adv. Reut Michaeli (Aid Center for Immigrants—
Israel Reform Action Center); Adv. Nicole Maor (Israel Reform Action
Center), Dr. Einat Albin (Tel Aviv University); and Dr. Tomer Broude
(Hebrew University). Additionally, Dr. Adriana Kemp (Tel Aviv University)
and key government officials who were unable to attend the meeting
contributed comments. The group scrutinized and discussed the bill for over
three hours, considering broad theoretical questions, including personal
scope; the merits of hard law compared to soft law mechanisms; the
appropriate balance of social, civil, and political rights; and the specific,
nuanced wording from the perspective of practitioners.
Following the expert consultations, the students set out incorporating the
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helpful comments and criticisms proffered by experts in three corners of the
world into the bill. Georgetown Law and Hebrew University students
discussed substantive changes and open questions until a third draft was
finalized in March. This draft was circulated in advance of the symposium.
C. The April 9, 2010 Symposium
The April symposium was hosted by the Georgetown Immigration Law
Journal. Much of the planning and organization for the event was done by
Editor in Chief Jessica Schau and Special Events Editor and IMBR author
Julia Follick. Two issues of the journal were devoted to printing the bill, the
commentaries, and articles from leading academics dealing with the bill and
the issues raised by it.
The journal invited potential authors in December, 2009 and January,
2010. The response was overwhelmingly positive, as experts from around the
world expressed interest in the project and agreed to devote time to writing an
article reflecting on the bill and the rights of migrants. Having solidified an
illustrious list of authors, the organizers turned to inviting discussants to
bring added expertise to the discussions on April 9th. The journal reached out
to human rights organizations, the U.S. federal government, and the major
players in the field of migration law and policy to assure that a wide range of
perspectives were represented.
Funding for the symposium was provided largely through generous
assistance from Georgetown Law. The Minerva Center for Human Rights at
Hebrew University and the Migration Studies Unit at the London School of
Economics also made essential contributions, making the event a truly global
collaboration.
IV. NEXT STEPS
In the 2010–2011 academic year, new cohorts of students will be inte-
grated into the project at both Georgetown Law and Hebrew University. The
MSU is also looking for ways to select and support a group of students who
can eventually join the collaboration. Students will focus on revising the bill
in light of the wealth of comments generated by the April symposium and
ongoing meetings with experts. In addition, a new phase of the project will
begin, focusing on advocating the bill in the international human rights field.
This undertaking will include the study of successful and less-successful
efforts at creating international human rights norms, discussions with practi-
tioners, and potential participation in conferences such as the Global Forum
on Migration and Development. Students, primarily those at Hebrew Univer-
sity, will also begin compliance studies to determine the degree to which
sample countries have already implemented the provisions called for by the
IMBR.
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